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Summary 
This thesis discusses the interconnection of 'performance' and 
'improvisation', which, despite its long and established history, 
has always proved difficult to definitively pin down. My 
research question presupposes that 'performance' and 
'improvisation' are neither completely separate nor completely 
interchangeable. I focus on the area where 'performance' and 
'improvisation' overlap each other, which I call 'performance 
improvisation'. The thesis seeks to answer the question, 'What 
can I induce from materials focussed around the individual 
"creativities" that might serve to construct a prototypical 
explanation to define "performance improvisation"? '. The main 
chapters interpret and analyse materials written and published 
between the beginning of the twentieth century and the 1990s with 
particular emphasis on the so-called 'theatre' and 'dance' in 
North America. The concluding chapter proposes oppositional 
features of 'performance' and 'improvisation', stating that 
'performance improvisation' is a dynamic intertwinement of those 
features, which manifests in each individual 'creativity'. The 
conclusion offers a benchmark for future attempts at defining 
'performance improvisation'. 
A brief overview of the commedia dell'arte in Chapter 1 
introduces the main chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the correlation 
of human body and mind. In Chapter 3, I discuss body and mind 
negotiating with and deviating from traditions and conventions. 
The scope of the discussion expands in Chapter 4, which considers 
the idea, or the concept, of 'performance' and 'improvisation' as 
seen by individuals. Chapter 5 looks at the audience's point of 
view in relation to the performer's point of view. The argument 
in those chapters is tested in Chapter 6 against case study 
materials that discuss highly experimental practices. Chapter 7 
concludes the thesis, in which I answer the research question by 
way of proposing eight pairs of oppositional features that 
characterise 'performance' and 'improvisation'. 
1 
1 Introduction 
This thesis discusses the interconnection of 'performance' and 
'improvisation' which, despite its long and established history, 
has always proved difficult to definitively pin down. The title, 
Towards a Definition of Performance Improvisation, is meant to 
suggest that the conclusion of the research would offer a 
benchmark for any further attempts at defining 'performance 
improvisation'. 
Chapter 1 will introduce the line of argument to be employed 
across the rest of the chapters, setting out the basis on which 
the research parameters, the organisation of the thesis, and the 
research methodologies have been devised. The discussion in the 
following chapters will lead to the conclusion of the thesis, 
whose proposals are made for establishing what I metaphorically 
called the benchmark in the paragraph above. 
i 
1.1 Research Question 
1.1.1 Reviewing 'Performance' and 'Improvisation' as Discussed 
in Literature 
This sub-section of Section 1 considers some examples of the 
'common usage' of the terms 'performance' and 'improvisation'. 
For the purpose of helping to shape the research parameters 
in Section 2, examples in this sub-section are deliberately 
chosen from several different genres of literature: nineteenth- 
century novels, writings in linguistics, in aesthetics, in 
philosophy, in music, and in architecture. The examples cited 
here make their own point in the sense that, though never being 
irrelevant, they will not become the main subjects of the 
discussion in the following chapters of the thesis. I will 
2 
explain the reason in Section 2. 
In Jane Austen's Mansfield Park, the younger members of the 
family and their friends come up with an idea that they will 
1 
'[raise] a little theatre at Mansfield'. They think about 
turning one of the rooms in the house into a stage with some re- 
arrangement of the furniture and with the help of a few 
additional materials such as curtains (p. 149). In order to 
avoid a show of extravagance, one of the characters suggests that 
they should try 'performance' rather than 'theatre': 
We must [. . .] make the performance, not the theatre, our 
object. Many parts of our best plays are independent of scenery [original emphases] (p. 149) 
The other characters agree to the suggestion on the spot (p. 
149). The novel itself does not reflect on the word 
'performance' any further. The word simply passes for its 
'common usage' among the characters in the novel, to the 
narrator in the novel, and, at least in theory, to the model 
2 
reader of the novel. In this case, the 'common usage' of 
'performance' emphasises the notion of participating as an actor 
in a production while diminishing the weight of exterior aspects 
of a production, such as the embellishment of the stage. 
In the field of theoretical linguistics, the term 
'performance' has become part of the essential jargon as the 
terminological dichotomy of competence/performance suggested by 
Noam Chomsky has spread its influence throughout the field in the 
past thirty years. Irrespective of Chomsky's own theory having 
shifted and modified considerably in the same thirty years, one 
3 
widely-read textbook introduces a 'beginner' to Chomskyan 
grammar by giving a brief but succinct description of that 
dichotomy, which includes the following sentences: 
Competence (the fluent native speaker's knowledge of the 
language) is contrasted by Chomsky with performance (what people 
actually say or understand by what someone else says on a given 
occasion). [. . .] Very often, performance is an imperfect 
reflection of competence: for example, the fact that people make 
occasional slips of the tongue in everyday speech does not mean 
that they don't know their native language, or don't have fluency 
(i. e. competence) in it. Slips of the tongue and like phenomena 
are -- for Chomsky -- performance errors [. . . ]. 3 
The textbook expects the 'beginner' to grasp the meaning of 
'performance' in the sense that 'performance' relates to the 
actual moment of the speaker uttering a sentence of her native 
language. 'Performance' means that the speaker cannot take back 
what she is uttering, 'slips of the tongue' included. The 
influence of Chomskyan grammar on other fields of study, for 
example, philosophy, psychology, biology, computer science, and 
cognitive science, does not necessarily mean that the 
competence/performance dichotomy has been accepted in those 
4 
fields. 
In an attempt to categorise various types of 'human 
5 
activities' for aesthetical discussions, G4rard Genette explains 
the terms 'performance' and 'improvisation' in his book, The Work 
of Art. The version of the book to which I am referring is a 
6 
translation from the French. According to Genette's 
categorisation, 'works of performance' (p. 56) include: 
theater, cinema (as far as the profilmic, or what takes place on 
the set, is concerned), musical or poetic improvisation or 
performance (p. 56) 
LF 
Here the term 'performance' emphasises the temporal aspect of 
'human activities'. It is in being part of such 'performance' 
that the term 'improvisation' finds its place in Genette's 
categorisation. Genette suggests the two-fold nature of 
'improvisation', namely, 'spontan[eity]' (p. 57) and 'a mastery 
born of long training' (p. 57), which associates with a classic 
concept of 'improvisation' detected, for example, in the 
discussions on the commedia dell'arte. The last section of this 
chapter will take up the commedia dell'arte more in detail. The 
'common usage' of 'improvisation' from an aesthetical-taxonomical 
point of view declares that: 
In practice [. . .] an improvisation [. . .] is always based to some extent either on a preexisting theme [. . .] or on a certain number of formulas or clich4s; this rules out all possibility of 
freely inventing each moment [. . I. (p. 58) 
At the same time, Genette points out that no one within this 
range of performance is able to produce 'everything [. . .] on 
the spot' regardless of the question whether it is being 
improvised or not (p. 61). 
Philosopher Stanley Cavell focuses on 'improvisation' in 
music by first assessing it diachronically around its 
7 
'convention' and then bringing it to the point at which the 
'convention' becomes a question in itself. Provided that a 
listener of an earlier Beethoven piece is familiar with the solid 
convention which makes up the 'language' (p. 201) of Beethoven's 
music (p. 201), she may pretend, consciously or not, that the 
piece is 'being improvised' (p. 201). The very fact that Cavell 
writes on behalf of the composer, the player, and the listener 
5 
serves as a testimony to a shared understanding of that 
particular convention. In the later works of Beethoven, however, 
the term 'improvisation' starts to refer to the attempt at 
creating a new 'convention' as well as to the practice of an 
existing 'convention' (p. 201). In those later works, the 
question is no longer 'how to do what you want' (p. 201) but 'to 
know what would satisfy you' (p. 201). At that point, no one can 
be entirely certain of what she or he is composing/playing/listening 
for what kind of purpose and within what kind of framework. When 
that happens, according to Cavell, 'improvisation' virtually 
ceases to function as a term; the word is now deprived of a 
context that people could share. 
Jacques Derrida describes 'improvisation' in Points ., a 
collection of interviews published in print. I use a version 
8 
which is a translation from the French. While explaining 
'improvisation', Derrida points to the fact that the interview is 
9 
being recorded, that the 'tape does not wait' (p. 32), and that 
'there is no time to look for the right words' (p. 32). Such 
comments foreground the fact that he is actually experiencing 
what he is describing, namely, 'improvisation'. According to 
Derrida, 'improvisation' is what a person gives away even when 
she tries to hide it. When he says, 'Even if I decided not to 
answer your [the interviewer's] questions, [. . .]I will have 
responded in any case' (p. 35), Derrida is a living testimony to 
his own comment. To Derrida, an 'improvised exposition' (p. 49) 
never equals an 'absolutely spontaneous, instantaneous, almost 
simultaneous response' (p. 49). Since the respondent herself 
6 
always activates some kind of 'defense' (p. 49) mechanism against 
making such a total 'response', the 'defense' in turn reveals her 
so-called self (pp. 49-50). In that sense, the 'defense' is not 
defending her. Derrida's 'improvisation' particularly emphasises 
a person's desire to reveal or to conceal something, a desire 
that always 'reveals' everything anyway. 
Finally, I quote from a paragraph in an introductory book 
on architecture: 
[. . .] the architect's work is intended to live on into a distant future. He sets the stage for a long, slowmoving 
performance which must be adaptable enough to accommodate 
unforeseen improvisation. His building should preferably be 
ahead of its time when planned so that it will be in keeping with 
the times as long as it stands. [my emphases] 10 
The terms 'performance' and 'improvisation' function as 
theatrical metaphors in the context of the architect 'set[ting] 
the stage', or designing a building. Behind those metaphors 
lurks a concept that associates with a Shakespearean cliche, the 
'world' being a 'stage'. The 'common usage' of 'performance' and 
'improvisation' in this case presents an image of an 
architectural building as a designated space for its occupants to 
live comfortably, actively, and also in a flexible manner. 
1.1.2 Creativity 
The 'common usage' of 'performance' and 'improvisation' manifests 
11 
what the linguist George Lakoff calls a 'creative enterprise'. 
Lakoff contends that whereas we form a 'concept of what a table 
is, (p. 175) by exercising 'the commonsense psychology [. . .] of 
objectivist cognition' (p. 175), our attempts at categorising the 
terms in some 'other domains' (p. 175) inevitably involve 
7 
'providing an alternative to the classical theory of 
categorisation' (p. 175): 
I have a concept of what a table is. That concept corresponds to 
tables, not to tigers, clouds, or baseball gloves. [. . .] The 
word 'table' in English designates tables; it doesn't designate 
elephants or roses or automobiles. [. . .] But such commonsense 
assumptions about physical objects do not necessarily extend to 
other domains. When we use them to deal with political 
movements, inflation, friendships, marriage, our emotions, and 
our foreign policy, the results are not always happy ones. In 
such cases, the entities and properties are by no means so clear, 
nor is the distinction between what is essential and what is 
accidental. (p. 175) 
The examples we saw in the previous sub-section give us a 
preliminary understanding that both 'performance' and 
'improvisation' belong to the realm outside what Lakoff calls 
'physical objects', or specific and clear 'entities' and 
'properties'. While the writers agree that 'performance' and 
'improvisation' directly involve the human body and mind as well 
as her environs, they take 'alternative' and 'creative' views, to 
use Lakoff's words, in defining what they regard as 'performance' 
and 'improvisation'. The question is: What kind of creativity 
does it take for people to utter and write the terms 
'performance' and 'improvisation'? 
The whole point of such 'creativity' resides in the fact 
that it depends on each individual, not 'people' as a group, to 
'create' the 'theory' of categorisation. This brings about a 
problem of its own. One salient problem has to do with the 
possibility that an individual in her writing or utterance may 
decide not to use the terms 'performance' and 'improvisation' 
while some external factors formally or even 'casually' put her 
8 
writing or utterance in the context of the 'common usage' of 
'performance' or 'improvisation'. I will give two examples of 
such individual 'creativity'. 
Allan Kaprow in his article, 'Just Doing', presents his own 
12 
account of 'experimental art' by claiming that '[a]rt is 
[. . .] easily forgotten. And that is the condition for 
experimentation: the art is the forgetting of art' (p. 103). 
Kaprow in this particular article cites the word 'performance' 
for the purpose of making it part of a disclaimer: 
The playground for experimental art is ordinary life. But 
playing in this ordinary world does not mean including even more 
features of the commonplace than we are already used to finding 
in exhibitions, concerts, poems, dances, films, and performances. 
Such appropriations are the traditional strategies that turn life 
into art. [. . .] In contrast, the experimental artist who plays 
with the commonplace does so in the very midst of crossing the 
street or tying a shoelace. There is no excerpting and 
reenacting them on a stage, no documenting them for a show. (p. 
103) 
While the article clearly points out that what Kaprow calls 
'experimental art' is different from what he calls 'performance', 
the fact remains that the article itself appeared in TDR, a 
journal devoted to 'performance studies'. In that context, 
Kaprow's notion of 'experimental art' is subsumed, at least on 
the printed page of the journal, under the concept of 
'performance' which is being created heuristically by the 
editors, contributors, and the readers of the journal. 
The other example is a painter's brief comment on one of his 
still lifes. The painting by Togyu Okumura, entitled 'A Tureen 
from Spain', and the painter's very short comment on it, 'I had 
an opportunity to borrow this tureen from someone. In it I 
9 
arranged a branch of karin [a kind of pear]', appear on the same 
13 
page of the catalogue for one of his retrospectives. The 
14 
translation is from the Japanese. The verbal reference to 
arranging karin is crucial in the sense that it foregrounds the 
action of the painter who, for the specific purpose of working on 
the painting, deliberately put the branch in the way it shows in 
the painting. In that context, the painting can be 'read' in 
line with Genette's description of 'performance': the painter 
performs according to a convention of preparing objects for a 
still life, and the ultimate result is that particular painting. 
I will explain in Section 2 why the following chapters of the 
thesis will not discuss paintings per se. 
The question, 'What kind of creativity does it take for 
people to utter and write the terms "performance" and 
"improvisation"? ', can be rephrased: What are the individual 
creativities that form, directly or indirectly, the terms 
'performance' and 'improvisation'? Methods such as citing 
everything that contains the words 'performance' and 
'improvisation', which, at least in theory, could be done by using 
a computer, will inevitably fail; they would disregard the kind 
of discussion induced by materials that do not employ those 
words. On the other hand, we shall have absolutely no 
interpretational or analytical criteria if we choose to extend 
the range of discussion as far as all individual writings and 
utterances that only contextually suggest their association with 
the 'common usage' of 'performance' and 'improvisation'. 
Only a subtlety of interpretation and of analysis will assess 
each case of individual 'creativity'; at the same time, such 
10 
subtlety can never be practical for a single research unless the 
researcher sets a limit to the range of discussion. In the next 
sub-section, I will ask the research question, which is my 
criterion of setting a limit to my discussion of 'performance' 
and 'improvisation'. 
1.1.3 Raising the Research Question 
My research question presupposes that 'performance' and 
'improvisation' are not completely separate nor are they 
completely interchangeable. Nor is it the case that either 
'performance' or 'improvisation' in its entirety forms part of 
the other. 'Performance' and 'improvisation' partly invade each 
other, which is the area of 'performance and improvisation'. I 
will call that area 'performance improvisation'. By that term I 
therefore do not mean that the word 'performance' necessarily 
functions as an adjective for the word 'improvisation'. The 




The research question for the thesis is: 
What can I induce from materials focussed around the individual 
'creativities' that might serve to construct a prototypical 
explanation to define 'performance improvisation'? 
The next three sections will describe an-actual process of 
limiting the range of discussion: by specifying the research 
11 
parameters, the organisation of the thesis, and the research 
methodologies, I will be able to focus sharply on the research 
question and also to bring the quantity of research materials 
down to an appropriate size. 
I will also briefly review the principles and the practice of 
the commedia dell'arte in Section 5 of this chapter. The 
research materials in the Chapters 2 to 6 mention the commedia 
dell'arte as a typical example of the traditional forms of 
'performance' and 'improvisation'. The research itself will not 
centre around the commedia dell'arte. 
1.2 Research Parameters 
The main chapters of the thesis, Chapters 2 to 6, will be an 
interpretation and analysis of: 
Materials written and published during the span between the 
beginning of this century and the 1990s 
and also of: 
Materials on 'theatre' and 'dance' in North America as they are 
so labelled in the books and the journals in which they appear 
Transcribed interviews and lectures will be included in the 
materials for discussion. Materials will be in English, either 
15 
originally or in translation. 
Written materials have an advantage over non-written 
materials in explicitly revealing two particular aspects of human 
activity, which have a particular relevance to my research 
question. First, the medium of writing can focus on the process 
of human activity as well as the result of it. Second, the 
12 
medium of writing can explain the kind of human activity to which 
well-established rules do not apply. While it is possible to 
describe or demonstrate well-established rules by means of 
charts, scores, formulae, drawings, photographs, film, and non- 
verbal, physical demonstrations, it is only through the medium of 
writing that rules which are not well-established can be 
explained unambiguously. For example, Barbara Carlisle describes 
how she directed at her home a series of plays written by 
herself: 
[. . .] Wine took place in a corner of the living room, with the 
concerts [. . .] represented by two chairs-against one wall and the restaurants [. . .] by a small table and two chairs [. . . ]. We played the concert music. [. . .] The actors were always in character when in view and treated the spectators as fellow 
concertgoers or restaurant patrons. 16 
Other media like photographs and film would not be able to show 
clearly some of the important rules in the play such as the 
actors 'always' being 'in character when in view' even though 
they are not physically separated, as in a traditional theatre, 
from the spectators. A photograph or film would let the rules 
blend with other factors of human activity, making the division 
between them too ambiguous to detect. 
I will consider published written materials throughout the 
discussion in order to have consistency in the interpretative and 
analytical procedures. 'Raw' materials like handwritten or typed 
memos, letters, and various kinds of drafts all demand the kind 
of deciphering procedures which necessitates a specially 
developed technique. In that respect, 'raw' written materials 
resemble non-written materials such as charts, drawings, 
13 
paintings, photographs, and film, which would all require 
specialised interpretative techniques. 
The research parameters stated at the beginning of this 
section meet the following three provisions I have set for my 
source materials. 
The first provision is that the materials deal with human 
activity at the level of the argument that is neither overtly 
scientific nor overtly philosophical. The competence/performance 
dichotomy in linguistics, aesthetic problems, and a play on words 
as seen in Derrida, all taken up in the previous section, will be 
regarded as being too scientific and too philosophical to 
constitute the main subjects of the discussion in the following 
chapters. Instead, science and philosophy will appear in 'the 
chapters indirectly or briefly in order to support the discussion 
of the materials. 
Specificity is the second provision for the materials. In 
order to maintain a subtlety of interpretation and analysis, the 
materials have to be specific enough to encourage a non- 
metaphorical discussion. In that respect, the last example in 
the previous section, a paragraph from a book on architecture, 
is too rich in metaphor. ' 
The third provision requires that the materials come from a 
set period of time and that they directly or indirectly relate to 
a set region. An investigation into individual 'creativities', 
as stated in the research question, calls for a collection of 
materials which clearly distinguishes small differences between 
each 'creativity'. That above all demands a substantial number 
14 
of cases. It is also crucial that the materials reflect the 
authors' diverse professional positions and their diverse 
purposes in publishing. In a thesis of this length, the 
materials can be rich in quantity as well as in diversity only 
when we set a chronological-regional target for them. 
This century has seen practitioners, critics, academics, non- 
academics, professionals, and non-professionals all write 
publicly, and often for the same journals, about various types 
and processes of human activity, which in effect has proven that 
established rules would hardly apply to all who wish to discuss 
such matters in writing. It is particularly in the fields of so- 
called 'theatre' and so-called 'dance' in North America that 
diversity in writing, namely, everyone writing about her subject 
in her own way, has been most striking. In the following 
chapters, we will discuss anecdotes, teaching instructions, in- 
depth case studies, 'personal' comments, and more theorised 
comments, which all reflect people's diverse positions and 
viewpoints when they write and publish in the fields of so-called 
'theatre' and so-called 'dance' in North America in this century. 
In the following chapters, roughly half of all the materials 
will not mention North American theatre or dance. Those 
materials will discuss practices and theories developed in the 
course of this century in Europe, and in Britain, and refer 
directly or indirectly to what they regard as non-European forms 
of practices. Such theories and practices will be crucial, since 
they will characteristically relate to the very nature of North 
American theatre and dance. 
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1.3 The Organisation of the Thesis 
The main discussion in the following chapters, Chapters 2 to 6, 
will be organised around two overall principles: 
Starting with a close interpretation and analysis of the 
interaction of human body and mind, the discussion will gradually 
expand its scope to interpret and analyse a person or people 
making or participating in 'theatre' and 'dance', in 
'performance' and 'improvisation' 
Case study materials will appear side by side with the material 
on more general and theoretical issues 
Chapter 2 will be a close interpretation and analysis of 
material dealing with how a human being correlates her body with 
her mind. Chapter 3 will not only discuss the way human body and 
human mind negotiate with some existent forms, traditions, and 
texts but also the way in which human body and human mind search 
for rules of their own. In Chapter 4, the scope of the 
discussion will expand further to consider the idea, or the 
concept, of 'performance' and of 'improvisation' as seen by 
individuals. Chapter 5 will extend the scope of the discussion 
as far as the audience's point of view in relation to the 
performer's point of view. Chapter 6 will be the only chapter in 
which case study materials will dominate the material on more 
general and theoretical issues. The argument of the preceding 
chapters will be tested in Chapter 6 against material that 
discusses highly experimental 'performance' practices. By 
organising the chapters in such an order, the later chapters will 
be able to develop their argument on a firm understanding that 
individual 'creativities' always start with individual bodies and 
minds making specific decisions at specific 'moments'. 
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1.4 Methodologies for Interpreting and Analysing Source 
Materials 
The purpose of building interpretative and analytical methods is 
to construct the main chapters in such a way that they will 
smoothly introduce the final chapter, in which I will attempt to 
answer the research question, 'What can I induce from materials 
focussed around the individual "creativities" that might serve to 
construct a prototypical explanation to define "performance 
improvisation"? '. 
The methods for interpreting the source materials will 
function alongside the methods for analysing them. 
Interpretation of a single piece of written material will come 
before analysis of the same piece only in the sense that the 
material will be 'read' first according to what each chapter 
focuses on and then according to the question of 'looking for a 
prototype of performance improvisation'. The weight of 
interpretative or analytical methods will differ from source to 
source. The distinction between interpretation and analysis will 
be fairly clear in some examples, while in other examples it will 
be impossible to divide the two. It is only through such a 
flexible procedure of interpretation and analysis that the 
discussion can fully advance the important aspect of the research 
question, namely, paying close attention to differences between 
individual 'creativities'. 
In the following chapters, to interpret the materials means 
to read the materials in the framework of each chapter. This 
type of reading will rely on two criteria ih my discussion. 
The first criterion is that, for the two reasons stated 
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below, I will not divide the source material into primary and 
secondary sources. One of the reasons has to do with the fact 
that my discussion will only refer to the published material. 
Strictly speaking, every piece of material in the following 
chapters will belong to the category of secondary sources, since 
the published material is not 'performance' or 'improvisation' or 
'performance improvisation' itself. The other reason has to do 
with a possible hierarchical inference regarding 'primary' and 
'secondary' sources, that the former seemingly exert more 
authority than the latter. My discussion will investigate the 
nature of individual 'creativities', to which extent no 
particular material will enjoy any kind of 'centrality' or 
'directness' over the other materials. Chapter 6 will be an 
exception: it will treat case study materials as having some 
authority over other sources. 
The second criterion concerns the so-called factual 
reliability of the source material. In the following chapters, 
the material will not be read for 'fact'-finding purposes. The 
discussion will focus on the literary aspects of the material 
rather than emphasising factors such as when the book or the 
article in question was published and whether it deals with its 
contemporaries or deals with the past. I will read each piece of 
material by paying particular attention to the way the words and 
terms have been chosen, to the way in which sentences are 
structured, to the writing style, and to the scope of the given 
source. 
In my discussion, to analyse the materials means to read them 
in such a way that they suit the framework of the research 
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question. Terminology is crucial when we analyse the pieces of 
material one by one. Some pieces adopt the word 'performance' or 
the word 'improvisation' or both. There are pieces that do not 
use the word 'performance' or the word 'improvisation' and adopt 
other terms instead. When reading materials that use the words 
'performance' and 'improvisation', I will reassess the words not 
simply within the context of individual materials but also in a 
larger context, that is, North American 'theatre' and 'dance' as 
a whole. I will show that the words 'performance' and 
'improvisation' have allowed enormous potential in the theory and 
practice of North American 'theatre' and 'dance' in this century. 
When introducing materials that do not use the words 
'performance' and 'improvisation', I will reassess the contexts 
that render words or expressions other than 'performance' and 
'improvisation' against some contexts of the materials that adopt 
the words 'performance' and 'improvisation'. Analysis will be 
conducted at every possible level of the material, that is, at 
the word level or at the sentence level or at the paragraph level 
or at the level of an entire piece of material. 
In Chapter 7,1 will conclude the discussion. The argument 
in the Chapters 2 to 6 will be reassessed according to the 
research question raised in Section 1 of this chapter. I will 
answer the research question, state the significance of that 
answer, and make a proposal for future attempts at defining 
'performance improvisation'. 
1.5 Commedia dell'Arte 
As a starting point in our attempt to define performance 
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improvisation, we take a look at the principles and the practice 
of the commedia dell'arte. 
The 'traditional' features of the commedia dell'arte can be 
detected in its mode of existence: 'a theatre of professional 
actors, whereas the literary Italian theatre, the "commedia 
emdita", was performed by court functionaries or members of 
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academies. ' The fact that the actors were professionals does 
not matter in itself; what is crucial seems to be that those 
groups of professional actors inhabited a 'tradition'. 
'Tradition' is discussed by Richard Schechner as follows with 
regard to 'repertory': 
Without a repertory and a basic training technique we stumble 
into a 'once only' aesthetic without consciously choosing it. 
[. . .] Without vision and technique we get what we've got: bursts of energy, sometimes extremely creative, followed by 
sputtering inconsistency, unplanned discontinuity rationalized 
after the fact. 18 
Although the direction of Schechner's experimental theatre cannot 
be equated with that of the commedia dell'arte, we find that the 
'tradition' in Schechner's sense was in fact inherent in the 
commedia dell'arte: 
Like all theatrical companies of the period, commedia dell'arte 
troupes played a repertory, an accumulation of entertainments, 
and there is every reason to believe that once a particular piece 
had been worked out to the satisfaction of all through 
improvisation, it joined the repertory to be played as finished 
work. On the other hand, the possibility of improvisation always 
must have been present in the consciousness of the actors, who no 
doubt continued to improve on their work with a new joke, an 
unexpected punch line, or a reference to a local scandal picked 
up that morning in a tavern. 19 
'Repertory' formed a 'core' of the commedia dell'arte, to which 
was added improvisation for the 'improvement' of their theatre. 
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The commedia dell'arte being conspicuously dependent on each 
performer's improvising skill is delved deeper into by Jean-Louis 
Barrault, who seems to suggest that improvisation for the 
commedia dell'arte quite plainly meant an occasion to display a 
performer's 'being': 'it is only when one has perfect control of 
one's body, feelings and mind, and when one is fully prepared to 
meet any situation, that one can talk of improvisation. The 
Commedia dell'Arte can therefore only be practised by the 
"Complete Actor", and it is the kind of theatre which compels the 
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actor to get to the pitch of his "own true personality"'. Such 
requirements for the performers meant that the performers were 
expected to be sensitive and responsive both mentally and 
physically to as many different situations as possible inside 
and outside theatre. Developing flexibility through their own 
personalities could complement the nature of their acting. The 
constant 'improvement' trend, whether or not it was in fact 
regarded as an improvement by the audience, by itself signified 
the enactment of 'tradition'. 
A performer's accomplished skill principally belonged to 
'literate', or textually-based, ways of transmission in the 
commedia dell'arte; a 'text' did not have to be, for example, a 
publishable script, but it had to function as a 'language', by 
means of which performers and the audience communicated. The 
language in that sense existed as rules bound by the society as 
well as by the culture, and improvisation was used in the 
commedia dell'arte oft the basis of form, group-work, or trial- 
and-error: 
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What the actors of the commedia dell'arte achieved was the 
generation of plays without the use of a playwright. The plays 
were constructed, for the most part, from known elements, verbal 
and physical. Actors retained a store of amorous arias and 
dialogues, tirades and harangues, rodomontades, imbroglios, and 
puns, often recorded in 'zibaldoni', or actors' notebooks, while 
the zanni also hoarded lazzi, standard comic routines featuring 
beatings, chases, pratfalls, scatology, obscenity, and roguery of 
all sorts. [. . .] The actors brought to the creation of the 
piece characters whose behavior was known and predictable, 
characters 'accumulated' over the years both by those actors and 
by their predecessors and contemporaries. Circumstances, events, 
and relationships could differ from play to play, but the 
essential personalities of the characters provided a stable 
foundation. 21 
According to Domenico Pietropaolo, systematisation of 
improvisatory actions was established to such an extent in the 
commedia dell'arte that it is possible to analyse the commedia's 
improvisation as 'a process of composition -- aiming, that is, at 
the formation of composite units by the addition of discrete 
parts. And this means that improvisation is not an elementary 
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and self-contained notion but a relational concept. ' He then 
semiotically clarifies what exactly was going on among performers 
when they were improvising: 
In the simplest case possible in a dialogue situation, 
[improvisation] involves at least two variables, which it grafts 
onto one another in the formation of stimulus-and-response 
elementary units of communication: given the stimulus produced by 
one character, the process of improvisation must determine the 
textually appropriate response of his interlocutor, which is then 
regarded as another stimulus, itself awaiting a response to the 
evolving script. (p. 168) 
The performers in the commedia dell'arte abided by the rules so 
that people could understand the meaning of the performers' 
actions; at the same time, it was also the only means of 
realising improvisation. The choice, in other words, had already 
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been laid out for the performers based on their respective 
'potential range of competence' (p. 169). What remained to be 
done was for each performer to 'materialise' the choice by 
picking up a certain combination of variables. Making 'right' 
choices proved the performer's 'talent' and the resultant choices 
themselves revealed how 'competent' the performers were. 
Meanwhile, the nature of improvisation demanded that such choices 
would be made almost instantly, although pending a further 
refinement; the 'choice', then, looked more like instinctive, or 
reflexive, action and reaction. Performers' 'talent' in the 
commedia dell'arte at least partly included their ability to 
respond reflexively or instantaneously without a prior 
arrangement. 
The system of working within agreed-upon rules made it easier 
for performers of the commedia dell'arte to construct a 
production while 'correctly' anticipating a particular reaction 
from the audience. A moment of surprise, for example, could be 
enacted by a performer who seemingly deviated from the 
established rules; the performer could control how far that 
deviation would go, and the impact of which upon the audience the 
performer could foresee. Pietropaolo explains: 
A performer must, in fact, decide whether to surprise the 
audience by producing the least expected response or to give them 
exactly what they expect along with the pleasure that comes with 
the sense of having made an accurate prediction. [. . .] Between 
the two extremes of, on the one hand, predictability [. . .] and, 
on the other hand, unpredictability I. . .] there may already be 
a number of repertory options available to the actor, who can, in 
any case, give rise to a quasi-continuum of solutions by making 
small modifications to his standard responses in order to make 
them suitable for the occasion. (p. 172) 
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Improvisation for performers of the commedia dell'arte meant an 
intricate skein of conscious or subconscious decision making, the 
result of which would always be a manifestation of 'play[ing] the 
23 
moment' both for the performers and the audience. People 
clearly appreciated such 'moments'; there otherwise would have 
been no need for a deliberate inclusion of improvisatory actions 
in a production. 
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2 Performer's Body and Mind 
A performer makes mental and physical decisions in the 'moment' 
of performing as we have seen with performers of the commdia 
dell'arte. Here we will more closely delve into the mechanism of 
how exactly a performer not only in the commedia but in any kind 
of performance co-ordinates her own body and mind. Our question 
will especially centre around how a performer 'trains' her mind 
and body so that they will be ready for any possible 
improvisatory occasions. 
2.1 On Technique 
After Grotowski, we can see a performer as what she is: 'Theatre 
people themselves do not usually have an altogether clear 
conception of theatre. To the average actor the theatre is first 
and foremost himself, and not what he is able to achieve by means 
of his artistic technique. He -- his own private organism -- is 
1 
the theatre'. A performer always starts with being the 
performer 'herself'. She builds up the 'moment' of performance 
based on her body and mind. A performer cannot be less than 
'herself'. This does not necessarily mean that a performer's 
'moment' will always be a kind of 'extra' work added on to her 
natural self. Simply because a performer's self is so complex 
and potentially so rich in nature, even the plain posture of 
standing is a complicated work of the performer's being 
'herself',. that is, her body and mind functioning in an intricate 
way. 
When a performer makes decisions in performance practice, she 
is going through what Viola Spolin calls a 'creative experience', 
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which is 'penetration into the environment, total organic 
involvement with it. This means involvement on all levels: 
2 
intellectual, physical, and intuitive'. Body and mind seem to 
be inseparable rather than exclusive to each other. Susan 
Melrose puts the relationship between body and mind this way: 
'the body often knows what the conscious mind does not know it 
knows -- or will not say. One of the most useful aspects of 
Halliday's [M. A. K. Halliday] functional grammar for our present 
purposes comes from his focus on process: the cryptogrammar 
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"construct[s] reality by not describing" but by enacting it'. 
Melrose seems to imply here that 'body' is capable of practising 
what 'mind' does not necessarily clarify. Spolin explains the 
'intuitive' level: 'When response to experience takes place at 
this intuitive level, when a person functions beyond a 
constricted intellectual plane, he is truly open for learning' 
(p. 4). Especially when the time given to a performer is limited 
as in most of the fragmentary circumstances of improvisation, 
decision-making by the performer often strongly relies on this 
'intuitive' level of experience. In such cases, a performer's 
technique in making decisions gets both demanding and vital, 
hence 'truly open for learning'. 
A performer practises within space and time. Her decision- 
making first of all has to follow the laws of nature, which limit 
the range of what she can do with her own body and mind. On the 
other hand, decision-making in performance is helped by such 
unavoidable natural boundaries. If a performer willingly goes 
along with the current natural limitations facing her, her body 
and mind will operate in a relaxed and smooth manner of 
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performance rather than in a rigid one. It is not unlike when we 
lie down when feeling too tired to be on our feet. A performer 
can also try to resist the laws of nature, although, whatever she 
does, she will never actually succeed in making an absolute 
resistance. A performer, for example, may jump high in the air 
and try to stay in the air as long as she can, which requires a 
certain amount of technique on the part of her body. Trying to 
resist the laws of nature is one way of using the limitations 
inherent in them, in which sense a certain resistance may be used 
to a performer's advantage. Rudolf Laban points out that '[t]he 
use of movement for a definite purpose, either as a means for 
external work or for the mirroring of certain states and 
attitudes of mind, derives from a power of a hitherto unexplained 
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nature'. This 'power' of an 'unexplained nature' is explained 
by Laban as follows: 
One cannot say that this power is unknown, because we are able to 
observe it in various degrees of perfection wherever life exists. 
What we can clearly see is that this power enables us to 
choose between a resisting, constricting, withholding, fighting 
attitude, or one of yielding, enduring, accepting, indulging in 
" relation to the 'motion factors' of Weight, Space and Time to 
which, being natural accidents, inanimate objects are subjected. 
This freedom of choice is not always consciously or voluntarily 
exercised; it is often applied automatically without any 
contribution of conscious willing. But we can observe 
consciously the function of choosing movements appropriate to 
situations; that means that we can become conscious of our 
choice, and can investigate why we so choose. We can observe 
whether people yield to the accidental forces of weight, space, 
and time, as well as to the natural flow of movement in the sense 
of having a bodily feeling of them, or whether they fight against 
one or more of these factors by actively resisting them. (pp. 23- 
24) 
A performer makes 'right' choices according to her adequate 
appreciation of what that 'power' is capable of. The question, 
27 
then, will be what kind of 'choices' a performer makes in each 
performance, which, according to Laban, we will be able to 
describe 'consciously' even if the performance itself might take 
place 'unconsciously'. Contact improvisation, described by 
Cynthia J. Novack, can be regarded as a clear-cut example of the 
kind of performance in which the laws of nature are fully 
explored both 'acceptably' and 'resistantly': 
In some sense, the body and movement itself in contact 
improvisation are also synonymous with nature, because they 
follow natural laws of gravity, momentum, inertia, and so on. 
Feeling (physically) those forces, becoming swept away by 
disorientation [. . . ], represents a reality to the contact 
improviser which takes precedence over movement based on ideas 
(mind) separate from body, or feeling (emotion) separate from 
body. It is interesting that oneness with nature connects with 
both calm peacefulness and wild disorientation. The shared 
attribute of both is that mind and culture are receding and 
allowing body and nature to take over, bringing out the best 
aspects of the person. 5 
Novack reiterates the existence of a strong relationship between 
'body and movement' and 'nature' in contact improvisation, 
seemingly suggesting that 'mind' hardly has anything to do with a 
contact improviser's movement. 'Choices' made by a contact 
improviser at each moment of her performance will be 'intuitive' 
ones coming out of her trained and highly responsive body. The 
body frees itself from heavy thinking in mind and instead 
responds to whatever stimuli it senses before the owner of the 
body actually assesses and analyses the whole procedure of that 
response. A contact improviser may then not be acutely 
'conscious', in Laban's sense, about their bodily movement while 
performing. This in turn highlights a dancer's experience, her 
skill and dexterity, and so on, since the range of choices is an 
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instant reflex of what she has learned so far. Meanwhile, a 
contact improviser has to maintain the kind of 'mind' which keeps 
the on-going performance within the framework, or the general 
'rule', of contact improvisation. Since bodily movement directly 
builds up contact improvisation, the 'mind' which frames the 
performance is not separate from body. Decision-making in 
contact improvisation thus concerns however vague an idea on the 
part of the performer about the general 'form' of contact 
improvisation, which the performer heuristically presents by 
using her body intuitively. 
While making decisions, a performer is 'showing' her 
decisions. As Jon Whitmore sums up: 
One of the unique features of a theater performance, which 
distinguishes it from literature and most other art forms, is 
that a performance does not describe action or events or objects 
but, for the most part, shows them. This is the most primitive 
form of signification, which is known in philosophy as ostension. 
6 
Sartre on a character in drama points out: 
Someone is placed in a certain situation with his conflicts and, 
as a result, he is an individual. But individuals are actually 
far more complex than that, and their situation comes from their 
past, their contradictions, and the various pressures upon them. 
This can be rendered by the novel, but it is too complicated to 
be rendered in two and a half hours in the theater. On the other 
hand, what you present is immediate individuation; but if you do, 
it is through immediate action, that is to say drama. A person 
is defined as such or such because he is in such or such a 
conflict, a narrowly defined conflict. 7 
Body and mind always show in everyday life whether intentionally 
or unintentionally. Once in a performance framework, how a 
performer connects body and mind becomes important. Julian Beck 
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expects a performer to 'make clear' what she does: 
Specialized experience like sponges of blue ink tossed onto green 
glass can fascinate eyes, but the person who throws the sponge is 
always more interesting than the splashing ink. The problem is 
to make a theatre in which this is clear. Your hand lifting the 
familiar coffee cup to your lip is more than a vermillion streak 
in the evening sky: whatever you do beats any scenery, this must 
be made clear. If we are to survive the landscape. 8 
The 'showing' of decision-making is vital for the performer 
herself before it bears meanings to anyone else. Showing her 
decision-making gives a performer a basis to move on to the next 
moment, when she will have to make another decision. 
A 'clear' decision often has to be made instantly in the 
course of performance, improvisation being a blatant example. 
Erving Goffman's account seems relevant here: 
[. . .] if the individual's activity is to become significant 
to 
others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express 
during the interaction what he wishes to convey. In fact, the 
performer may be required not only to express his claimed 
capacities during the interaction but also to do so during a 
split second in the interaction. 9 
Body and mind work 'during a split second' so that the result of 
the work will 'show' without further delay, or more precisely, 
almost the instant of that split second. As Goffman further 
points out, such split-second decision-making in the framework of 
performance requires a certain technique and thus is not for 
everyone to execute easily: 
[. . .] individuals often 
find themselves with the dilemma of 
expression versus action. Those who have the time and talent to 
perform a task well may not, because of this, have the time or 
talent to make it apparent that they are performing well. (p. 33) 
Whether or not such a decision-making will be accomplished 
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depends first on how quickly her mind and body stimulate and 
respond; secondly, it will depend on how effectively or 
efficiently the resultant 'show'-ing will be sensed by the others 
involved in the performance and also by the performer herself. 
The technique for an instant, clear decision-making in 
performance differs from how an instant, clear decision-making 
arises in everyday life. The technique required of a performer 
in a performance will by itself be an object of appreciation or 
criticism, in other words, by itself be a performance. In 
everyday life, a decision-making will usually be appreciated for 
its worth only after the result of that decision is known and 
evaluated. The equal importance of decision-making itself and 
the result of the decision-making in performance means that a 
performer's body and mind have to be specifically fit for 
performance circumstances, hence the need for technique 
specifically required in performance. Melrose implies this kind 
of technique by confirming that an 'intuitive' action in 
performance actually indicates a performer's technique: 
In theatre terms, 'intuitive acting' is a matter of 
internalisation of additional somatic and psychological codes, to 
those internalised through the habitus. What the 'intuitive' 
professional actor indicates through her use of the term is 
probably that her operative modes are not formulated 
discursively; but this does not mean for an instant that they are 
not formulated and schooled somatically and theatrically. 
Theatrical coding overcodes the 'everyday-spontaneous' practice, 
in such a way that it overlays the latter, pointing up some of 
its elements, exposing others, lending them then to critical 
in(tro)spection. 10 
A performer's technique in performance will always be built upon 
what that performer goes through in her everyday life, that is, 
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what she is. The technique for performing 'overcodes' a 
performer's 'being'. Irene Mawer explains technique when she 
discusses what she calls 'artistic value': 
Just as we speak with slightly different intention and with 
artistic significance when we employ speech to move an audience 
to laughter or to tears, so must gesture, whether occupational or 
speech, be more emphatic, and more perfectly produced, with 
definite artistic value, than the movements which we use in the 
ordinary performance of everyday occupations. The real 
appreciation of this point will help the student to be clear upon 
the difficult question of complete naturalism versus the 
'exaggeration' which appears at first sight to the performer. 11 
'Artistic' value judgement aside, it seems that Mawer stresses 
the importance of a performer's technique 'overcoding' everyday- 
life actions. In this sense, what we call a performer's 
technique can be considered as an appropriate functioning of the 
relationship between a performer's response and her stimulus, 
which she innately possesses but which will be 'improved' and 
'revealed' to fit any performance circumstances through training, 
experience, or so-called talent. Furthermore, a warning against 
'exaggeration' implies that a performer's job is to use her body 
and mind appropriately, that is, clearly but not overly so. 
Although a clear, instant decision-making does not 
necessarily have to be intelligence-oriented, such a decision 
will always have within its grasp a 'form', or a general idea, of 
the performance. A performer will subconsciously be 'aware' of 
the body's functioning properly/improperly in the current 
situation. If the well-refined stimulus-response relationship 
between body and mind will indeed be called technique, then 
'awareness' towards 'form' can also be regarded as part of the 
stimulus-response mechanism, in particular what body and mind can 
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remember and can foresee. The term 'body-thinking' is described 
by Melrose as 'a proto-somantic sketching of image and actional 
potential in space and time and in relation to others and to 
12 
objects, in minimal but telling detail'. As is flatly noted 
here, somatics actually can function for a performer 
'automatically' (p. 90), which suggests that this 'body-thinking' 
may literally mean a performer's body working of its own volition 
without the mind's conscious instructions. Then, being aware of 
the form of the performance would not imply more than the fact 
that neither a performer's body nor her mind is unconscious. The 
difference between such 'awareness' and what Shomit Mitter 
describes in terms of 'conscious awareness' with regard to 
Stanislavski can be seen in Mitter's definition of the term: 
Most actors know that the more one thinks about what one is 
doing, the more difficult it is to do it. The more clearly one 
works out what one is going to do on stage, the worse the result. 
A conscious awareness of the image that is required leads actors 
to imitate it rather than to live through the experience of which 
that image should naturally be the creative result. This 
suggests that the failure of the Stanislavsky system is likely to 
have been a result of its cerebral approach to characterization. 
By recommending that actors consciously imbibe the psychology of 
their characters, Stanislavsky may be seen as having created a 
situation in which his actors were more likely to experience 
self-consciousness than transformation into character. 13 
'Conscious awareness' here refers to the kind of awareness 
heavily inclined to a performer's mind; a performer's 'self' will 
be focussed on, questioned by the performer herself, and forcibly 
driven to try to be some other 'self', all by means of 'cerebral' 
thinking. Mitter seems to imply that a performer's mind ceases 
to connect to her body once her use of mind goes beyond the field 
of 'experience'. The 'experience' here can be rephrased as the 
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presence of a stimulus-response relationship between body and 
mind. In the kind of awareness which a performer retains when 
making quick, clear decisions, the performer's mind never slows 
down the decision-making or interferes with the clarity of the 
'showing' aspect of that decision. 
To live a 'moment', a performer will have to acquire the kind 
of technique which will allow her body and mind to be flexible 
enough to use the laws of nature to her advantage, to be 
decisive and overt enough to 'show' her decisions clearly, to 
be sensitive enough to function quickly, and to be well-balanced 
enough to keep her decisions manoeuvring within whatever 
framework the performer sets for the performance. We find that 
Moshe Feldenkrais in effect describes such a technique when he 
defines what he calls 'self-image': 
Our self-image consists of four components that are involved in 
every action: movement, sensation, feeling, and thought. The 
contribution of each of the components to any particular action 
varies, just as the persons carrying out the action vary, but 
each component will be present to some extent in any action. 
In order to think, for instance, a person must be awake, and 
know that he is awake and not dreaming; that is, he must sense 
and discern his physical position relative to the field of 
gravity. It follows that movement, sensing, and feeling are also 
involved in thinking. 
In order to feel angry or happy, a man must be in a certain 
posture, and in some kind of relationship to another being or 
object. That is, he must also move, sense, and think. 
In order to sense -- see, hear, or touch -- a person must be 
interested, startled, or aware of some happening that involves 
him. That is, he must move, feel, and think. 
In order to move, he must use at least one of his senses, 
consciously or unconsciously, which involves feeling and 
thinking. 
When one of these elements of action becomes so minute as 
almost to disappear, existence itself may be endangered. It is 
difficult to survive for even brief periods without any movement 
at all. There is no life where a being is deprived of all 
senses. Without feeling, there is no drive to live; it is the 
feeling of suffocation that forces us to breathe. Without at 
34 
least some minimum of reflex thought, even a beetle cannot live 
too long. 14 
We may have to bear in mind that especially where somatics 
is concerned, there can hardly be any 'writerly or scriptural 
15 
economy of mainstream learning and transmission', as Melrose 
asserts. Instead, somatics 'begins its function as "something 
like" the anecdote' (p. 83). Technique cannot be mapped out for 
every performer's consultation in the first place. 
Regarding technique in general, V. Kristi explains 
Stanislavski's conversion, as it were, from an overt 
'psychological approach' to an approach which to a great extent 
leans on the physical movement of a performer: 
Realizing that dramatic action combined the physical and 
psychological, Stanislavski at last came to the conclusion that 
it was easier to achieve this -- unity through a physical than 
through a psychological approach. He confessed the error of his 
previous attempts to establish the creative state divorced from 
concrete action, and became increasingly convinced that the 
analysis and the synthesis, the experience and the incarnation, 
are a single simultaneous process, and not different stages of it 
as he had thought before. 16 
Granted that 'dramatic action' in the Stanislavskian sense does 
not in its entirety conform to the kind of improvisatory 
technique which we are here discussing, we can still see that 
Stanislavski 'at last' crosses the line which divides a 
psychological approach, his prominent 'technique' till now, from 
a physical approach. Kristi seems to assert that the conversion 
is done not for a total and complete change of attitude towards 
performance on Stanislavski's part but rather'as a result of his 
search for an 'easier', and presumably more effective, way to 
produce 'dramatic action' out of a performer. A physical 
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approach for Stanislavski does not end in exploring a performer's 
body; a performer uses this approach primarily as a pragmatic 
means of reaching a 'creative state'. 
Shomit Mitter states that Stanislavski first 'worked from the 
17 
body to the mind', but then, 'following the institution of his 
System' (p. 23), he started to work 'from the mind to the body' 
(p. 23), and finally in his later career he 'attempted to work 
the somatic imperative back into his method of approaching roles' 
(p. 23). Mitter cites several 'advantages' in employing this 
'somatic imperative': 
First, it rids the actors of self-consciousness both through the 
manifest inability of the masked body physically to express 
embarrassment and because the mask transforms the self before the 
self has the opportunity to take account of that change. (p. 19) 
Here again, how to avoid being entangled with self-consciousness 
seems to be a crucial problem for a performer trying to achieve 
her 'dramatic action'. By working from body to mind, a performer 
will be able to overcome that problem without even realising it. 
The use of the term 'mask' with its practicability will be dealt 
with later in the chapter. Another advantage of working 
somatically lies in its tangibility to the performer herself: 
Second, whereas feelings can be elusive, the body is palpable and 
therefore easier to handle. Actors tend to be more comfortable 
dealing with physical actions than with feelings because actions 
inspire faith through their actuality. (p. 19) 
What is suggested here concerns one way of developing a 
performer's confidence-building, which she can more quickly and 
securely establish if she concentrates on her 'physical actions'. 
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A performer's mind, or 'feelings', comes after those actions. A 
concrete coordination of a performer's body seems to be able to 
trigger her mind so that she will 'feel' confident about her 
performance. It follows that a performer prefers concreteness, 
and thus a sense of instant recognition of her achievement, to a 
'feeling' which does not clearly express itself in the form of a 
tangible action. When a performer's action is concrete enough, 
it will not only be 'easier to handle' for her but will also stay 
within her for a long time to come and will be performed whenever 
required, which is yet another advantage of a 'somatic 
imperative': 
Third, material cues, being solid, also have the advantage of 
being more easily fixed to recur. Where the actor's task is not 
merely to generate feelings but to retain them over extended 
runs, the body has the advantage of being far more easily 
disciplined to respond than feelings which are capricious (. . .] (p. 20) 
'Recurrence' here implies that a performer having acquired this 
particular technique can be regarded as having a firm control 
over her body-work. Mitter sums up 'from the body to the mind' 
by stating: 
Lastly, somatic work has the advantage that it can create 
experience where there is none to be remembered. (p. 20) 
A performer's body comes first, leading her mind to 'feel' 
according to the body coordination. If Stanislavski's ultimate 
objective is indeed directed towards mind and not towards body, 
then the body-to-mind technique may at first look as if it 
deviates from that objective. In fact, the technique helps a 
performer smoothly 'feel' her mind under any circumstances. 
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B. E. Zakhava in Stanislavski Today reiterates the importance 
of both physical and psychological aspects of the performer: 
In life, every muscle participates in every emotion. [. . .] But 
is it possible to remember and reproduce mechanically on stage 
the whole infinitely complex system of large and small movements 
of all the organs which express one emotion or another? Of 
course not. In order to recreate truthfully this system of 
movements, it is necessary to grasp the reaction in its whole 
psychophysical unity, i. e. in the unity of the internal and 
external, the psychological and the physical, the subjective and 
the objective. It is necessary to recreate this organically, not 
mechanically. 18 
Zakhava indicates that a performer cannot possibly make a 
'mechanical' move. A human performer's physical coordination 
proves to be too 'complex' for the performer to keep it under 
control without any mental guidances or mentally-comprehensible 
reasons behind that particular coordination. The idea of 'from 
the body to the mind' does not apply here literally. Rather than 
regarding a performer's body as a concrete and easy-to-control 
entity, Zakhava focusses on the body as a living creature which 
is ever-changing, plastic in its actions, and more intense in its 
details than the owner of the body thinks it is. Zakhava seems 
to imply that in order to 'recreate' a fine body-work, a 
performer has no choice but to work mentally since otherwise she 
would not physically be able to gather together all the relevant 
parts of the body and make them function properly so that they 
would fit her purpose. What we note here is that, in the 
Stanislavskian line of approaching performance, psychology 
remains the problem to be overcome by a performer. 'Recreating' 
movements in fact means recreating a certain psychological state. 
Meyerhold appears to put a more straightforward and 
38 
practical trust in a performer's body than Stanislavski does. 
Katherine Bliss Eaton explains Meyerhold's stand on 'gestures', 
from which we can see that Meyerhold sees no reason why the body 
and the mind should not work in a simple stimulus-response 
relationship so that one will be made to clarify the other on the 
spot: 
Meyerhold believed artful movement can help the actor go beyond 
the text of a play [. . . ]. Meyerhold pointed out that people 
often betray their thoughts through movements and gestures, and 
the thoughts thus revealed may have little or no relationship to 
what is being said; only through gesture do people disclose their 
real relationship to each other. Thus two dialogues may be 
taking place simultaneously: a spoken dialogue and an inner one, 
the two being quite different, and it is up to the director to 
show the inner dialogue. 19 
For Meyerhold, a performer's body clearly materialises her mind 
no matter what that same performer does 'simultaneously'. For 
example, even if she tries to suppress her mind or disguises her 
mind or denies her mind, the body will often tell the 'truth' to 
the outside world. The 'inner dialogue' refers to a performer's, 
or a character's, mind being presented out in the open through 
her body, in which sense it never remains 'inner'. In 
Meyerhold's line of thinking, we seem to be allowed to 
concentrate on our body-work per se, since there cannot possibly 
be any other way of 'show'-ing the mind. The technique will then 
concern how a performer effectively controls the 'openness'. 
This kind of technique, based on Meyerhold's confidence in 
the body's substantial ability in performance, starts with a 
detailed observation of a performer's body. If a performer's 
body is the primary 'inner' expression which actually shows on 
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the outside, we have to know more about all the subtle 
coordination of a human body. A performer should be able to 
choose an exact coordination for her purpose and to make that 
coodination in an instant. Meyerhold resorts to a mathematical 
analysis of the body so that a performer will be able to explore 
the coordination of her body systematically. The coordination 
seen this way will also be easier for a performer to study and 
learn. 
The body operates in such a way that, rather than existing 
side by side with the mind, it leads on the mind, reflects the 
mind, and is reflected by the mind. Despite their apparent 
differences in style and technique, Meyerhold's biomechanics and 
contact improvisation both focus on the performer's body first as 
a human body following the laws of nature but then as an overt 
medium of 'expression', which does not so much follow as initiate 
the 'content'. In Meyerhold on Theatre, the 'stylized theatre' 
is described: 
Since the stylized theatre wants to abolish scenery which is 
located on the same plane as the actor and the stage properties, 
to remove the footlights, to subordinate acting to the rhythm of 
dialogue and plastic movement; since it anticipates the revival 
of the dance and seeks to induce the active participation of the 
spectator in the performance, then clearly the stylized theatre 
is leading to a revival of the Greek classical theatre. 20 
Here, the 'stylized' state of the theatre means that a 
performance has to go back to the point where the primary 
importance rests on the 'plastic movement' of a performer's body. 
The 'stylized theatre' possesses the bodily function which in 
different circumstances would prompt such performances as contact 
improvisation. 
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Other people who refer to the technique in general include 
Copeau when he asserts that '[e]motive expression grows out of 
correct expression. Not only does technique not exclude 
sensitivity: it authenticates and liberates it. It upholds and 
21 
protects it'. Copeau here seems to take the 'correct' 
technique as an initiator of the enrichment of a performance. 
Like Meyerhold and contact improvisers, Copeau seems to think 
that a performer's body leads the performer's mind. 
Spolin uses the term 'physicalization': 
The theater is not a clinic, nor should it 
statistics. The artist must draw upon and 
is physical but that transcends objects -- 
observation and information, more than the 
itself, more than the eye can see. We mus- 
for this expression. 'Physicalization' is 
be a place to gather 
express a world that 
more than accurate 
physical object 
t all find the tools 
such a tool. 22 
A performer's expression has to be physical while more-than- 
physical at the same time. We will come back to specific and 
practical exercises suggested by Spolin later. 
In the same vein, Schechner points out that 'expression' and 
'feeling' cannot be separated in the first place: 
Human commmunications systems are not reducible to the static 
model of 'sender-channel-receiver', or any variation thereof, 
that assumes the existence of discrete parts. The human system 
is an extremely subtle multiplex-feedback one in which the 
originator of feelings is also affected by the emotion s/he is 
expressing -- even if these emotions are a lie. [. . .] the 
doing of the action of a feeling is enough to arouse the feeling 
both in the doer and in the receiver. Olivier need not work 
himself into a jealous rage against the actress playing 
Desdemona; but neither is he devoid of feelings; performing the 
actions of Othello will arouse Olivier. The so-called surface of 
emotion -- the look on the face, the tone of the skin, the tilt 
of the body, the placement and moves of muscles -- is also the 
emotion's 'depth'. Cortical and subcortical routines are linked 
and can be mutually trained. 23 
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A 'surface' expression instigates emotion and emotion stimulates 
a particular movement of the body, in which sense 'surface' is 
'depth'. A performer then has a good cause to 'train' her 
'surface' expression, being assured that by carrying out the 
bodily training she is also probing into emotional aspects of her 
performance. 
Strasberg asserts that a technical training would avail to 
nothing without a performer's 'awareness', which he explains: 
An actor often does not do everything he wants to do. His 
intentions are deflected by habits of which he is unaware most of 
the time. Instead, he often does things of which he is equally 
unaware because they are mannerisms -- automatic and unconscious 
behavior. The essential part of the actor's training tries to 
make him aware of what he is doing at the time a thing is 
happening. Otherwise, he doesn't know whether to do it more or 
to do it less. That is the difference between acting and life. 
[. . .] This split awareness [. . .] must develop as a kind of 
sixth sense, and yet it cannot do so at the expense of the 
actor's belief, his concentration, his involvement in what he is 
doing. 24 
Strasberg reiterates that a performer working on acquiring a 
technique of, 'body to mind' will not be successful in her 
training unless she knows the impossibility of severing body from 
mind. A performer somehow monitors what her body is doing 
through her experience of 'moment', which Strasberg calls 
'awareness'. 
For all their general preference of a body-to-mind approach 
over an approach which starts with heavy thinking, none of the 
practicing performers/directors cited above actually declares 
that a performer's body is, or should be, the starting point of 
how we look at performance. The reason does not seem to rest 
upon the fact that because the function of body and mind is so 
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intricate a subject in terms of physiology and kinesics, we 
cannot be certain if everything does start with our body. As we 
have seen so far, the performers/directors in their own way lay 
stress on the importance of freeing the body from the mind; and 
yet they all seem to cling to the 'feeling' in one way or 
another. Even though a performer has got to start somewhere and 
a performer's body may be the better place to start than her 
mind, these performers/directors do not abandon the belief that a 
performer's body really is moved by what seems to be part of her 
mind. 'Awareness' nevertheless should not override a body 
movement since too much 'awareness' would interrupt a performer 
in the process of going 'from body to mind'. 
A technique in approaching performance through a performer's 
body will enable a performer to be sensitive especially in her 
'sixth sense'. In an actual performance, the only time a 
performer can perform 'seemingly spontaneous[ly]', as Clive 
Barker describes, is when she lives by this 'sixth sense' 
successfully: 
Study and rehearsal are the preparation for a process, a 
springboard to action, and not the means of arriving at a fixed 
result. This is why, in order to produce recreations of 
seemingly spontaneous patterns of human behaviour, the actor must 
sink the study and rehearsal material into the automatic reflex 
activities of the back brain, and to work with an instinctive 
trust and confidence in the processes of the subconscious 
body/think. It is the only way he can meet other people in 
performance. 25 
A vital part of the technique required of a performer is enacted 
when she pushes what she has achieved through studying and 
rehearsing to the back of her mind. Her 'awareness' eventually 
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has to land on the 'subconscious' level, with the completion of 
which a performer for the first time has the chance of actually 
making her performance seem spontaneous. 
Is there a 'pattern' in the relationship between body and 
mind, a pattern which can be presented so that a performer will 
be able to learn it? Patricia Relph in discussing Wilhelm Reich 
and Alexander Lowen, who 'are responsible for clarifying and 
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naming five character types', says of 'pattern': 
Of course humans develop in infinite variety; nevertheless, there 
is much evidence that individuals do exhibit patterns of 
behavior. There is also considerable evidence that the 
relationships between emotional experience and somatic behavior 
are very regular. (p. 30) 
Robert L. Benedetti describes 'emotion' and 'information' by 
dividing 'communication' into a 'nonverbal' kind and a verbal 
kind, each of which being given a separate role by Benedetti: 
Generally speaking, nonverbal communication provides our sense of 
the intensity and depth of a feeling, while it is best left to 
words to communicate specific, factual information. [. . .] it 
is context (plot, the identification of character traits, and the 
audience's understanding of the situation in which the characters 
interact) that provides a conceptual understanding of the exact 
quality of emotion, but it is generally the nonverbal aspects of 
the performance (muscle tone, the breathing, inflections, and so 
on) that provide the power and believability of the emotion. 
Without this nonverbal foundation, our response to a play would 
be superficial or only intellectual. 
The potentiality of nonverbal communication is great, but 
don't expect it to do a job for which it is not suited. 27 
Such a function-specific view of a performer's body and mind 
may be taken as the recognition of body and mind working in a 
systematic way: a performer would be able to know, whether 
intellectually or physically, what her body can do and cannot do. 
This could help a performer experience her body-mind relations 
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more efficiently. 
Knowing a 'pattern' or seeing some 'regularity' in the body- 
mind relationship in performance has a tendency to establishing a 
'clich4', which Clive Barker describes as what is 'already 
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total, and consciously defined before one employs it'. Instead 
of 'clichh', a performer can work on 'prototypes' as Barker 
explains: 
A prototype is a structure based upon limited knowledge from 
which further investigation and development can take place. 
During our everyday lives, our brain is subconsciously processing 
information from a wide variety of sources. On the basis of this 
information we act. It is obvious, therefore, that the more 
information fed in during the acting process, by study of the 
text and the situation and from the experiences of rehearsal and 
performance, the richer will be the prototype produced. (pp. 117- 
18) 
A performer ensnared by 'cliche' will be at a loss in a 
circumstance which is quite different from the one she has known 
from experience. The 'total' nature of 'clichb would not be 
easily applied to each and every performance occasion. For a 
performer, no technique can be regarded as being useful unless it 
actually helps her live the 'moment' of every single performance, 
however unstable that 'moment' might be. 'Prototypes', on the 
other hand, is never 'total' as long as a performer is willing to 
learn. Constituent factors of prototypes will keep modifying 
themselves, may override one another, and yet should have a 
strong authority on the performer. 
In comparing pantomime and mime, Jean-Louis Barrault asserts 
that while the gesture for pantomime stays within the framework 
of content and expression, the gesture for mime does not: 
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Pantomime was a dumb art; modern mime 
pantomime adds to the action proper a 
of a dumb man [sic]. Modern mime, st 
to forswear this dumb language [sic]. 
only, and if it superadds anything it 
of gesture [. . . ]. 29 
is a silent art. Ancient 
gesture language like that 
riving after purity, seeks 
It aims at being action 
is a sort of lyrical song 
In Barrault's definition, the objective of pantomime resides in 
conveying some story or narrative, which inevitably results in a 
performer's body making a 'gesture language', a gesture 
signifying some specific meanings to everyone involved in the 
performance. Barrault defines mime as a kind of 'pure' movement 
of the body which tries to shed off such agreements on 
signification between the performer and the audience. This does 
not mean that mime in Barrault's sense seeks after abstract 
expressions and representations, as he further explains: 
'Unfortunately up till now modern mime has seemed to offer only a 
limited scope. Either it forks off towards the abstract or the 
abstruse [. . . ]. Or else it harks back to burlesque and links 
up with ancient pantomime' (pp. 157-58). Instead of simply 
following the 'language' code, mime for Barrault has to be a work 
of a coordination between body and mind, which will be regarded 
as a concrete 'presence' of a performer: 
[. . .] miming should not aim at being something simply visual, but a presence, that is to say the embodiment of a dramatic 
present. The visual aspect of things is only a means and not an 
end, in the same way as objective miming is a means and not an 
end. If miming is born from silence it means that it is 
essentially present. [. . .] The problem is not to be understood, 
the problem is to be evident, and of course one must not be 
incomprehensible on the pretence of poetry. 30 
From what we have observed about Meyerhold's confidence in a 
performer's body, his stressing the importance of movement is 
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fully expected: 
Movement is the most powerful means of theatrical expression. 
The role of movement is more important than that of any other 
theatrical element. [. . .] For the actor, the theatre is any 
stage which he can construct for himself -- without the 
assistance of a builder, wherever and however necessary, and as 
quickly as his skill will allow. 31 
Likewise, Michel Saint-Denis states that '[m]ovement -- 
gesture -- is an elementary, direct means of expression; our 
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immediate reactions are almost always physical'. Saint-Denis 
nevertheless moves on to say that he actually considers gesture 
as a pragmatic wrapping of what should be inside it: 'it is not 
enough to use a gesture' (p. 148) suggests that gesture after all 
cannot be but a means, that 'this gesture must be inhabited by a 
thought; gestures not dressed by thoughts are empty and 
meaningless' (p. 148). By presenting a distinctive 
gesture/thought dichotomy, Saint-Denis here seems to assert that 
physical reactions per se will never obtain a recognised status 
as a 'performance'. Rather than 'from body to mind', what is 
suggested here looks more like 'body because of mind'. 
Michael Chekhov gives a new meaning to the term 'gesture' by 
claiming that gesture could equal a performer's psychology: 
To increase our own life of the stage means to be able to see 
everywhere -- in the written words, in the events around us, and 
in our own psychology -- gestures, gestures, and more gestures, 
but not states of mind. [. . .] the state of mind which we must 
understand is one in which the inner movement goes on, and must 
not be understood as a fixed thing, but as an invisible 
psychological process going on in a certain definite way. 33 
As we will see later in the chapter, 'gesture' in Chekhov's sense 
is not a figure of speech or is used metaphorically. For 
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Chekhov, gesture not only realises the 'from body to mind' 
approach but becomes both the starting point and the goal of a 
performer's training. 'The state of mind' cannot be 'fixed', by 
which we assume Chekhov means that the mind is not to be labelled 
in a nutshell such as 'sad' or 'happy'. The mind will inevitably 
reveal itself by constantly changing its 'state', that is, by 
going through a sequence of movements. 
Artaud makes it quite clear that a performer innately has a 
potential for acquiring technique, which enables her to 
materialise 'universality' through performing: 
Compared with the murderer's fury which exhausts itself, that of 
the tragic actor remains enclosed within a perfect circle. The 
murderer's fury has accomplished an act, discharges itself, and 
loses contact with the force that inspired it but can no longer 
sustain it. That of the actor has taken a form that negates 
itself to just the degree it frees itself and dissolves into 
universality. 34 
'A perfect circle' and being 'enclosed within' that circle in 
Artaud's sense mean a self-contained universe of performance, not 
a pre-determined and rigid enclosure. A self-contained universe 
can be regarded either as being completely closed or being 
infinitely open. Performance practice, which we will further 
look into in the following section, will always 'negate itself' 
in terms of being part of 'universality'. 
2.2 Masks 
Keith Johnstone uses masks in such a way that a performer will 
eventually learn to put on and take off her mask whenever 
required. Johnstone explains that a mask, when successfully worn 
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by a performer, simply 'change[s]' that performer. According 
to Johnstone, the 'difficulty' rather 'lies in stopping the 
student from making the change "himself"' (p. 167). Wearing a 
mask prevents a performer from initiating such a change. The use 
of a mask makes it easier for a performer to actually 'fit' into 
the role since, instead of trying to 'fit' into something or 
someone which or who does not yet exist in performance terms, she 
is now allowed to 'fit' into a 'mask', namely, 'Mak[ing] the face 
fit the Mask' (p. 166). Johnstone places much confidence in 
using a mask simply because he believes that a performer, once 
she puts a mask on, will quickly 'fit', will be more efficient 
than when she is 'thinking'. Such pragmatic fitting-in tasks 
contain enough elements needed for performing. 'There's no 
reason', Johnstone states, 'for the student to start "thinking" 
when he already "knows" intuitively exactly what sort of creature 
he is' (p. 167). A performer will be able to 'experience being 
another creature' (p. 166) by quickly fitting into the mask which 
she is wearing, since this 'intuitive' action will be the same as 
saying that she is 'being another creature'. 
If a performer is assisted by her mask when she tries the 
'from body to mind' way of performing, it is because a mask 
leaves only a limited number of choices for the performer, making 
it much easier for her to move quickly and decisively. It does 
not mean that a performer's variegated range of expressive 
ability will be straitjacketed by the fact of her wearing masks. 
Rather, as Susan Valeria Harris Smith argues, a human performer's 
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various feelings such as 'joy, pain, or anger' will find a 
'temporary form' (p. 2) within individual masks, a form which a 
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performer concretises by comfortably wearing each mask, by 
feeling 'liberate[d]' (p. 2) in it. In the line of 'from body to 
mind' approach, expressions come out for the outside world to see 
only when a performer makes some specific bodily movements, and 
we can say that a mask does half the work for the performer by 
limiting possibilities and by bringing a performer to a 
'temporary reality' (p. 2). 
John Harrop also implies that the mask helps a performer to 
live in the present and not to be bound by some already 
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established factors. When, as Harrop describes, 'The mask 
reflects, literally and metaphorically, stored aspects of the 
human condition sculpted to produce responses in the actor' (p. 
67), it does not mean that a mask functions in such a way that a 
performer is led to discover some fixed factors in an already 
fixed human body and mind. Instead of looking for the completed 
manual for performance in a mask or trying to mould a future 
direction with a seemingly fixed mask, a performer brings out her 
'present' self through a mask, which is to say that '[the mask] 
produces response from the deepest wellsprings of the actor's 
being' (p. 67). Since '[t]he mask does not conceal but reveals' 
(p. 67), it can be used specifically to prompt a performer to 
'discover' (p. 67) what she may not be able to find otherwise. 
If that discovery is made during an exercise or in the course of 
a rehearsal (p. 67) and a performer is assured that she has now 
acquired what she failed to see before, then she will be able to 
perform fine without a mask from now on. Harrop calls the mask 
'a catalyst to process' (p. 67), and it seems that the mask, for 
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all its 'fixed' appearance, actually benefits a performer as a 
source of 'imagination' (p. 67) whether used during an 
exercise or during performance. 
Citing the Living Theatre, Robert L. Benedetti discusses what 
it is to deny a mask in performance. To Benedetti, 'discarding' 
a mask robs a performer of a chance to pursue some vital elements 
of performance which are different from everyday life in the 
first place: 'by discarding the aesthetic mask in favor of an 
artistic heightening of their own everyday social mask, [the 
Living Theatre] sacrificed much of the capacity of the process of 
mask-wearing to move their audiences into extended, heightened or 
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new states of reality'. Benedetti asserts that the Living 
Theatre drops the mask because they strive for 'self-realization' 
(p. 73). Their decision in fact works the other way, depriving 
them of 'the very mechanism which could most help [them] to 
extend or alter [their] condition' (p. 73). Like Harrop, 
Benedetti here points toa benefit of wearing a mask, namely, the 
mask's potential power of illuminating a performer's up-till-now- 
unrecognised ability to express herself, which she possibly will 
never have chance to illuminate any other way with as much 
intensity and clarity. Abandoning a mask may be a performance in 
itself, but it kills the performance at the same time since 'it 
connotes the end of change' (p. 73). Benedetti concludes that 
'state-of-being acting is [. . .] dramatically and spiritually 
inferior to acting-as-a-process-of-becoming' (p. 73). From this 
remark we can infer that mask-wearing not only pushes 
'imagination' to the fore but keeps the actual performing alive 
by making it continuously-less-than-perfect, that is, 'becoming'. 
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As the use of a mask shows, a body-oriented action can 
produce a performance which is richer and more profound in its 
expression than we might often expect. The so-called 'intuition' 
is not necessarily a careless or ambivalent means of performing 
but it can be an otherwise untestable 'revealing' aspect of a 
human performer. The question is, how this revelation will be 
actually practised in a performance circumstance. Mask-wearing 
can be regarded as being highly useful since, on the one hand, it 
spares a performer having too many options to move quickly and, 
on the other hand, its very limitations open the way for the 
wearer to deepen her imaginative potential. She may thus have an 
opportunity to explore her-ability further in a concrete way. 
2.3 The Moment of Performance and Sustaining 
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When a performer's 'instrument', as Strasberg puts it, 
operates fully and enables the performer to 'make a particular 
"run" and also many other "runs" so that he can satisfy any 
demand made by a director or himself' (P. 46), it means that a 
performer can work both specifically and flexibly. These two may 
not easily be achieved in a complementary manner to each other: 
specifics require a performer to distinguish what she is doing 
from what she is not doing, while flexibility prepares a 
performer to leave the possibility of another choice open 
alongside the choice that has been made. In reality, any action 
by a performer will be a specific, particular gesture whether it 
happens to be pro-body or pro-mind. Yet at the same time, a 
performer, being a human, cannot be expected to drop a certain 
action or line of thinking in an instant totally and 
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categorically. Hodgson and Richards point to the distinction 
between a 'surface' flexibility and what our 'feelings' nurture 
in the 'depth' of ourselves: 
If acting is associated with living, and the living is to go on 
at any particular depth, we cannot accept the switching on and 
off. Most of our feelings and attitudes build comparatively 
slowly and the technique the actor aims to acquire should be the 
sure control of this building. The technique he very often 
acquires is that he can 'turn on' the surface response associated 
with feelings, which makes for a completely different response in 
the audience who, similarly, accept a surface experience. What 
we must do is to be able to distinguish between the surface and 
the depth approach. 40 
Here the implication is that it is useless for a performer to 
train only a 'surface' part of her 'response' since it fails to 
touch what a human performer innately possesses and what she 
cannot get rid of. In order to delve into the 'depth' of her 
experience, a performer has to be braced for a considerably - 
drastic method of training. Mask-wearing might be one of such 
drastic measures. Given that a deep experience will not be 
susceptible to a whimsical change of its 'surface' counterpart, 
such training will inevitably be a difficult one for a performer 
to go through. Two points seem to be at issue: first, a 
performer has to have an ability to live the moment of 
performance by unfailingly showing some kind of gesture which is 
clear enough to the outside world; second, a performer's chosen 
gesture has to be pending. In other words, making a quick 
decision for her action cannot be an ultimatum on the part of a 
performer: it may be sustained in the sense that the decision 
will be supported or it may be sustained in the sense that the 41 
decision will be attacked and be subject to change. 
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Performance practice can be regarded as a move to tackle those 
two aspects of decision-making, which ideally renders as deep and 
flexible a practice as possible. 
We find that various performers/instructors/directors give 
their own account of performance practice with regard to the 
two points posited above, only that they respectively use their 
own terms to describe them. Accordingly, we will be advised to 
interpret the remarks by those people while asking at the same 
time if they correspond to the above-posited two points. 
Strasberg's general attitude towards performing suggests that 
a performer is expected to concentrate on her performance in such 
a way that her 'imaginative use of [. . .] various mental, 42 
physical, sensory, and emotional resources' in all possible kinds 
and forms will be used to her advantage. What Strasberg calls 
for is versatility: 
In individual's progress we are concerned with whether or not he 
is able to deal with any task he sets himself. [. . .] In fact, 
it is the nature of an acting exercise -- or any exercise -- to 
be abstract. [. . .] Thus, there is a stage in training -- and 
also usually in working on a part -- where you do not help the 
actor by setting him tasks related to final results in the scene. 
At this moment you do not worry about whether the problem is 
logically right or wrong in relation to the scene. At this stage 
you help the actor by setting him tasks that help to encourage in 
him the kind of response which he has to be capable of giving in 
any play under any conditions. (p. 147) 
To back up his theory of producing a particular 'run', Strasberg 
stresses the importance of giving a performer a 'task', which by 
its nature makes it mentally and bodily easier for the performer 
to start with an actual gesture. The purpose of a task changes 
according to different stages of rehearsals and moments of 
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performance, or to different performance styles. When the 
question is raised as to how exactly a performer trains herself 
to be more versatile, we may turn to another remark of Strasberg: 
'When you see good performers, one of the things that make them 
good is a certain amount of relaxation' (p. 88). 'Relaxation'. 
corresponds to versatility once it is put in the framework of his 
approach through 'task'. Being relaxed can be rephrased as not 
becoming obsessed with only one of the alternatives in 
performance. Meanwhile, his much-discussed 'affective memory' 
can be regarded as Strasberg's way of training a performer to 
show a clearly discernible gesture. A performer, while being 
relaxed, nevertheless has to be alert in her body and mind so 
that her gestures will be sharp enough, or 'affective': 'The 
important thing in using affective memory is to maintain one's 
concentration, not on the emotion, but on the sensory objects or 
elements that form part of the memory of the original experience' 
(p. 110). Despite its apparent connotation, 'memory' is not 
necessarily restricted to a mental or psychological activity of 
remembering; it can also be a physical, kinesic activity of 
retrieving some particular movement or sensation. 
Benedetti uses the terms 'relaxation' and 'concentration' in 
explaining how to sense the 'present' moment: 
Relaxation is possible only as a by-product of your focus of 
concentration. In order to achieve realization of your actual 
presence on stage, your primary point of awareness must be the 
present moment, not the past or the future. Relaxation in the 
sense of being 'ready to act' demands that you immerse yourself 
in the present instant, because it is only now that you exist. 
This is more difficult to achieve than would be imagined. We 
tend to protect ourselves from the unknown of the immediate 
moment by dwelling imaginatively in the past or the future. 43 
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Both Strasberg and Benedetti call for an attitude on the part of 
a performer which consists of utmost alertness towards the 
'moment' of performance; a performer has to turn possibilities 
into realisation, while further possibilities keep coming to her 
without any interval. 
Richard Boleslavsky touches upon 'memory', stressing that it 
has to be controlled: 'The point is to bring yourself back as you 
were then, to command your own ego, go where you want to go, and 
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when you are there, to stay where you went'. A performer first 
of all has to be certain about what she wants to bring out as her 
'memory', since 'when you have something to say, the experience 
comes so much more quickly, a hundred times faster than when you 
have nothing to say' (p. 39). Still, Boleslavsky's notion of 
'memory' seems to put more emphasis on 'memory' as a mental 
remembering act and its retention; 'memory' of that kind is able 
to operate 'continu[ously]' and thus help compensate 'our 
physical strength', which tends to be less sustainable (pp. 20- 
21). Accordingly, 'concentration' by Boleslavsky means 'the 
quality which permits us to direct all our spiritual and 
intellectual forces towards one definite object' (p. 20), which 
once achieved can be sustained if so required. We might 
attribute Boleslavsky's approach partly to the fact that he 
posits the existence of 'something materially imperceptible' 
which a performer 'concentrate[s] on' (p. 22). According to 
Boleslavsky, a performer can concentrate even when she cannot 
perceive the object of concentration 'materially'. This shows 
how decisively Boleslavsky divides human performers' action and 
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reaction into physical aspects and mental aspects, which, as far 
as our present discussion is concerned, poses a question. At the 
same time, to follow through Boleslavsky's notion, mental 
concentration is supposed to make a jump into physical expression 
and back as if a perfect 'memory' will solve all the problems and 
difficulties regarding the body-mind relationship within a 
performer. 
We find that Grotowski also mentions 'memory': 
Make your actions concrete, relating them to a memory. If you 
are confident that you are doing this, then do not analyse 
completely what memory is there -- you do it concretely and that 
is enough. [. . .] there are no impulses or reactions without 
contact. A few minutes ago we talked of the problems of contact 
with an imaginary partner. But this imaginary partner must also 
be fixed in the space of this actual room. If you do not fix 
your partner in a precise place your reactions will remain within 
yourself. 45 
Unlike Boleslavsky, Grotowski here makes it clear that even an 
'imaginary' object must be grasped by a performer in such a way 
that she will be able to specify that object at least up to a 
point in relation to the reality she is facing. 'Memory' in this 
case leans on the kind of performers' activity which comes out 
kinesically. Grotowski's account, that a contact would not be 
possible unless a concretisation accompanies it, sounds contrary 
to Boleslavsky's above remark, although both assertions may in 
practice bring out similar actions on the part of a performer. 
Michael Chekhov's 'method' consists of what he calls 
'atmosphere', 'objective', 'radiation', 'preparation', 
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'sustaining', and 'psychological gesture', which are all body- 
oriented. When Chekhov describes 'concentration', for example, 
he does not particularly draw our attention to the mental aspect 
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of a performer, although we realise that Chekhov in fact does 
imply the existence of such an aspect and its role in 
performance: 'concentration makes imagination concrete, and 
imagination, if it is concrete, cannot be produced without 
concentration of this kind. [. . .] the images which we are 
going to act by such kind of concentration and highly developed 
imagination, [sic] will appear before us while we are working on 
the part. [. . .] These will come of themselves' (p. 45). 
Spolin traces step by step what a human being goes through 
when improvising: 
All have probably seen the roughness and lack of reality in the 
scene where the actor reads, 'It's cold in here' and then 
proceeds to shiver; for although the two might in some cases 
occur simultaneously, inner action generally precedes 
activity/dialogue: 






Go to refrigerator 
3) Dialogue 
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'What's there to eat? ' 
As explained above, 'inner action' refers to a performer's 
physical, or physiological, or biological, or psychosomatic 
aspect, which distinguishes itself from 'activity': 'inner 
action' will be regarded as being involuntary, making it in a 
strict sense a 'reaction' rather than an 'action'. Without such 
'inner action', Spolin seems to suggest here, improvisatory 
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actions performed would not look convincingly 'realistic'. This 
means that a performer somehow has to bring herself to 'inner 
action' even when a performance condition does not favour a 
desired 'inner action' to be felt by her. On the other hand, 
once the desired 'inner action' happens within the performer, 
then the following procedures such as a voluntary activity of 
actually going to the refrigerator will happen smoothly. By 
experiencing 'inner action' first, a performer explores her 
potential flexibility in its deepest possible level; this makes 
her 'surface' actions easier to handle. 
In the following remark by Johnstone, an already accomplished 
skill of driving a car or playing a particular sonata is a 
prerequisite for a driver's or a musician's mind to 'detach'. 
Detached mind here means that her mind does not exactly instruct 
her body what to do in a conscious manner: 'When you are 
"absorbed" you no longer control the musculature. You can drive 
for miles, or play a movement from a sonata while your 
personality pays no attention at all. Nor is your performance 
48 
necessarily worse'. In a sense, this is an 'ideal' situation 
for a performer to aim at: it is an ultimate relationship between 
body and mind. 'Absorbed' in this case does not mean 'obsessed'. 
A performer in this case finds herself already so confident 
physically and mentally that she is 'relaxed' and also is purely 
'concentrating'. We have to remember, though, that driving or 
playing a classical piece on an instrument presupposes a 
format 
which restricts the range of flexibility'allowed. 
We can find some examples of action-oriented approaches in 
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Carlo Mazzone-Clementi on 'teaching Commedia acting'. Pointing 
out that 'we must choose between immobility and action' (p. 62), 
Mazzone-Clementi encourages a performer to 'take chances' (p. 
62), which will be rewarded if that performer is relaxed and has 
'a clear vision of the goal' because then she will be able to get 
the 'inspiration' she needs (p. 62). Once again we detect a call 
for a specific movement or gesture to be initiated from a 
performer, who should be relaxed but at the same time is expected 
at least to form a 'vision'. By stating that 'rudimentary 
exercises must not be done superficially' (p. 62), Mazzone- 
Clementi stresses the importance of exploring actions in depth, 
which correlates the remarks made by the people we have seen so 
far. The assertions by Mazzone-Clementi seem to link up together 
at a performer's 'kinesthetic level' (p. 62). To Mazzone- 
Clementi, a performer develops her ability and sees a goal 
primarily through bodily sensations. Such an approach reveals 
most directly when a performer tries to break in by taking up the 
task of 'running', which 'is a primary physical activity [. . .] 
and drives extraneous thoughts from the mind' (p. 61): 
The motion of this act is dominated by the contact of foot and 
floor -- inhaling, exhaling, turning, wheeling, sweating, as you 
follow the leader. Do you run badly? You will discover it in 
motion. Is your body unresponsive? Thinking about it will not 
help. The kinesthetic response comes only with motion. 
Kinesthetic response is not a product of brute energy. 
Paradoxically, the difficult must be easy. We must break down 
the RUN. Balancing on one foot, then the other. Stretch, reach. 
Equilibrium: does it desert you when you depend on only that tiny 
pedestal, your foot? [. . .] (p. 61) 
A performer learning Commedia acting eventually starts working 
with others. Here again, action comes first: 
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Balance and counterbalance with the partner cannot begin in the 
brain. We must start, once again, at home: the body. The 
elementary push-and-pull of the WALK is now explored with the 
partner. These counterweight exercises with a partner [. . .] train you to move together [. . .] with a common fulcrum. 
Adjustments must be made for varying sizes and weights. There is 
never an ideal partner. There is always and only this partner of 
the moment. (p. 63) 
Moving with someone else highlights the circumstantial nature of 
the 'moment' along with the need for constant 'adjustments', 
which in the end can only be experienced by way of practical 
training, or exercises. A partnership develops into a group- 
work: 
Moving from work with a single partner to work with a larger 
group, the exercises become more complex. We learn to create for 
one another the 'improviso' situation, to accept easily a new 
reality (no matter how absurd), to respond in character, 
honestly, inventively, and spontaneously. All advanced exercises 
in collective spontaneity take a spiral form basic to commedia. 
Commedia is juggling. (p. 63) 
A performer confident enough in her kinesic 'sensations' when 
working alone should also become confident and comfortable enough 
in working with others. She reaches out to her co-performers 
through sensations. A performer is basically exercising the same 
approach of moving from. body to mind whether alone or with a 
partner or in a group. 
Jane Winearls in explaining the quality of dance movement 
asserts that '[t]o develop quality in Dance Training, it is 
necessary to understand and experience the elements from which it 
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springs'. The 'elements' which Winearls introduces are the 
very elements required of a non-dancer performer as well. 'Three 
fundamental elements to be considered in movement', Winearls 
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states, are 'energy', 'design', and 'speed' (p. 79). 'Energy' 
can be described 'in terms of growing tension which becomes as 
strong as possible with a maximum of resistance, and of 
increasing relaxation which becomes as heavy as possible with a 
minimum of resistance' (p. 79). A dancer who 'understands' the 
direction and the amount of energy in her body turns out to be 
not unlike a Commedia actor in the sense that both the dancer and 
the Commedia actor will be expected to 'know' their bodies' 
limitations and possibilities. The knowledge in this case is not 
necessarily in physiological terms but it at least has to be 
acquired within the range of kinesic senses, which will help the 
performers move their bodies and picture the consequences of the 
particular movements they make. 'Design' by Winearls reads: 'The 
design of body movement is dependent upon the situation of the 
starting point of movement, and the order in which joints 
connected with the movement go into action' (p. 80). A performer 
designs her bodily movements once again by means of the knowledge 
about her own body. Again, such a performer is not unlike a 
Commedia actor who understands the mechanism of 'running' inside 
out through physical senses. Finally, what Winearls calls 
'speed' refers to the way the energy is distributed in a 
performer's body during performance: 
The third element to be considered is the gathering and losing of 
speed. As it flows away from the centre, movement loses speed 
and gains it when flowing in towards the centre. [. . .] To move 
at a constant speed indefinitely is very harmful as it destroys 
the natural rhythm, and a dancer who constantly moves too 
suddenly or too tardily is subjecting herself to unnecessary 
strain. (p. 83) 
Whether or not such an unnecessary strain had better be avoided 
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remains to be seen, given that we could think of a performance 
which is not a 'modern dance' and which deliberately exploits 
this kind of strain. Still, if a performer understands her 
bodily rhythm and is thus able to control the 'speed' of her 
movements, it suggests that she knows how to perform in a relaxed 
and yet efficient manner. In other words, her body knows how to 
relax. 
Living the 'moment' of a performance and sustaining one's 
movements precipitate four phases of practical action, namely, 
'four phases of mental effort which become visible in small 
expressive bodily movements' in Laban's The Mastery of 
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Movement. First comes 'the phase of attention' (p. 115), which 
brings a performer to focus on 'the object of the action and the 
situation of its execution' (p. 115). Laban points out that 
attention can be the result of a 'direct concentration' but can 
also be produced in a 'flexible manner' (p. 115). This is 
followed by the 'phase of intention', which Laban attributes to a 
performer's 'muscular tensions produced in small body areas' (p. 
115). Laban gives an example: 
[A] person's attention is drawn to a book lying on a table. He 
stands and looks at it directly. His intention of reading it 
becomes visible in a certain muscular tension in his chest and 
neck. He decides to pick up the book and his hand moves swiftly 
towards it, but before he does so he remembers that he has 
something else to do. No longer having the intention to read the 
book, he drops his arm. (p. 115) 
As is explained above, a performer's intention will not 
necessarily be followed through completely or be materialised as 
an overt consequence. This implies that muscular tensions can 
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function in order to put the action forward or to halt its flow 
or to change its directions, that is, to 'sustain' an action in 
both the two meanings of the word which we mentioned earlier. 
Next follows the phase of 'decision' (p. 115), which in the above 
example refers to 'a sudden jerk in the hand' (p. 115). In other 
circumstances, this phase might develop within a performer 
'gradually' (p. 115) instead of suddenly. Finally, there is the 
phase of 'precision' (p. 115) and Laban seems to mean by this 
phase a performer's conscious or subconscious supervision over 
the action which is about to set off: 
It is that very brief moment of anticipation of performing the 
actual deed which, very often, if unfamiliar, is highly 
controlled by a bound flow effort, or, if the opposite is the 
case, is unconstrained and charged with free flow. (pp. 115-16) 
Like most of the remarks by people we have examined so far, Laban 
draws our attention to the fundamental question regarding body 
and mind, though here he does not explicitly mention the workings 
of a performer's mind. When a performer is obliged to try to 
'control' her movements in performance, she can be regarded as 
being nervous about what she is about to do. We cannot place 
such nervousness entirely in her body or entirely in her mind, 
but it certainly can be visible to others in the form of her body 
acting or reacting in an intense, careful, and somewhat 
restrained way. When on the other hand a performer feels 
physically and mentally confident about her performance, she is 
given the opportunity to plunge into her 'free flow' way of 
making a move. Here, 'free flow' does not indicate 
uncontrollability: she finds herself in a purely 'unconstrained 
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and charged' situation. It means that she is concentrating 
extremely well both physically and mentally without being 
conscious of her concentration level. 
2.4 Exercise 
A performer cannot but put her pending choice into a real action 
at some point, and especially in improvisatory circumstances this 
often has to be done fairly quickly, possibly instinctively. 
This calls for a lot of training, or exercises, on a performer's 
part, and we will see some of the exercises suggested for 
improvisation. 
According to Michael Chekhov: 
(. . .] there are three qualities which the actor-must have as 
continuous abilities. One is the feeling of ease, another the 
feeling of form, and the third one we may call the feeling of the 
whole. [. . .] if this ability [feeling of the whole] is 
developed, the actor will not be lost among the many details, but 
they will become organic parts of the whole. 52 
What Chekhov means by the term 'whole' may require an 
explanation; he points out that this particular feeling is put to 
use 'mostly with our partners on the stage, so it requires a very 
fine mutual understanding and sensitiveness to our partners' (p. 
91). If we think of the 'moment' of a performance, and of an 
improvisatory circumstance, such 'mutual' sharing of 
'sensitiveness' can be regarded as the core of the entire 
practice. Chekhov explicates, although in quite general terms, 
what it is for a performer to exercise this feeling of the 
'whole': 
Listen and look at each other, and rely upon this third thing 
which is this lightly developed sensitivities. This is the thing 
65 
which we are actually acting with, not only with our hands and 
voices, but with something more. This is one of the things which 
we have to develop. (p. 91) 
In Advice to the Players by Robert Lewis, we find an exercise 
which may be used as a means of exploring sensitivities towards a 
performer's surroundings and towards her co-performers: 
Here's an improvisation that ensures the process of talking and 
listening. It's a telephone set-up. I am going to place these 
two chairs about two feet apart with their backs to each other. 
Each chair is in a room in a separate location by a telephone. I 
want one person to go to the telelphone and call up someone in 
the class. When that actor hears his or her name, he will go-to 
the other chair and answer the phone. You are each then in 
different places talking on the telephone. The first actor 
should have a definite purpose (objective) in mind, preferably 
something strong, urgent, imaginative. Don't just call your 
friend and ask her to go to the movies: that isn't likely to lead 
to a great confrontation. Have a clear intention, stick to it in 
whatever logical ways you can in order to fulfill it. The person 
receiving the call, upon hearing the request, demand, favor, or 
whatever, that is put to him, should immediately adopt his 
intention and pursue it with all the logic at his command. The 
dialogue resulting from the two people on the telephone, each 
controlling his own objective, will constitute the 
improvisation. 53 
Mutual sensitivities sometimes ignite arguments or conflicts, 
which are perfectly legitimate as long as they remain the 
products of performers' feelings of the 'whole'. In the exercise 
above, each of the two performers on the phone is expected to 
appreciate the other's 'objective' while at the same time she 
tries to insist on her own 'objective'. As we can see in Lewis' 
comment following a trial of this exercise, these objectives have 
to be negotiated tightly and straightforwardly within the given 
circumstance. Moreover, since it is a performance situation and 
not an everyday situation, sensitivities include the performers' 
ability to bring themselves into the given circumstance not 
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merely in terms of a surface level but with the kind of 
commitment which involves their deeper levels of action. Lewis' 
comment reads: 
Don't anticipate. You immediately refused to give him the five 
grand he asked for. Do your fellow students usually call you up 
in the morning for a loan of $5,000? I, for one, would, first of 
all, be flattered. You see, it is not only enough to play your 
action (which probably would have been 'to refuse the nut'); you 
must create the logic of the situation, not simply accept it. 
Maybe you'd try to find out if he's kidding. If he isn't, how 
the hell did he get into a spot where he needed that much money 
at once? If it seems genuine, and he's your crazy friend, even 
though you have to refuse him because you haven't got the money 
to lend, you might try to think of some suggestion as to where he 
might go, etc., etc. You then are dealing with a situation based 
on the truth of your relationship, your characters, the 
circumstances, and so on, and not playing your intention 
abstractly. (pp. 85-86) 
The 'truth' of the performers' 'relationship' will not be clearly 
evident to the outside world unless the performers physically and 
mentally transform themselves and 'live out' the given 
circumstance. Concrete responses and suggestions from one 
performer to the other will form an integral part of the 'whole' 
only when the performers are alerted to the situation of the 
'moment'. Without fostering nearly 'genuine' senses towards the 
incident of that particular telephone-call, the performers cannot 
easily be alerted enough. 
Among the exercises which Johnstone introduces we can pick up 
the one which explores 'status' between characters/performers. 
This is another example of training performers' sensitivities 
towards a given condition. First, 'status' by Johnstone means: 
[, .] every 
inflection and movement implies a status, and 
(, .] no action 
is due to chance, or really 'motiveless'. It 
was hysterically funny, but at the same time very alarming. All 
our secret manoeuvrings were exposed. If someone asked a 
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question we didn't bother to answer it, we concentrated on why it 
had been asked. No one could make an 'innocuous' remark without 
everyone instantly grasping what lay behind it. Normally we are 
'forbidden' to see status transactions except when there's a 
conflict. In reality status transactions continue all the 
time. 54 
'Status' seems to be a kind of relationship which involuntarily 
forms itself whenever one person finds herself in contact with 
another. A performer's task lies not in pondering over such 
'status' but in actually practising 'status': 'Status is a 
confusing term unless it's understood as something one does' (p. 
36). A performer can act out 'status' which is given to her as 
part of her role. She can also deliberately pretend to have a 
certain 'status': 'You may be low in social status, but play 
high, and vice versa. [. . .] Status seems to me to be a useful 
term, providing the difference between the status you are and the 
status you play is understood' (p. 36). In a way, 'status' 
functions like a 'mask', although 'status' seems to emphasise the 
relative and subjective nature of relationship between 
performers, which makes it fundamentally group-oriented, more 
flexible and prone to manipulation than a 'mask'. Johnstone 
explains how a 'status exercise' will be useful to improvisation: 
Once the status becomes automatic, as it is in life, it's 
possible to improvise complex scenes with no preparation at all. 
The status exercises are really crutches to support the actor so 
that instinctual systems can operate. The actor then feels that 
everything is easy, and he doesn't experience himself as 'acting' 
any more than he does in life, even though the actual status he's 
playing may be one very unfamiliar to him. (p. 46) 
As an exercise, a performer might reverse the expected status of 
the role she is playing. When a 'cashier' exerts as high a 
status as possible or a 'robber' as low a status as possible, it 
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will be a 'maximum-status-gap exercise', which may look quite 
'absurd' in improvisation (p. 72). Once a performer has learned 
to take such 'absurd' circumstances as 'easy' situations, then we 
can say that she has acquired a technique to treat sensitivities 
smoothly. 
Performers can also train their sensitivities towards co- 
performers and the surrounding situations by even more purely 
focussing on their physical bodies, which is what Chaikin tried 
in the Open Theatre: 
One of his [Chaikin's] first attempts at working somatically, and 
perhaps the most widely adopted of Chaikin's Open Theater 
exercises, was sound-and-movement transfers. In contrast to 
Method techniques, which rely on an actor's emotional engagement 
with a`condition to generate its physical form, sound and 
movement was an attempt to work from the outside in. One actor 
would begin a simple, repeatable gesture using both body and 
voice, not selecting in advance what the action should express, 
but playing with it until it touched on a clear condition; that 
actor then approached a second, who tried to copy the forms 
exactly, thereby being led to their emotional content; the second 
then altered them and transferred a new sound and movement to a 
third actor, and so forth. Using kinetic impulses to locate 
inner states, actors were able to discover emotions that had not 
been in their experience before. 55 
Performers in circumstances such as the one described above are 
put in a position to depend almost exclusively on their 'somatic' 
senses. They are devoid of any reliable intellectual frameworks 
like making a telephone conversation and playing out a certain 
status, which would compensate or reinforce the performers' 
somatic sensations. This is an extremely well-refined exercise 
in that a performer can move or let out a sound only by 
concentrating on observing what her predecessor does and by 
replicating it, which requires nothing but sensitivity on a 
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performer's part. Chaikin seems to believe that a certain 
movement and sound passed on from one performer to another 
carries emotional qualities along with it. If a performer 
successfully copies a movement and a sound which so far have been 
totally unfamiliar to her, she is now possessing the 'emotion' 
exerted by the copied movement and sound. Since the exercise is 
not set up in an intellectual or contextual circumstance in the 
first place, emotions rendered are likely to reflect a 
straightforward and fundamental relationship between bodily 
senses and how mind treats those senses. 
Chekhov suggests an exercise which is specifically intended 
for improvisatory training: 
Choose some very simple business, like cleaning a room, finding a 
lost article, setting the table. Repeat this action at least 
twenty or thirty times. Each time avoid repetition of any kind. 
Do each action in a new way with a fresh inner approach. Keep 
only the general 'business' as a spine for the exercise. 
By doing this exercise you will develop your originality and 
ingenuity, and with them you will gradually awaken the courage of 
your individual approach to all that you do on the stage. As a 
result, you will later on be able to improvise on the stage quite 
freely at all times. This means that you will always find new, 
individual ways to fulfill old business, remaining within the 
frame given by the director. You will discover gradually that 
the real beauty of-our art, if based on the activity of the 
Creative Individuality, is constant improvisation. 56 
That a performer commits herself to a simple business over and 
over in different manners is another way of saying that a 
performer is living a 'moment' which never repeats itself twice. 
She has to train to live all the given 'moments' by making them 
into subtly different 'moments' without deviating from the 
situation of setting the table. She has to experience the task 
from every possible angle. This will eventually lead her to 
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explore deep into each task and to be able to 'sustain' her 
movements as she pleases. 
A more strongly body-oriented exercise suggested by Chekhov 
interacts with his theory of 'psychological activity': 
Choose any naturalistic position, for instance, lean with both 
hands on the table; sit in a chair with your head resting in your 
hands [. . . ]. Take any of these or similar positions before you 
realize what their psychological meaning may be. Then, holding 
the position, try to define what is expressed in it. What 
Qualities might be hidden behind such a position? What inner 
activity might have brought you to such a state? This 
psychological activity with the Qualities you have discovered 
must be continued inwardly by you. Concentrate completely on the 
radiation of the discovered activity with qualities, and do it 
until you feel that your inner strength grows, that the position 
is absolutely yours and that you can at any minute begin to 
improvise, starting from this position of yours. Then begin to 
improvise, continuing the position. (p. 83) 
In this exercise, a performer does not even have a 'task' to 
begin with. Such an overtly from-body-to-mind approach 
especially serves for a performer who is trying to foster 
sensitivity towards any possible 'quality' her body may exert. 
Although 'quality' here might refer to some specific meanings 
which a particular bodily action signifies, 'quality' in this 
exercise seems to point more strongly to a kind of energy which 
each physical gesture builds up and retains. 
'Creative Individuality' as Chekhov calls it can be achieved 
by a performer's conscious and deliberate effort to cast off the 
convention which tends to straitjacket a performer. There seems 
to be a premise that a performer is not likely to break away from 
convention if she simply performs with the hope that her 
performance will be something unconventional. Breaking the 
convention needs practice. A performer can go through exercises 
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which are specifically intended for the training of out-of-the- 
establishment actions and reactions. Strasberg explains how 
convention became convention in the first place: 
It is difficult to realize how strong and animal-like the 
adherence to a verbal pattern or convention can be. It is 
difficult for the actor to perceive how ferociously the clichý 
holds on to him. 
The conventional mold holds out to the actor the attraction 
of security. After all, a convention becomes a convention 
because it has proved its effectiveness. It has taken years to 
develop. It is both acceptable and impressive. It may be phony, 
but it gives results on the stage. That's why bad acting is 
always acting. Even if it's bad, it still deals in performance 
with some of the problems that have to be accomplished in the 
scene. 57 
In order to find a way out of succumbing to the natural instinct 
for 'security', a performer has to persuade herself not to be 
afraid of making movements which may look ridiculous or 
preposterous to other people. Strasberg suggests an exercise: 
For example, the first line may be, 'I have to tell you 
something. I don't know what I have to tell you because I -- ' 
At that moment there may feed into the line the actor's feeling, 
'My wife. You don't like my wife'. This has nothing to do with 
the lines as such. Nobody has said anything about his wife. 
Sometimes these banal phrases come out with meanings and 
connotations that are hair-raising. The exercise is very 
difficult to do, because the lines the actor says have no meaning 
in themselves. He can only feed into the lines the meaning of 
whatever thought is actually transpiring -- no matter what it may 
be. If he can do so, it means that at this moment he has been 
able to rid himself of those preconceptions which unconsciously 
lead the actor to imitate the conventional idea of how a thing 
should be done. (p. 213) 
To reveal her 'stupidity' out in the open may be difficult to do, 
but this might be one of the most effective exercises for a 
performer in learning to live a 'moment'. Strasberg also 
introduces another exercise, which he calls 'one-word 
improvisation' (p. 105), as another means of training a performer 
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to be unconventional. The word 'America' is given, and a 
performer may decide to perform, for example, a drunken Statue of 
Liberty or an overslept man hurrying to the office (p. 106). 
Strasberg asserts that 'any statement can be made to mean 
anything, depending upon the circumstances that surround it and 
the characterization that is brought to it' (p. 106). As a 
further variation to the 'one-word improvisation', he takes up 
Walt Whitman's 'I Sing the Body Electric', which he says could 
assume a different meaning when uttered by a man when he is 
having a cold shower on a cold morning (pp. 106-107). The 'one- 
word improvisation' can be developed into 'three-word 
improvisation' (p. 107) and so forth, but the principle remains 
the same, namely, training a performer to free herself of 
'preconceptions'. 
Performers find it easier said than done to follow their 
instincts. Most likely they fear their movements would be too 
shallow to look convincing or too predictable, which suggests 
that performers often lack a 'plunge' into commitment on the one 
hand, a sensitive flexibility on the other. The cited exercises 
will help performers first of all get accustomed to such 
improvisatory ways of using their physical and mental abilities. 
Then, performers will be expected to be able to retain the 
technique they have acquired so that it will actually function 
'improvisatorily', in other words, not only when the performers 
are exercising but whenever and however their instincts and their 
will command it to function. 
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2.5 Kinesics 
A performer who knows how to live the present 'moment' of a 
performance possesses well-tuned and well-trained sensitivity 
towards her body. She has the ability to control her body as a 
constantly-moving entity, as an object which is 'systematically' 
flexible. Those who aim at refining their kinesic senses will 
eventually realise that it is a question of how easily they can 
take full control of their senses. Feldenkrais states: 'People 
with a fine kinaesthetic sense tend to a low tonic concentration, 
and are not satisfied until they find the way of doing which 
involves the smallest amount of exertion; also, the limit to 
which the unnecessary effort is eliminated, is closer to the 
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ideal minimum'. Here, the mechanism and the working process of 
kinesics itself claims more importance than the 'result' (p. 
109). When pressured to produce results, a performer makes 
'effort', which, at a 'higher level', will possibly blind her 
from 'detect[ing] small differences' (p. 109). Feldenkrais does 
not regard activities which are 'habitual with repetition' (p. 
109) as practices to be avoided; on the contrary, repeated 
activities sink in and form part of kinesic functions which a 
performer can control smoothly. As long as she keeps her 
sensitivity intact so that she can make certain that habitual, 
repeated actions are 'right' (p. 109), a performer wastes neither 
energy nor the quality of her performance. 
Once such habitual actions are fully under control, a 
performer can then decide when and how some particular actions 
should be stressed, brought out of the habitual routine, and 
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given a new 'meaning'. Daniel Stern comments in an interview: 
One of the things that fascinates me is to see what aspect of a 
behavior an actress or actor will decide to exaggerate, and how 
they'll exaggerate it. Because that will give a clue to what is 
the prepotent factor of all the stimuli put together -- exactly 
how performers build a piece out of sequences of behavior. 59 
Exaggeration disrupts the systems of habitual activities with 
which a performer feels most comfortable, and we have a contrast 
between habits and exaggerations, each complementing and 
highlighting the other. If some exaggerations elicit a new 
'meaning', it is always in relation to what non-exaggerated 
actions mean in a habitual situation. 
Given this, we realise at the same time that kinesic problems 
cannot be categorically tucked into neat, binary relationships 
such as habits versus exaggerations. According to Schechner and 
Cynthia Mintz, performers may use kinesic actions to show a blunt 
split-up of 'meaning' and 'channeling', but they may also 
introduce an unprecedented matching of 'meaning' and 
'channeling', or they may even try a matching of 'meaning' and 
'meaning'. Schechner and Mintz note that 'meaning' and 
'channeling' are not the same as 'content' and 'form': 
No one channel can alone convey 'meaning'. Meaning is in fact 
the confluence of multi-channeled information. When one channel 
is separated out, say negatively by subtracting speech as in 
pantomime, or through a change in speed as when Foreman freezes 
an action or Wilson presents one in extreme slow motion, a 
dissociation between 'meaning' and 'channeling' occurs. This is 
somewhat like the old dissociation between 'content' and 'form' 
but different at the decisive point of communications flow. 
[. . .] Thus, meanings are combined with meanings 
because any 
change in the rate, flow, intensity, or channel used in 
communicating not only changes the messages but alters the 
context. 60 
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Being a complex system of many 'channels', kinesics cannot be 
discussed under a monolithic concept of 'form' versus 'content' 
per se. Kinesic variations involve intricate workings of 
'channels', which undermines a prospect of stable and consistent 
relationship between body and mind, although such a relationship 
may be developed after a performer has gone through a sufficient 
amount of training and has made kinesic actions habitual. 
Indeed, performers could instead try to experiment how far the 
dissociation can go, in what way the dissociation is possible, 
and how a new 'association' (p. 106) may be formed, which all 
derive from the fact that a web of kinesic channels produces a 
different 'context' for each occasion. Schechner and Mintz cite 
a few performers: '[Dissociations of gesture'from meaning] can 
lead to new associations of meaning that are not consciously 
controlled by the artist -- as in the Grand Union's work -- or in 
more controlled new contexts, as in Wilson and Foreman' (p. 106). 
Laban, under the theme of 'Analysis of Simple Bodily 
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Actions', suggests that we examine 'bodily actions' of 'a 
person in everyday life', of 'a person portraying a character in 
a mime scene', and of 'a dancer performing a particular national 
or period dance' (p. 53). Laban lists some 'points of view' from 
which we may examine the actions: 
(a) ways of using the body, whether: 
upper or lower part of body 
right or left side of body 
off or on the floor 
symmetric or asymmetric 
simultaneous or successive movements in one or 
both limbs; 
(b) space, such as: 
directions and levels of steps and gestures 
change of front 
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extensions of steps and gestures 
shape of gestures; 
(c) time, such as: quick and slow in gesture and step 
repetition of a rhythm 
tempo of a rhythm; 
(d) weight, such as: 
strong or weak tension 
placements of accents 
phrasing arising from stressed and unstressed 
periods. (pp. 53-54) 
These spatial and temporal dimensions of human actions are in 
fact some of the 'channels', which in this case show externally 
so that we can 'observe' (p. 53) them for analysis. Even from 
such simple and general kinesic cues as the ones above, it is 
clear that 'channels' potentially contain numerous means of 
making the body move, which is exactly what prompts performers to 
explore their 'own' systems and variations of kinesics. 
A similar presentation of the performer's kinesic movement 
can be seen in Winearls when she defines 'principles of 
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movement' for 'modern' dancers. Of the four principles 
introduced by Winearls, 'Principle One' (pp. 18-20) deals with: 
1. Tension as outward expansion results in lightness. 
2. Tension as inward contraction results in strength. 
3. Relaxation as inward deflation results in heaviness. 
4. Relaxation as outward release results in softness. (p. 19) 
Their examples are: 
for 1. Rising on the toes with fully expanded chest and extended 
arms as-in diving. (p. 18) 
for 2. Rising upwards only in order to come down strongly as in 
hammering. (p. 18) 
for 3. Sinking to the floor after continued activity. (p. 19) 
for 4. The rising from the keyboard of a pianist's hands after 
excessive tension. (P. 19) 
'Principle Two' (p. 21) is about how a performer might use the 
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'force of gravity': 
When the force of gravity is being overcome by energy, it can be 
said that Weight is being resisted. If a great deal of energy 
resistance is used, the resulting movement will be strong. If 
the minimum amount of energy resistance is offered, the resulting 
movement will be light. In either case the movements will 
contain tension as they are offering resistance to weight in some 
degree. 
In making use of Weight, energy can be greatly assisted, and 
economic movement will balance strength with weight. In giving 
way to gravity it can be said that Strength is being given 
assistance. If a great deal of gravity assistance is given the 
resulting movement will be heavy. If only a little gravity 
assistance is given, the resulting movement will be soft. In 
either case the movements will contain relaxation as they are 
being assisted by gravity in some degree. (p. 21) 
Here, the spatial and the temporal aspects of 'tensions' and 
'relaxations' crisscross with the gravitational 'assistance' or 
the body's 'resistance' to gravity. Kinesic actions can at least 
to 'some degree' be regarded as a question of how a human 
performer negotiates with gravity. Winearls then explains 
'Principle Three' (pp. 22-23), which she breaks up into 'three 
basic rhythms' (p. 22). 'Rhythm' in this case particularly 
refers to what Winearls calls 'accent', and the 'initial accent' 
by Winearls means: 
Movements which have their accent'at the beginning seek only to 
leave the present state. Tension is gathered suddenly and 
immediately released with an explosive action, the rest of the 
movement being the resulting follow through of the initial 
action. Whatever the degree of tension, whether it be light or 
strong, movements with an initial accent are of an impulsive 
nature. (p. 22) 
'Tossing the head' and '[s]natching oneself away from someone's 
grasp' (p. 22) are among the examples. The 'terminal accent' 
such as '[t]urning the head sharply to focus upon an object' and 
'[t]hrusting out the foot to intercept an object' (p. 23) can be 
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defined as: 
Movements in this group have their accent at the end and seek to 
achieve a definite purpose in attaining a new state. Tension is 
gathered throughout the movement and comes to a final climax as 
the purpose is achieved. The rest of the movement is the flow 
back in order to repeat the action. Whatever the degree of 
tension, whether it be light or strong, movements with a terminal 
accent are of a purposeful nature. (p. 23) 
Finally, there is the 'transitional accent': 
This forms a pendulum like swing which keeps in constant motion 
between two points. In themselves, pendulum movements are not 
progressive but can be used to create momentum for movements in 
the other two categories. Strength and Weight are balanced in 
such a way that the accent falls upon the transition between the 
two, i. e., where weight becomes strength, in the middle part of 
the movement. Whatever the quality of swing, whether strong or 
light, movements with a transitional accent are of harmonious and 
regular nature. (p. 23) 
This kind of accent appears as we 'swing' our limbs while walking 
(p. 23). Since 'accent' is a relative term and can only be 
recognised within a certain length of time, it concerns a 
performer's action seen as one syntagmatic sequence of several 
movements. In this sense, 'Principle Three' implies a 
performer's conscious or subconscious sensitivity towards the 
entire sequence of actions as a 'whole'. 'Principle Four' has an 
even wider perspective in that it concerns an overall direction 
or purpose or goal of a performer's action: 
Some actions are free flowing by nature, as in flicking round 
with a duster. Some are more naturally guided, like ironing. (p. 
27) 
According to Winearls, '[t]hrowing things about in order to 
unearth a mislaid object' is an example of 'free flowing' 
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actions, while '[t]hrowing at a target' is one of 'guided'- 
flowing actions (p. 27). A performer is supposed to master all 
these 'principle' kinesic actions not only separately but also in 
various different arrangements. 
As we have seen before, a performer's sensitivity must be 
directed towards her surroundings, including her co-performers. 
Schechner and Mintz make the point of seeking kinesic analyses in 
the field of 'group' performances: 
The performing group is particularly close-knit; rehearsals 
themselves may be looked at as a means of generating harmony 
among a group of people who normally might each go their own way. 
The traditional advantage of 'ensemble', performing has been this 
'harmony'. But what is harmony, insofar as it applies to 
performance? We believe that it may be kinesic congruence, what 
[A. E. ] Scheflen calls 'reciprocals'. All human interaction 
[. . .] shows a high degree of intra-group reciprocation of 
movement. It is our contention that performing groups show much 
more than the average; that, in fact, it is the high density of 
reciprocal gesturing, posturing, and grouping that is the basis 
for what is 'felt' as an 'ensemble'. If this thesis is true, and 
it can be tested, then new exercises in reciprocal gesturing, 
posturing and grouping can be developed to directly foster 
ensemble performing. 63 
What we plainly call 'feelings' may be understood as being 
prompted by active kinesics, though, as hinted above, this by 
no 
means is the same as saying that a performer's 'feelings' are 
kinesic actions per se. In performance practice, the question of 
body and mind in many cases compels a performer to start with 
body rather than with mind. It does not necessarily mean that 
body and mind are separable. 
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3 Contexts, Text, Form, and Process 
As long as a person is called a 'performer', her decision-makings 
and actions rely on a certain framework which at least roughly 
determines the direction and the nature of the performance piece. 
We will examine in this chapter some possible frameworks and 
their capacity for improvisation. 
3.1 Improvisation in Three Contexts 
Anthony Frost and Ralph Yarrow set improvisation in 'three major 
1 
contexts': 
[Improvisation] feeds firstly into what we might call traditional 
training, as a preparation for performance and a way of tuning up 
the performers. We can place this in the (Stanislavskian) 
tradition of 'character' preparation, or to put it another way, 
as a method of schooling the actor to project the 'reality' of 
the character [. . . ]. The second tradition (or perhaps anti-tradition) rests on a 
more radical acknowledgement of the fragmentation of nineteenth- 
century notions of a consistent personality. The comic and the 
satiric vein, often allied to improvisation, challenges 
assumptions about stable social personality and 'bourgeois' 
respectability; taken to extremes, it undercuts political, 
religious and philosophical myths about the coherence of 
individual identity and its consonance within a system of 
stratified order and significance. The work of Jarry, Artaud and 
Beckett, for instance, extends and foregrounds this 
destabilisation; it also requires a more radically physical and 
improvisatory approach to acting, and it is not surprising that 
alongside this eventually scripted and accepted form of theatre, 
work on and with improvisation should have continued to develop 
almost as a form in and for itself. [. .] 
The more radical modes of improvisation both accept the 
consequences of the disintegration of the existential self and 
attempt to use them positively. Grotowski's actors learn to 
'disarm', to arrive at a condition without the protective ma ks 
of the familiar or the comfortable escapes of dramatic cliche. 
The work focuses not on the reality of the character but on that 
of the performer; where it emerges as public theatre, it is the 
inventiveness and authenticity of the performers in their 
relationship with the spectators which is foregrounded, as 
opposed to the presentation of a narrative. Here improvisation 
and performance are seen as part of a developmental process which 
can thus extend beyond theatre into, for example, psychotherapy 
or education. (pp. 14-15) 
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If, as Robert L. Benedetti states, Stanislavski's 'vision was 
of the performance not as a reflection of reality, but as a 
2 
reality into itself', his vision in training a performer to 
'project' the character would also bring the performer 'towards 
bein ' (p. 46) rather than towards 'seeming' (p. 46). To make 
the 'being' happen, the Stanislavskian performer may be forced to 
go through an overwhelmingly repetitive trial of improvisation: 
Kostya's sea journey, put forward by Stanislavski as an example 
of the actor's work process at its most fruitful, occurs at the 
nth repetition of an improvisatory exercise which Kostya and the 
other student-actors are heartily sick of. They have been over 
and over the material, can't get into it, etc. And yet it is 
precisely by going over it (one more time) that the actor does 
get into it (at last). Which is to say: Rehearsal (sic], of 
which Kostya's experience is here offered as the type, has, like 
reading, the form of a penetration-by-scanning. Running over and 
over the lines, one at length penetrates to the core of the 
material. 3 
Assuming that a 'character' can be paralleled with 'the core of 
the material', we accordingly take improvisatory exercises such 
as the ones mentioned above as having one specific purpose for 
Stanislavski and the Stanislavskian performers: these performers 
first and foremost have a goal to reach for, which is to 
'penetrate' to 'the core of the material', to be. Improvisatory 
exercises are the means of achieving 'being' while at the same 
time they are part of the whole 'initiation' process towards 
'being'. Ideally, then, each improvisatory exercise will 
function organically so that the performer literally 'builds up' 
the character. The performer uncovers every possible element of 
her character through as many improvisatory sessions as she 
needs. Only when it is agreed upon that the 
'character' has been 
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reached is the performer's 'preparation' considered to be done. 
In the Stanislavskian sense, the procedure involving 
improvisation therefore is logocentric: a 'character' can be 
complex or not so complex but he or she always has to be 
completely 'projected', otherwise the performer playing the role 
of that character is not truly 'being' the character. The whole 
procedure of exercises including improvisation loses its meaning 
without a thorough manipulation of a character by the performer. 
Stanislavski's view towards performers playing a role may 
then succinctly be put as follows: 
In Stanislavsky the actor plays a role and the result, ideally, 
is illusion. In Brecht, the actor plays a role and the intended 
effect is alienation. In Grotowski, the actor plays a role in 
order more clearly to be himself. 4 
'Illusion', if achieved, indicates that the performer 'being' the 
character is satisfactorily noted as such by the viewer as well 
as by the performer herself. The ultimate performer, for 
Stanislavski, is in fact a 'character'. Such a strong pro- 
character approach seems to be based on the premise that a 
performer can be a character after going through a sufficient 
amount of preparation including improvisation. This in turn 
suggests that the performer and the viewer are all put in a 
position to judge if the performer's 'being' a character is 
'true' or not. On what basis they evaluate the performer's 
'being'-ness is another question; our present concern centres 
around the fact that improvisatory exercises were in fact 
regarded as being useful for the Stanislavskian performers in 
their attempt to be a character. 
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We have to remember that the approach which Stanislavski took 
was at least to some extent unavoidable, especially when he 
worked on Chekhov's plays: 
For all the affinity he professed to feel for them, Stanislavski 
did not find Chekhov's scripts easy to read. E. . .] And, 
indeed, the first time through, The Sea Gull struck him as 
'monotonous' and insufficiently 'scenic'. 'Are you sure, ' he 
asked Nemirovich-Danchenko, 'it can be performed at all? ' This 
last comment reveals Stanislavski, as reader of Chekhov, 
grappling with what we have seen to be the characteristic dilemma 
of readers in Chekhov: inability to imagine taking action on the 
basis of what one has read. [. . .] Unable to read in and act from the text, one reads into the text something which, as 
already one's own, it is possible to act upon. 5 
Improvisatory exercises were supposed to make up for what was 
missing in Chekhov's scripts. 'In one type of theatre (say, the 
Chekhovian)', state Frost and Yarrow, 'the implication is that 
characters encounter one another. In another (say, in commedia) 
6 
the actors meet [. . . ]'. The fact remains that we can also try 
the Stanislavskian approach in non-Chekhovian plays; Chekhov's 
plays on their part can be performed from many approaches other 
than Stanislavski's. For example, we can easily imagine a 
situation such as the one witnessed by Jim Hiley in a rehearsal 
with John Dexter as the director: 
Many younger -- and not so young -- performers like to ask hard 
questions about their characters' motivation and backgrounds. 
This is a welcome antidote to the waffly, generalised work that 
goes on in so many pockets of our theatre. A different director 
on Galileo might have gone in for that sort of talk, and perhaps 
used improvisation to explore the lives of the characters away 
from the text; this could have helped fill out the smaller 
performances. Dexter would contend that such delving was not his 
responsibility, though it is doubtful whether it can ever be 
pursued effectively in isolation from the ensemble. 
Interestingly, Simon Callow enjoyed Dexter's approach, 
despite a strong Stanislavskian background. Dexter was a 
trainer, he said, not a teacher; and a lot of actors' talk about 
improvisation was 'indulgence'. 7 
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In this case, improvisation towards character building was not 
exercised because the director did not 'delve' into the 
discussion concerning the 'lives' of the characters in the first 
place. 
What Frost and Yarrow term as the 'second tradition', or the 
'anti-tradition', parts itself from the first tradition when the 
performer's role as a character is recognised as acutely as the 
character per se: 
The improvisation is not about the character's inner life, but 
about the actor's. It awakens responses in the performer which 
are primal, and personal. Afterwards, they can be analysed and 
adapted and assimilated into the actor's conception of the role. 
As they are happening, though, they force the actor to respond 
directly and imaginatively to the situation. 8 
Without such a 'personal' approach to the character, a performer, 
in Jerome Rockwood's words, 'will have no basis for the creation 
of a character for which, after all, he will have to borrow from 
9 
his own store of emotions and experiences'. Improvisatory 
exercises in the Stanislavskian sense would have been impossible 
if any 'personal' approaches on the part of the performer had 
been denied, but what mattered to the Stanislavskian performer 
was a mental and physical conviction that he or she was becoming 
a character. As soon as that conviction starts losing the 
absolute authority, the very presence of the performer will 
inevitably be foregrounded. The performer on the brink of the 
'anti-tradition' finds herself in a subtly ambivalent position of 
'being': 
The presence is not only the actor's 'scenic nature', something 
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that precedes expressivity and is independent of it. It is above 
all the dialectic complement of expressivity, the other pole with 
which expressivity interacts, giving shape to the acting [. .] 
Acting is not expressivity alone but the result of a dialectic 
between expressivity and presence, between the expressive and the 
pre-expressive level. 10 
The 'pre-expressive level' of a performer seems to present 
problems in the performer's preparing process while, as Jacques 
Copeau explains, the solution to those problems can also be found 
in the same pre-expressivity: 
The actor is no longer himself. And he is not yet 'other'. The 
more he prepares for the role, the further he gets from what he 
was doing on the first day. He has had to give up the freshness, 
the naturalness, the nuances and all the pleasure that he got 
from his instant interpretation, to accomplish the difficult, 
thankless, painstaking work of turning what is literally and 
psychologically true into what is theatrically true. He has had 
to set up, to master and assimilate all the processes of 
metamorphosis which simultaneously distance him from his role and 
lead him into it. It will be only when he has completed this 
study of himself in relation to a given character, articulated 
all of his capabilities, exerted all his being in the effort to 
serve the ideas he has conceived and the feelings for which he is 
paving the way within his body, his nerves, his mind, into the 
very depths of his heart, only then will he be able to get a new 
grip on himself, now transformed, and try to give his all. 11 
Despite advocating the performer's every possible effort from 
every possible angle to 'transform', which exerts hardly any 
difference from what 'Kostya' experiences in his improvisatory 
exercises, what Copeau clarifies here is a kind of detachment on 
the part of the performer towards his or her character. Such 
detachment prompts a performer's emotional stepback, which in 
turn enables her to start concentrating more on somatic 
possibilities. A conversion of a 'psychological' truth into a 
'theatrical' truth is expected through the performer's 
exploration of herself. More importantly, however, this 
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seemingly detached approach towards a character actually turns 
out to be what 'leads [the performer] into [his or her] role'. 
This seems to imply that detachment will open the way to 
discovering a dimension of a character which otherwise would not 
have been touched upon. If a performer concentrates on getting a 
'grip' of herself, which in itself does not necessarily mean that 
she consciously 'expresses' herself, she will be more 'into' the 
character. 
At this point, improvisatory exercises take on a different 
and more nebulous meaning because they no longer function 
exclusively as a means of making a performer a character nor are 
they strictly part of the process for the performer to become a 
character. Improvisation instead is now loaded with a power not 
only to deepen the performer's expressivity but to change the 
structure of the theatre as well. What Copeau describes as 'a 
12 
new improvised comedy' may be introduced as an example: 
Choose from among the company, the six or eight actors most 
suited for this project, the most alert, the most confident and 
the most compatible with one another, who will henceforth 
concentrate almost exclusively on improvisation. [. . .] Each 
one of them takes on one of the characters of the new comedy. He 
makes it his property. He nourishes it, fattens it up from his 
own substance, identifies his personality with it, thinks about 
it continually, lives with it, giving it not only his own 
constitution, external abilities and physical peculiarities, but 
his ways of feeling and thinking, his moods, observation and 
experience, sharing his reading, in short developing and changing 
along with it. [. . .] At first I play the role of the poet in 
front of these jesters. This new thing springs from me. I know 
its origin and its early development. In order for them to 
retain all their freshness, I forbid research by the actors. 
[. . .] We 
do exercises repeatedly, but we never take the same 
scenario more than four or five times. We exercise on any 
pretext, while out walking, during meal-times, preparing our 
roles for any eventuality. We become our role, and we confront 
it with those of our comrades, thus beginning the formation of a 
collaborative work. Soon, the characters develop entirely 
without me; they escape from me completely. Scenarios are 
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created one after the other from within themselves. My only role 
in relation to them is that of critic. The comedy is ripe; it 
appears on stage. If it succeeds it will outshine all other 
genres, and soon there will be a new development when it starts 
to enrich itself from the outside, by the contributions of the 
public, who will finish the modelling of the characters we 
present, and by the contributions of the poets who will borrow 
their characters from the new comedy to develop or change them 
according to their own imagination. (pp. 153-55) 
At first, the performers described above seem to improvise within 
the framework of a-performer-given-a-role. As they devote their 
whole selves to materialise their respective characters, the 
performers begin to shift the framework with which they started. 
In Copeau's words, the result of such improvisatory works would 
be a new 'genre' (p. 155). A 'genre' in these circumstances may 
not constitute any substantial shape which will eventually leave 
a mark in the theatrical history; rather, 'genre' here implies 
'the freedom of creative imagination, of dramatic fantasy' (p. 
155), something that goes beyond a straightforward character- 
performer relationship and enters into new entity. 
The third stage of improvisation according to Frost and 
Yarrow is in the realm of theatre on the verge of going 'beyond 
theatre'. Grotowski's actors, as Frost and Yarrow point out, 
concentrate on being performers in such a way that the very idea 
of 'character' is put into question or even denied. Here, the 
purpose of Grotowski's and his actors' experiment is quite clear. 
When 'beyond' refers to the use of improvisation in a therapy 
session or in primary schools to teach some basic social rules to 
children, we can also measure the extent and the purpose of going 
'beyond' in a relatively decisive manner, although in quite a 
different sense compared to the way we see Grotowski and his 
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actors. Apart from those cases, this third stage draws on a wide 
range of unclear theatrical framework coupled with uncertainty in 
how or when a performer goes 'beyond'. While theatre for 
therapy or theatre in education is outside our discussion in this 
thesis, more subtle and unclear 'styles' of theatre/beyond- 
theatre are essential elements in our discussion because such 
opacity is precisely that which defines 'performance 
improvisation' further. Opacity shows in various ways, one of 
which we find in the following passage from Virginia Woolf's 
= Be the Acts. The passage describes the world presented in 
a village pageant and the 'real' world of the villagers 
overlapping each other as the village performers and the village 
audience 'mingle' at the end of the pageant, creating illusion- 
cum-reality: 
Was that the end? The actors were reluctant to go. They 
lingered; they mingled. There was Budge the policeman talking to 
old Queen Bess. And the Age of Reason hobnobbed with the 
foreparts of the donkey. And Mrs. Hardcastle patted out the 
folds of her crinoline. And little England, still a child, 
sucked a peppermint drop out of a bag. Each still acted the 
unacted part conferred on them by their clothes. 13 
Can we say that the villagers are 'improvising' and that such an 
illusion-cum-reality is 'performance'? We will look into the 
idea and the concept of 'performance' and 'performance 
improvisation' more closely in chapter 4. 
3.2 Improvisation and Text 
We can think of texts which do not necessarily have a format 
suitable for literary criticism. 'The participants in happenings 
and performance pieces', describes David Cole, 'work from 
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instruction sheets or scenarios. And even when no script, 
however rudimentary, is in evidence, reading -- displaced from 
scripts to other kinds of texts -- quite possibly still forms the 
basis of the actor's work. In such cases the script-surrogate 
14 
may be a manifesto or theoretical document [. . . ]'. Here, the 
question of 'loyalty' to the text hardly comes up as an issue 
simply because 'texts' no longer are play-texts, or play-scripts. 
Texts exist in different shapes bearing different functions. 
They may still present a format seemingly unchanged from that of 
a traditional play-script; on the other hand, they may be rough 
memos intended for a general instruction to the performer; or, 
they may look like a map, an illustration, or a graph. Some 
texts would clarify as many details as possible, while some would 
only indicate principles. The author of the text might be 
important, while in some cases the identification of the author 
would not matter very much. Some texts may retain their content 
without any modification or re-writing, while some may go through 
such modifications from performance to performance. Some texts 
start from a scratch and the participants will have to develop 
them during rehearsals and in performance. An improvisatory 
performance appearing through these textual frameworks will 
inevitably be quite idiosyncratic, that is, highly dependent on 
individual cases. 
Norma Jean Deak writes, directs, and performs. Her 'text' 
and improvisatory possibilities in it are described by Deak 
herself as follows: 
Because I considered myself primarily a performer rather than a 
writer or director, my first performance began with an idea for a 
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particular character. After making the costume and collecting a 
few props, I went into the space dressed as the character and 
improvised different actions. I had a vague idea of possible 
situations beforehand, but I did not write a scenario or make any 
notes in advance. Although I wrote a small amount of text as I 
went along, the final performance was based primarily on the 
improvisations I did during rehearsals. The performance was a 
vehicle for the character and a vehicle for me as the performer. 
With my second performance my way of working changed. I 
wrote a scenario based on a short text that I had written. The 
scenario included indications for staging, dialogs and narrative 
sections. Before it was completed, I started to work on staging 
and wrote additional text as needed. With each new performance 
the text became more important and writing took up more of my 
preparation time. For my last few performances I have written 
complete scripts before beginning to work on staging. I now 
think of myself as a writer/performer. 15 
Her 'vague idea of possible situations' and her 'small amount of 
text' apparently help Deak improvise. She seems to be able to 
'create' with such a rudimentary text. More precisely, 
improvisation actually develops the text for her, the text which 
eventually identifies with her physical performance. In her 
'second performance', the initial text is not a rough memo but 
more like a play-script, although Deak can still modify it as she 
goes through preparations. Any improvisatory actions in her 
'second performance' have a solid 'canon' to rely on. 
In the case of Atelier Th4atre et Musique's performance, 
improvisatory elements are stipulated like a cue as part of the 
meticulously arranged 'text' of their own: 
Work on San Paroles [sic] (Without Words) began in 1978 with 
acute observation of Bagnolet residents at a cafe -- the. gestures 
that they made, facial expressions, their nonverbal sounds, and 
the words they frequently spoke. Certain of these gestures, 
sounds, and words were chosen and structured according to one of 
the 'systems' that are part of the 'grammar' developed by 
[Georges] Aperghis and the group. These fragments of cafe 
behavior became the 'words', and several of these 'words' 
comprise a 'sentence'. The 'words' and 'sentences' are scored 
according to a 'system'. The score for Sans Paroles, and a later 
version set in a self-service restaurant called M tode pratigue 
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pour se perdre [sic] (Practical Method for Losing One's Wem), is 
performed as a round (en canon). Each element in the score below 
is precisely determined in advance except the 'Free-Gestures' 
which are left entirely to the improvisation of the actors. 
'Gesture 1', for example, is exactly the same gesture each time 
it appears in the score. Each line of the score is a 'sentence'. 
A) Gesture 1 
B) Gesture 1/Sound 1 
C) Gesture 1/Sound 1/Phrase 1 
D) Gesture 1/Sound 1/Free Gesture/Gesture 2 
E) Gesture 1/Sound 1/Phrase 1/Gesture 2/Sound 2 [. . .] 16 
'Free gesture' is 'free' in the sense that nothing is planned for 
the performers during this particular moment. At the same time, 
it is possible to look at 'free gesture' as a deliberate 'plan': 
for the duration of the time allocated for 'free gesture', the 
performers have to perform according to their own directions. In 
fact, these supposedly 'free' gestures are bound by the text 
since they cannot weaken or divert the whole structure of the 
performance. 'Free gesture' has to help maintain the flow of the 
whole sequence of the performance. It is highly unlikely that 
during 'free gesture' a performer suddenly starts a fight with 
another performer in the cafe unless the following part of the 
score will smoothly co-ordinate this. 'Free gesture' in Sans 
paroles may be regarded as a more 'serious' version of classic 
improvisation exercises such as the ones described by Viola 
Spolin among others. 
The published version of Abigail's Party states that Mike 
Leigh is the one who 'devised' the play; there also is a note for 
the reader, which says, 'Abigail's Party was evolved from scratch 
17 
entirely by rehearsal through improvisation'. The published 
script in fact reveals nothing about improvisation to the reader. 
As far as its reader is concerned, Abigail's Party will stand 
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side by side with, for example, Alan Ayckbourn's Absurd Person 
Singular, or basically any other play-script we usually obtain in 
a published version. To what extent other plays go through a 
textual development by way of improvisatory trials without 
mentioning it in the published text is another matter. The fact 
remains that were it not for the above-mentioned note, a reader 
would almost certainly 'read' Abigail's Party in the same way as 
she reads Ayckbourn unless she has the prior knowledge of who 
Mike Leigh is or in what kind of performance Leigh and his actors 
are interested. Attaching such a note for the benefit of the 
reader in itself draws her attention to the making process of the 
play, while at the same time the reader still has no way of 
knowing how exactly the play was improvised; being notified that 
a play was devised through improvisation seems to have little 
effect on our actual 'reading' of the text as a published, 
printed matter. 
Abigail's Party in the form of a published script is a text 
at the time of, and after, the performance rather than a text 
growing with the procedure of devising the play. A text in this 
form may be called a post-performance publication. At this 
stage, a text functions more like a record or anecdote of the 
actual performance in two senses: first, if improvisatory 
elements during rehearsals result in some kind of fixed elements 
by the end of the rehearsals and by the time of performance, an 
anecdote tends to provide us with only the outcome of a process; 
on the other hand, especially with the kind of performance which 
heavily relies upon the performer's improvisatory actions during 
the actual performance, an anecdote we obtain may literally be a 
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record of a once-only performance. The latter case can be 
enacted either purposefully, that is, for the sake of recording a 
performance, or simply as a natural result of a creating 
procedure chosen by individual performers, an example of which we 
see in some forms of Happenings: 
The wonderful thing about new free theater is that you cannot 
have a playbill. Spontaneous happenings are like this also -- 
you cannot say ahead of time who will do what or what will take 
place. One must have something like an afterbill which is 
written up afterwards. This has long been a favorite thought of 
mine. Then the afterbill would be mailed to any person who had 
been in or at the performance and wanted a record of what had 
happened. 18 
In a sense, 'recording' a performance and making it public so 
that it will be available for a permanent reference goes against 
the principles of improvisation: once made into a 'text' of 
whichever form, an improvisatory element may be transformed into 
a proto-text as Roselee Goldberg points out when discussing one 
of John Cage's performance: '[John Cage's] Variations V, given in 
July 1965 at the Philharmonic Hall in New York, was a 
collaborative work with Cunningham, Barbara Lloyd, David Tudor 
and Gordon Mumma; its script was written after the performance by 
19 
chance methods, for possible repeats'. An 'afterbill' 
therefore will make an otherwise once-only performance a 
repeatable 'text'. Meanwhile, a recorded 'chance' performance 
might become a practical source of yet another phase of 
development, possibly an improvisatory one, in the future. A 
'text' can be a stable and fairly reliable anecdote but it can 
also open itself for a further development during performance. 
Richard Schechner explains: 'On a larger scale, the whole 
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workshop-rehearsal phase of performance needs protection and 
isolation, a well-defined safety net, while the finished 
performance can move from place to place on tour, overcome many 
particular distractions heaped on it by audience, and in general 
20 
"take care of itself"'. 
It is clear that what we call 'text' varies in its form, 
meaning, and use for individual authors, directors, performers, 
and the reader/audience: 
The fact is, text just won't sit still under your eyes. The 
nature of text is to demand an answer and, as you respond, to 
demand another. Text is one part in a conversation. Like the 
mime who implies the kite by its effect on isolated body parts, 
text implies its answer by its own flight from center. Text 
means so much, in the performance it keeps demanding of you, that 
its meaning cannot be frozen, but continues to spawn itself in 
what Artaud, watching the precise manipulations of the Balinese 
dance, called 'an infinite perspective of conflicts'. If it 
doesn't do this, it is not, for you, a text. 21 
Accordingly, improvisatory elements vary. While 'improvisation' 
may bear different meanings for each person involved in a 
particular 'text', the fact remains that it is always a text's 
'demanding' nature which prompts the participants of a 
performance into action, including improvisation. Without having 
a text to which 'you' can 'respond' in a profoundly 
confrontational way, 'you' have little chance of eliciting the 
kind of improvisation which is not 'shallow'. 
3.3 Form and Process 
Not everyone can agree on when and how improvisation happens in a 
performance. Even though improvisation always occurs in the 
'moment' which we share together, we do not necessarily 
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experience the 'moment' in the same way. There was a kind of 
agreement among the performers and the audience in the commedia 
dell'arte, if not a perfectly identical understanding of 
performance, then at least a practical performative skill on the 
part of the performers and an eye to appreciate that skill on the 
part of the audience. Such an agreement established 
improvisation in the commedia dell'arte as an object of 
evaluation or criticism. To live in an improvisatory 'moment' 
while knowing very well that it is improvisation, both the 
performers and the audience need to recognise spontaneously a 
'form' in the performance. Susanne K. Langer explains 'form' 
with regard to 'human mentality' as follows: 
The comprehension of form itself, through its exemplification in 
formed perceptions or 'intuitions', is spontaneous and natural 
abstraction; but the recognition of a metaphorical value of some 
intuitions, which springs from the perception of their forms, is 
spontaneous and natural interpretation. Both abstraction and 
interpretation are intuitive, and may deal with non-discursive 
forms. They lie at the base of all human mentality, and are the 
roots from which both language and art take rise. 22 
We can assume that the Commedia performers and audience were 
given enough information and 'education', through their 
experience of performing and observing, to acquire the ability of 
exercising what Langer calls abstraction and interpretation of a 
form. In each Commedia performance, they could detect and 
evaluate improvisation on the basis of the form they recognised. 
According to Langer, a 'constant illusion of an imminent 
future, this vivid appearance of a growing situation before 
anything startling has occurred, is "form in suspense"' (p. 310), 
which we may assume will exert confidence both in the performers 
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and the audience, helping them appreciate improvisation. The 
question is, what does improvisation fall into when no agreement 
can be made among the participants as to the 'form' of a 
performance? In other words, if what Langer terms 'form in 
suspense' is unlikely to be sensed by the audience and the 
performers in a similar way, we may wonder how participants can 
reach the point when improvisatory actions may be recognised. 
Once a performance starts rejecting the inevitability of such 
suspended 'form', it will be more problematic to talk about 
improvisation. 
Performers and the audience take fundamentally different 
approaches to 'form', simply because the performers have worked 
together in the creating process of their performance whereas the 
audience, even when they participate in a non-rehearsed 
performance, are usually deprived of the general idea as to where 
the performance is headed or what its 'purpose' is. 
From a performer's point of view, especially when he or she 
embarks on a performance which does not have a pre-existing 
'text' such as a play-script, a 'form' of whatever kind may be 
heuristically evolved and developed in the process of making a 
performance; this is a separate matter from the fact that the 
performer is, or is not, aware of being in the middle of actually 
creating a form. Desmond O'Donovan, by using the word 'style', 
says, 'A style is not something one can consciously impose or 
really worry about. Style comes from one's sense of knowing what 
23 
one's doing'. The importance of 'process' can in some cases 
equal or even overwhelm that of the performance itself as a 
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'work': 
The process of its making and its reception always exceeds the 
work. For Brecht -- who stops at the very threshold of 
postmodernism -- the making and the process are still predicated 
on what is made, on the meaning to be produced; after Brecht, in 
the work of Beckett, for example, making and enunciation form a 
signifier which cannot be reduced to a signified. 24 
Schechner's environmental theatre also emphasises the importance 
of process: 
The task of environmental theater is to make process part of each 
performance. For the performer most of his daily work is 
process. If he knows where he's going and how he's going to get 
there, he cannot invent or discover in response to known and 
unknown obstacles. A performer deep in process is satisfied with 
Any point in his work provided he is in touch with that point. 
The ultimate of the work is identical to its immediacy: to be 
alive to the here and now, to express oneself here and now. What 
an immense risk that is! Those who love products value things 
and make things of all living beings. Those who love process 
value living and make living beings of all things. 25 
Schechner elsewhere defines process as 'rough and unexpected 
turbulences, troubled interruptions [. . .] not stylistic, but 26 
the genuine meeting between performer and problem'. 
Improvisation, being an embodiment of a temporal aspect in the 
preparation and the presentation of a performance, deeply 
involves both 'form' and 'process'; this also makes improvisation 
less easy to detect or to recognise. 
3.4 Examples 
Reading Schechner's words in Public Domain: Essays on the 
Theatre, which was published in 1969, we are able to assume that 
what happened to the theatre world during the years between the 
1930s and the 1960s turned what had been thought as improvisation 
upside-down, making it almost impossible for us to pin down 
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'improvisation' confidently: 
[T]he pattern of theatre experience offered by the Group [the 
Group Theatre) in the thirties and rigidly maintained by former 
Group members and their students in the forties and fifties is 
yielding to a more diverse set of experiences. It becomes less 
and less easy to set up dichotomies such as Broadway versus off- 
Broadway, regional versus New York, commodity versus art, script 
versus improvisation, art versus politics, or even theatre versus 
non-theatre. 27 
We will here take a look at some performances that appeared 
mainly towards the latter half of this century. Problems 
regarding improvisation against context, text, form, and process 
were most vulnerably and subtly handled by those performances. 
Despite their departure from a character-performer 
unification, the kind of performances that we will review in the 
following actually take up the Stanislavskian line in one crucial 
point, as Robert Benedetti asserts: 
[. .] Stanislavski's vision, his central impulse if not his 
form, is still very much alive in our theatre, not only in our 
traditional theatre but also in the work of the avant-garde such 
as Jerzy Grotowski, Julian Beck, Joseph Chaikin, Richard 
Schechner and others of equally disparate persuasions. This 
central vision was of the performance not as a reflection of 
reality, but as a reality into itself. It is this impulse away 
from seeming and toward being that we must gratefully credit to 
Stanislavski. 28 
If, for Stanislavski, a 'vision' towards bein ' was intended for 
the transformation of a performer into a character and not for 
the presentation of a performer as a performer, his 'vision' was 
at least putting a performer in the position of 'living' the 
moment on stage, not merely representing some particular 
personality. In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
'being' as 'living' the moment seems to take on an even more 
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vital factor in performance, which is to say that 'being' 
overlaps a performance itself rather than overlapping a 
performer's 'vision' or a director's 'vision'. Improvisatory 
elements can be attributed in the following examples to each 
performer's way of 'being', hence the difficulty of pinning down 
exactly when and where improvisation starts. 
Schechner's environmental theatre is 'neither mimetic nor 
psychodramatic' and has the 'logic' not of 'the story but the 
29 
logic of story-telling' according to Schechner's own account. 
He continues: 
Two groups of people agree to meet at a certain time and place. 
One group comes to witness a story, the other to tell a story. 
The story is of importance to both groups. For most of the 
performance time the agenda of story-telling is adhered-to. But 
at any time the story can be set aside or advanced (told) in a 
different way. For most of the time the group witnessing the 
story plays the bass line of the performance while the story- 
telling group plays the melody line. But these roles may be 
shared or reversed. The sharing and reversing is possible 
because of an assumption everyone makes: Anything that happens in 
the theater during the performance time is part of the 
performance. (pp. 83-84) 
Meanwhile, Schechner describes the 'position' of 'experimental 
theatre' as that which 'stands between the "once only" of 
paintings and Happenings and the "performing repertory" of ballet 
30 
or Asian theatre'. Being 'experimental' by Schechner means 
that we are able to 'add to spheres of experience rather than 
knowledge' (p. 17). Environmental theatre is not necessarily 
directed towards a performance as a 'work', because there is no 
dividing line in the first place between a work and a non-work. 
As far as the 'process' of a performance is concerned, every 
single point in the time-span of the 'process' will be regarded 
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as 'part of the performance', which implies that someone 'being' 
herself is indeed a performance. Apart from the fact that such 
performances may not let improvisatory elements reveal themselves 
explicitly to everyone, Schechner in Environmental Theater 
excludes the term 'improvisation' from what he describes as 
'process': 'Process is not improvisation or chaos. Both 
improvisation and chaos are useful sometimes. But process is a 
conversation between spontaneity and discipline. Discipline 
without process is mechanical; process without discipline is 
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impossible'. We have to consider exactly what Schechner has in 
mind when he says 'improvisation' in this context. It may be 
that the word 'improvisation' is here used for conveying the same 
meaning as 'spontaneity'. At the same time, the difference 
between 'process' and 'improvisation' seems to be clear for 
Schechner in this quote. Improvisatory elements may be popping 
out at any point of the process but they are not valued in the 
environmental theatre simply for their flash of insight, however 
brilliant they may seem at the time. Rather, improvisation will 
be valuable only when it is recognised as one of the possible 
ways of making a 'conversation', that is, when 'process' totally 
envelops improvisation, when improvisation is part of the 
discipline in the environmental theatre. This 'process', 
however, is never a fixed notion. If we look at the 
environmental theatre in the late 1980s, we can see that 
'process' itself has changed over the years: 
Today's environmental theatre may move the fourth wall around a 
bit, but no one is put up against or through it. The actors say 
their lines and go through their routines without being unduly 
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affected by what the audience does or does not do. 
'Confrontation', a term so endemic to the social/political/ 
aesthetic discourse of the '60s, is alien to the new 
environmentalism. The need to change, provoke, alter, or 
transform spectators no longer seems central to the aims of many 
practitioners. 32 
Without apparent 'confrontation', the environmental theatre in 
the late 1980s more sharply focuses on a work as a 'package' (p. 
93). 
To Schechner, happenings do not conform to any one of his 
listed headings in the 'performing chart', namely, 'play', 
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'games', 'sports', 'theatre', and 'ritual'. Meanwhile, a note 
added to the chart says: 'Happenings would not necessarily have 
an audience, they would not necessarily be scripted, there would 
be no necessary symbolic reality. Formally, they would be very 
close to play' (p. 73). Kirby on his part describes the 
difference between happenings and a 'traditional theatre' as: 
Let us compare a performer sweeping in a Happening and a 
performer sweeping in traditional theatre. The performer in the 
Happening merely carries out a task. The actor in the 
traditional play or musical might add character detail: lethargy, 
vigor, precision, carelessness. He might act 'place': a freezing 
garret, the deck of a rolling ship, a windy patio. He might 
convey aspects of the imaginary time situation: how long the 
character has been sweeping, whether it is early or late. 
[. . .] If 
the action is to sweep, it does not matter whether 
the performer [in a happening] begins over there and sweeps 
around here or begins here and works over there. Variations and 
differences simply do not matter -- within, of course, the limits 
of the particular action and omitting additional action. The 
choices are up to him. But he does not work to create anything. 
The creation was done by the artist when he formulated the idea 
of the action. The performer merely embodies and makes concrete 
the idea. 34 
Concretising an idea without minding much about an outward shape 
or about how effectively the action proceeds certainly puts a 
happening in a position close to 'play'. A traditional theatre, 
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with its 'mode of representation' being 'stylization despite 
35 
appearance', operates under a condition in which signification 
cannot be avoided. Happenings do not demand on the part of a 
performer the kind of skills which would 'efficiently' signify or 
represent something. At least in theory, then, actions in 
happenings will be highly performer-oriented, while the audience, 
even if they exist, will have a good chance of being left to 
wonder at the scene they witness; in some cases, we have no way 
of telling a performer from a non-performer, or a performance 
from a non-performance: 
[. . .] the belly dancer on the back roof let out a scream and 
crashed through the skylight, falling 12 or 13 feet to the floor 
below her. She was lying there bleeding and screaming, and 
everyone in the audience thought it was part of the happening, as 
indeed it was, though not planned so. A few people fought for a 
telephone to call police and an ambulance. [. . .] It proved to 
be a very wicked, superficial cut. At one point I tried to get 
the entire audience to leave by stepping over Cynthia [the belly 
dancer], but they remained where they were. In the meantime, the 
performers themselves weren't too sure whether anything had 
really happened or not, so they continued to perform. Poons read 
more from the Dada book. Dick Higgins proceeded to recite poems 
from his head. People climbed up into trees who had climbed down 
out of them. At one point a policeman questioning a member of 
the audience was circled several times by my daughter carrying 
the candle on the plate and chanting a rock and roll song. It 
was a fine bit of mayhem and quite abstract. 36 
There is a lack of agreement between performers and the audience, 
or the potential audience, on what constitutes the happening in 
which they are supposedly participating. There may even be a 
lack of agreement among performers. A happening actually 
presupposes such 'misunderstanding'. If happenings and 
'improvisation' are to be differentiated, it is partly because in 
happenings the degree of 'misunderstanding' is often so high and 
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partly because 'misunderstanding' is what characterises 
happenings. 
In fact, if we leave Kirby's definition for a moment, the 
term 'happenings' covers a rather wide range of performance. 
Schechner divides 'happenings' into three categories. The first 
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category is 'the technological, essentially electronic event', 
whose 'most sophisticated forms include electronic music in an 
environmental setting' (p. 151). Schechner points out that 
'human intentionality' (p. 151) will be 'almost nil' (p. 152) in 
performances such as some of John Cage's concerts. The second 
category also is deprived of 'human intentionality', only this 
time it describes a 'free-for-all happening' (p. 152), in which 
'[t]he large outlines of the event are known in advance, but the 
happening may change shape and direction as it proceeds' (p. 
152). The above-quoted performance, in which a dancer having an 
accident inadvertently becomes part of the happening, can be 
included in this second category. As Schechner notes, '[w]hat 
happens, happens' (p. 152) in the performances belonging to this 
category. The third category is 'a combination of the first two' 
(p. 153), referring to those performances that are neither too 
'cold' nor too 'uncontrolled' (p. 153); to Schechner, 'ceremony' 
(p. 153) is the word that aptly explains the performances in this 
category. Within the three, the first category seems to have the 
highest chance of being able to implement the notion of 
'improvisation'. It is systematically more viable to make an 
'objective' score or script or record involving technology and 
music, although in this case 'music' may imply something which 
cannot be dealt with in the traditional sense of music. 
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Technology, which is capable of shutting out 'human 
intentionality', on the other hand is supposed to be capable of 
marking out the 'human' quality: technology and human intentions 
are, at least in theory, quite different in nature and thus it 
would be easy for us to recognise one from the other. All these 
sound academic, however, if we realise that individual happenings 
in many cases criss-cross the above-mentioned three categories. 
All we can say is, while nothing hinders the participants of a 
certain happening from believing that improvisatory actions are 
taking place, it would somewhat diminish the principles of 
happenings if improvisation too consciously came up to one's 
mind. 
Pierre Biner uses the word 'improvisation' when describing 
some of the Living Theatre productions: 
[The Marrying Maiden] was the more interesting one from the 
group's point of view -- opportunities for improvisation were far 
greater in this play than in The Connection, which had only a few 
spots that allowed for uncharted stage business and improvised 
dialogue. The Marrying Maiden turned out to be almost entirely 
different from one performance to the next. 38 
It is clear that a deliberate arrangement is made here to produce 
'improvisation' as an inevitable result: 
The author [of The Marrying Maiden, Jackson MacLow], drawing on 
the rules of chance of the hexagrams in the I Ching, constructed 
six dialogue-and-character scenes. He provided a series of 
directions for the actors consisting of five degrees of vocal 
volume and five degrees of tempo in delivery. And, he specified, 
by means of a hundred adverbs and adverbial phrases, the tone in 
which certain words or groups of words were to be spoken -- with 
gaiety, sorrow, and other emotions following each other solely by 
chance. (p. 55) 
This play has a 'text' with mathematical exactness which 
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instructs the participants how to perform. The text, however, 
also elicits a 'chance' performance smoothly and naturally. 
Biner explains that the production explores this combination of 
specificity and pure chance: 
Judith Malina wanted to go even further. She prepared cards of 
the texts provided by the author for each scene. She then 
created a special part -- a dice thrower, played by Henry Proach 
-- and it was his throw of the dice that determined the sequence 
in which actors, or John Cage's taped 'music', were to be used. 
Each time Proach threw a seven, he handed a random scene card to 
an actor, who then performed it. Each time he threw a five the 
tape recorder was activated -- Cage's 'music' actually consisted 
of a taped reading of the play, with certain parts electronically 
distorted by Cage but most of the text remaining audible. (p. 55) 
The way they pattern various fragments of actions and arrange 
'chance' occurrences is highly technical and even classical in 
the sense that a parallel can be drawn from the way the commedia 
deli 'arte authorised improvisation: 
Most histories of the commedia record the deviation and the 
possible meanings of the word lazzi. Clearly, the word had a 
multiplicity of meanings even for the commedia performers 
themselves. Generally, the lazzi can refer to comic routines 
that were planned or unplanned and that could be performed in any 
one of dozens of plays. Some were obviously used whenever a 
scene-seemed to drag on too long and were totally improvised by 
one actor. Others, involving stage properties and several 
actors, had to be intricately preplanned. Some lazzi could be 
instigated by a single actor, forcing his unsuspecting partners 
to improvise around him. 39 
Also, the word 'improvisation' seems to be used by Biner here in 
a narrow and specific sense, pointing to performers' virtuosity 
in showing their acquired technique at required moments. The 
patterns have already been learned by performers, who now put 
them to use. The general idea of using improvisation in the 
Commedia was to satisfy the audience whereas in the Living 
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Theatre the idea of using improvisation seems to be targeted at 
'chance' itself, or more precisely, at the participants actually 
performing a chance. Another Living Theatre production described 
by Biner is called The Chord, and this again involves 
improvisation: 
In the chant the actors form a circle, including Julian [Beck] 
therein. They hold each other by the shoulders. The vertical 
spotlight used in the preceding scene denotes the boundaries of 
the circle. They inhale deeply. One of the actors in the circle 
intones a sound; then the nearest ones listen attentively to that 
sound and intone sounds of their own; each actor listens with 
total intensity, while beginning his own sound, to the sounds on 
his immediate right and left. The chord swells in intensity and 
volume, then descends gently and fades away. The quality of 
listening will determine the quality of the response, and the 
harmony and beauty of the ensemble. The chord is entirely 
improvised at each performance. (pp. 87-88) 
As in The Marrying Maiden, 'improvisation' in this production 
refers to the kind of improvisatory actions which are 
straightforward applications of the 'rule'. The Chord can be 
regarded as a textbook example of an improvisatory performance 
which sticks to a systematic, game-like structure. In this 
respect, The Chord again reminds us of the Commedia. In The 
13 the setting of which is a marine corps prison featuring the 
lives of the prisoners and the guards, improvisatory actions 
start to show a different dimension: 
Rehearsals as well as performances allowed for a certain margin 
of spontaneity to both guards and prisoners. 
A prisoner 
unwittingly stepping on a white line, 
for example, would evoke an 
immediate improvised act of punishment from a guard. 
Consequently, the actors were treading a tightrope that was, in 
effect, real. The blows may as well 
have been real, for their 
psychological effect on actors so involved 
invariably led to a 
real reaction, the contraction of muscles, and could not 
have 
been much more violent or painful. (p. 70) 
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The 'spontaneity' in The Briq is partly the result of building a 
calculated structure which is intended precisely for such 
'spontaneity'. In this sense, The Brig can be grouped with The 
Marrying Maiden and The Chord. Performers being placed under a 
pressure for some action is also common among these three 
productions. The difference between The Brig and the other two 
production is nevertheless clear. In The Marrying Maiden and The 
Chord such a pressure does not lead to a real physical danger. 
In other words, the performers are aware of the fact that what 
they are doing does not affect their physical well-being. The 
Bri does not draw a clear line which divides performance from 
reality: performers can be in physical danger. Improvisation can 
hinge on a reality/performance borderline for reasons other than 
the possibility of physical endangerment, but this particular 
reason is arguably the least disguised one. This does not mean 
that improvisation in The Brig has totally grown out of the 
'game' element. 'Real' actions in The Brig continue to enact the 
rule of the production, which in fact is vital; otherwise, those 
actions may completely lose control. Improvisatory elements in 
such a critical circumstance reveal the performer's adequate 
power and restraint with which she will keep a balance on the 
edge of the 'performance' framework. 
In an interview with Joseph Chaikin, Arthur Sainer asks 
Chaikin how a work of the4Öpen Theatre begins and if there is a 
'structure' to be 'felt'. Chaikin's answer reads: 
[. . .] that's more or 
less what we've been doing at the Open 
Theatre -- the blank page. In other words, saying 'The material 
doesn't exist', and we all put our heads together and our bodies 
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together and see what we can bring into existence. Then we say, 
'What's, so to speak, a theme, or what's the central idea or 
image of the thing? ' And the idea is that the theme has to be 
something which we can connect to, all of us can connect to 
equally, with equal vitality, and something which at any given, 
living moment concerns us [. . . ]. (p. 3) 
Themes, ideas, and images are generated among the performers as 
they work together. That way, the performers will be able to 
share the theme. This does not mean that the performers do not 
need anyone to 'write' for them. Unless the group has somebody 
who is capable of bringing an idea to the next phase of the 
formative stage, it seems that the idea does not always develop 
effectively into an actual piece of work. To use Sainer's words, 
a 'structure' may be instinctively 'felt' by the performers, but 
they often need a 'writer' to make the 'structure' workable as a 
performance piece. As Chaikin says, the 'writer' has to be a 
participant: 
[. . .] we had the skill of a writer coming in and working in 
relation to us -- we didn't have that skill, not any one of us 
had the skill and in combination we didn't have the skill -- and, 
to me, the weakness of the work was generally the degree that the 
writer was not participating. (p. 3) 
Exercises of the Open Theatre often feature improvisation. 
One of those exercises devised by Nola Chilton is described by 
Robert Pasolli 
One actor calls the colors and points to other actors, who must 
immediately make a movement and/or sound which is evoked by the 
color. The actors should respond impulsively without thinking. 
They succeed to the extent that they manage to make some physical 
adjustment to the abstraction. The exercise can be expanded to 
colors in phrases: barn-door red, instead of just red. 
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Improvising to a colour, or to a specified colour like 'barn-door 
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red', seems metaphorical; how can a colour be associated with a 
particular movement/sound? Reading Pasolli's description, 
however, we realise that the point of the exercise does not 
centre around how colours can possibly have movement or sound. 
Rather, introducing colours for improvisation exercises can be 
regarded as a hand-on, uncomplicated device which prompts 
performers to make physical movements without first figuring out 
in their head what the given 'theme' means. If one of the 
principles of improvisation can be found in the fact that action 
comes with or before thinking and not after thinking, this 
exercise proves to be quite efficient. Colours are abstract in 
one sense but very particular in another and performers are not 
confined to any rigid rules in their expression of a colour. 
According to Pasolli, the Open Theatre takes such 'physical 
adjustment' exercises seriously, which 'led to [Joseph] Chaikin's 
"sound-and-movement" technique, [. . .] the Open Theatre's basic 
unit of expression' (p. 4). Exercises eventually outgrow their 
framework, reaching for the creation of a 'kinetic environment': 
From one actor in a pair he [Chaikin] asked for a simple, sharply 
focused action with the voice and body, an impulsive action 
neither representative of everyday behavior nor expressive of 
inner feeling; a pure action, as it were. From the second actor, 
he asked for an impulsive re-creation of the first actor's 
statement, an appropriation of its dynamics and form; that is, a 
response in kind. The whole was to be a transmission of energy 
and a passing of kinetic material, but with the emphasis on the 
coming together of two actors who create a dramatic event by 
'inhabiting' the same kinetic environment. (p. 4) 
Pasolli points out that the 'sound-and-movement' exercises were 
shown 'as an improvisational statement-of-principles' (p. 7) to 
the audience, who appreciated their 'novelty, virtuosity, and 
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energy' (p. 7). 
Euridice Arratia describes the rehearsing procedure of the 
Wooster Group's Brace Up.: 'the live performance, the mediated 
performance [performers being videoed live onstage], and the 
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sound score are developed simultaneously'. A rehearsal period 
is a 'process' while at the same time it is a 'form'. The 
starting point of the production, which is to choose Chekhov's 
Three Sisters as the 'text', in itself seems to predict a 
manipulation of a 'form' in the course of the rehearsal period. 
Arratia reports that mise en scane ceases to be confined to the 
narrative per se defined by the text of Three Sisters but instead 
involves what happens on stage as a whole: 
Throughout the months I observed rehearsals, these 'game 
structures' were proposed by [Elizabeth] LeCompte at points when 
the rehearsal appeared to be stuck and performers seemed to be 
falling into what she defined as 'a kind of naturalism'. That 
is, when all the elements of the mise-en-scene [sic] began to 
function at the same level, threatening to cancel the 
multiplicity of readings. The game structures had the effect of 
making the performers refocus on the staging process, 
concentrating the scattered energy on new modes of dealing with 
material already familiar. (p. 128) 
The 'game structures' transform Chekhov's 'text' in such a way 
that they 'drive the performers to focus on formal aspects of the 
piece instead of on interpretation' (p. 128), and in LeCompte's 
words quoted by Arratia, 'on physical actions instead of emotion' 
(p. 128). The games are 'to a degree' improvised and the 
performers keep on adding some 'new elements' (p. 128). One of 
those games described by Arratia is: 
E. . .] 
[Joan] Jonas as Masha and [Beatrice] Roth as Irina are 
blindfolded. In order for the action to start, a blindfolded 
performer has to step on one of several 'x's made of black tape 
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placed on the stage floor. Once the 'x' is hit, the production 
manager (Clay Shirky), sitting in the audience area, calls out 
numbered short sections of the play dubbed 'islands'. Once the 
number of the island is called out, [Peyton] Smith, standing on 
mike by the upstage table, cues the performers where exactly in 
the script to start. This is only the skelton of the game, 
however. Besides these general, guidelines [sic], there are 
other rules and intricacies (many of them suggested by the 
performers) that develop. For example, if after a few minutes a 
blindfolded performer doesn't step on an 'x', the narrator can 
do so. Also, time limits are set, and when the time is up, 
performers have to quit the island they are playing and pass to 
the next section. (p. 128) 
The performers are asked to follow the specific 'rules' of the 
'game' rather than pursuing any mental or physical continuity 
regarding the narrative-related concept of Three Sisters. This 
is a quite straightforward use of improvisation, namely, 
demanding the performers to react to an unpredictable, moment-to- 
moment situation. 
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4 The Idea of Improvisation in Performance 
The preceding chapters took historical, practical, and formal 
approaches to performance improvisation without actually solving 
the most fundamental question in our discussion, 'What is 
performance? '. Indeed, our discussion so far has testified to 
the diversified nature of 'performance improvisation', while at 
the same time it has revealed our often intuitive sensitivity 
which enables us to feel the 'moment' of performance 
improvisation. Does it mean that we can point to some specific 
factors that any 'performance' has in common? Can we describe 
what performance is? In this chapter we will look at the 
literature that asks this very question, by means of which we 
will reassess the general idea of performance and that of 
improvisation. 
4.1 What is Performance? 
Performance is what the performer generates. Herbert Blau points 
out, 'A baby may be performing without consciousness, or so it 
appears [. . . ], but what would we know of performance if the 1 
world were full of babies. ' Granted that consciousness as 
opposed to unconsciousness cannot always easily be distinguished, 
we will cast off so-called 'babies' as potential human 
performers, accepting Blau's premise that an unconscious 
performance cannnot exist. On the other hand, we are not able to 
dismiss a person in a trance as a performer, which Blau explains: 
As with the disenchantments of the world, so with other states of 
elapsed consciousness. It's the falling away from trance, or its 
doubling in split consciousness, that makes us aware of trance as 
performance, as well as the possibility -- engrained in the most 
skeptical thought of performance, in performance as a thinking 
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body -- that the world may be tranced. (p. 172) 
In a hypothetical world consisting entirely of babies who may or 
may not be 'performing', with or without consciousness, there 
would be no one to make a judgement on the issue of performance 
in the first place. The difference between a baby and a person 
in a trance lies in the fact that only the latter can change his 
or her position, that is, only he or she can move backwards and 
forwards between in-trance and out-of-trance. A person in trance 
2 
is a potential performer. 
It is not a simple question if we ask what the absolute 
criteria are for deciding what is and what is not a performance. 
If indeed only non-babies can discuss performance, this suggests 
the following: the very concept of 'performance' involves a 
detachment from it, either physically or mentally. 
Performance usually presupposes the existence of an audience, 
but sometimes the same individual acts as an audience as well as 
a performer. Ronald Hayman summarises Peter Brook's experiments 
in the 1960s and after, when the group started showing their 
'work-in-progress', becoming less and less 'public'-oriented: 
Peter Brook had long been aware that actors do most of their best 
work in the rehearsal room [. . . ]. During the first nineteen 
years of his career (1945-63) Brook was not consistently and 
resolutely experimental in his approach. But the 1964 [sic] 
season at the LAMDA Theatre formed a watershed in his 
development. The programme carried a note comparing the 
experiment to a scientific research project, and warning the 
audience that it was watching 'a public session of work-in- 
progress: improvisation, exploration, and a re-examination of 
accepted theatre forms'. The critics ignored the admonition 
reviewing the show as if it were a finished work. Since then 
Brook has been more wary of exposing actors to the public before 
preparation has solidified into performance, but he has contrived 
an artificial situation in which actors can go on working as if 
they were rehearsing, but without the pressure of having to put 
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on a show within a limited period. Since he founded the 
International Centre for Theatre Research in Paris (in 1968) he 
has tended to spend most of his time working with actors, 
experimenting, doing exercises, working on lines taken from 
plays, ideas taken from myths, developing expressive sounds and 
movements, as alternatives to dialogue, approximating as closely 
as possible to perfecting the voice and body as performing 
instruments, but rarely exposing the work in public performances 
[. . . ]. 3 
An 'audience' does exist even in these cases: apart from the 
performers responding to themselves, the director responds to the 
performers and so do the other members of the company. 
The inverse of the above may also be possible. In this case, 
there would be an audience who are unable to distinguish a 
performance from a non-performance. In Virginia Woolf's Between 
the Acts, the setting for a pageant is outside the house: 
Rows of chairs, -deck chairs, gilt chairs, hired cane chairs, and 
indigenous garden seats had been drawn up on the terrace. There 
were plenty of seats for everybody. But some preferred to sit on 
the ground. Certainly Miss La Trobe had spoken the truth when 
she said: 'The very place for a pageant! ' The lawn was as flat 
as the floor of a theatre. The terrace, rising, made a natural 
stage. The trees barred the stage like pillars. And the human 
figure was seen to great advantage against a background of sky. 
As for the weather, it was turning out, against all expectation, 
a very fine day. A perfect summer afternoon. 4 
The description already implies a blend of 'stage' and the 
surrounding countryside, which seems to affect the audience's 
reaction to the performance of the pageant: 
Etty Springett tutted too. [. .] How difficult to come to any 
conclusion! She wished they would hurry on with the next scene. 
She liked to leave a theatre knowing exactly what was meant. Of 
course this was only a village play ... They were setting 
another scene, round the red baize box. She read out from her 
programme. 
'The Picnic Party. About 1860. Scene: A Lake. 
Characters -- ' 
She stopped. A sheet had been spread on the Terrace. It was 
a lake apparently. Roughly painted ripples represented water. 
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Those green stakes were bulrushes. Rather prettily, real 
swallows darted across the sheet. 
'Look, Minnie! ' she exclaimed. 'Those are real swallows! ' 
'Hush, hush, ' she was admonished. For the scene had begun. 
A young man in peg-top trousers and side whiskers carrying a 
spiked stick appeared by the lake. (p. 98) 
A real swallow flying over an artificial lake, a sheet, would not 
qualify as a performer, since, even if we assumed for the sake of 
the argument that someone had trained a swallow into such 
flights, the status of a performer would be given to the trainer 
rather than the swallow itself. The performer in such a case 
does not use his or her own body at the moment of the performance 
but is calling the shots, as it were, from behind. It is not 
obvious if the character 'Etty Springett' is ready to determine 
the non-performing/performing status of the swallow. She needs 
to be certain about the 'meaning' of the play, is aware that it 
is 'only a village play', is informed of the year and the place 
of the scene that is about to begin, and is able to see the very 
artificiality of the 'lake', all of which has to do with the 
'performance' initiated by 'performers', including the staff, in 
one way or another. A sudden, unexpected appearance of real 
swallows into the supposedly-agreed-upon picture of the 
'performance' at least gives a momentary shock to 'Etty'. If she 
wishes to do so, 'Etty' is free to take the incident of the 
swallows as part of the 'performance', whether or not she decides 
to see the swallows as 'performers'. As an audience, she has the 
right to exercise her own view. The countryside chosen as the 
setting for the pageant makes it difficult for the audience to 
draw a line between relevant and irrelevant elements in the 
performance. Meanwhile, the extent to which the performer 
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controls the performance and is responsible for the performance 
can be quite controversial partly because the audience always 
have their own way of seeing and judging the performance. 
Performance in Brook's sense and the pageant-performance 
in Between the Acts both reflect back 
inherent in what we generally call 'p, 
is no sweeping consensus over the use 
second, since performance is commonly 
even often represented by it, we feel 
term 'theatre' at the same time. 
on the vulnerability 
arformance'. First, there 
of the term 'performance'; 
related to 'theatre', or 
the need of defining the 
Richard Schechner's condensed definition of 'performance' and 
'theatre' cited below reads peculiarly drama-oriented, probably 
because he here takes up the four terms, 'drama', 'script', 
'theatre', and 'performance', all side by side: 
[. . .) the drama is what the writer writes; the script is the 
interior map of a particular production; the theatre is the 
specific set of gestures performed by the performers in any given 
performance; the performance is the whole event, including 
audience and performers (technicians too, anyone who is there). 5 
To Schechner, 'performance' and 'theatre' can be versatile, 
evolving, and yet apparently adjustable to specific 'events'. 
Especially on 'theatre' Schechner writes: 
I know an authentic need exists for encounters that are neither 
just informal person-to-person gatherings like parties nor 
formal, mediated, programmed routines like office or factory work 
-- or watching television and films, for that matter. Theatre is 
a middle world where actual group interaction can happen -- not 
only through audience participation but by subtler means of 
audience inclusion and environmental staging; theatre combines 
artistic-composed behavior with everyday-spontaneous behavior. 
(p. 94) 
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The requisite for 'theatre' thus positions itself somewhere 
between 'informal gatherings' and 'routines'. Michael Kirby also 
discusses 'theatre' from a slightly different angle, namely, from 
the psychological viewpoint on the part of the performer: 
Is it theatre if a person performs something when alone or if a 
full rehearsal of a play is conducted without an audience? By 
our definiton, it would be theatre as long as there was the 
intent to make theatre, to show the performance at some time to 
an audience. I. . .] The intent must be specific, however -- the 
intent to make something that will affect an audience. [. . .] 
The launching of astronauts or of a space shuttle draws a large 
crowd; people come from thousands of miles away just to see the 
event. But the launch is not done for the spectators. Its 
procedures and characteristics are determined by other purposes 
than to affect the audience. Having an affect does not make the 
launch theatre. Many things in life affect us without having the 
intention to do so; some theatre, which by our definition must 
have the intent to affect us, actually does not affect us at all. 
It is the intent and not the event itself or its impact on us 
that makes someting theatre. 6 
That the intent has to be 'specific' disqualifies an informal 
party as a theatre since its primary objective should be directed 
not towards an 'actual group interaction' but towards what will 
be achieved as a result of an interaction, for example, a feeling 
shared by the guests that they have had a good time. A routine 
work, on the other hand, is also disqualified precisely because a 
routine should eventually produce something, be it material, or 
physical, or spiritual, or whatever; the process to the finishing 
goal or how the goal has been achieved is not important as long 
as the finished state of the routine work is satisfactory. To 
take an example from a space shuttle launch, when astronauts wave 
to the people watching them and to the cameras as they walk to 
the shuttle before the launch, the atmosphere is usually pompous. 
To some people, the NASA control room shown on television may 
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have a visual effect similar to theatre. In those respects, 
there are some theatrical aspects in a space shuttle launch. 
Still, the ontological goal of the 'mission' remains intact; the 
pompous aspects of the launch would rather be regarded as a 
political gesture, which is quite another question related to the 
so-called 'performance', and we will not pursue it here. 
Calling an event 'theatre' or a 'performance' therefore can 
only be possible when, first of all, we realise the existence of 
something 'extra' to everyday-life; the potential theatre then 
materialises when this something extra becomes the main issue and 
has ceased to be an extra. 'Theatre' or 'performance', however, 
does not always mean a complete everyday-life-turned-inside-out. 
Sometimes, everyday-life keeps itself intact while people 
actively participate in a performance: 
Whether in Pittsburgh in 1885, in a New York Yiddish theatre in 
1907, in a Federal Theatre Project production in Chicago in 1938, 
or in a Workers' Stage performance in Newark in 1982, working- 
class spectators interrupt the show to trade comments with the 
actors. The actors, trained to expect and even to enjoy such 
outbursts, might incorporate the remarks into the play, ignore 
them, or occasionally stop the forward movement of the show and 
continue their performance on another level entirely -- by 
talking with the spectators. The mutual feelings of commitment 
and relationship generated in these encounters are often related 
to the immediacy of the theatrical effect. After all, if the 
audience member experienced the conflicts being acted out or if 
the actor lives and works in the same neighborhood, why not give 
voice to your emotional response or talk to the actor, your 
neighbor or co-worker, when he or she is on stage? In theatre 
for working-class audience, such exchange are not bad manners; 
they are part of the rules of the game. This last convention, 
perhaps more than any other, has separated working-class theatre 
from performances meant for middle-class and ruling-class 
playgoers. 7 
What McConachie and Friedman characterise as 'working-class 
theatre' may be the product of socio-cultural conditions each 
119 
class is subjected to. Because an active 'interruption' is the 
'rule', the working-classes described above are quite confident 
in the way they participate in their theatre. 'Etty' in Between 
the Acts keeps getting surprised, and sometimes annoyed or 
disturbed, by what she sees in the pageant precisely because the 
'rule' which she thought was clearly understood seems to be 
deceiving her. In the case of the working-class theatre, the key 
to calling an event 'theatre' or a 'performance' lies in the 
'rules of the game', by which the working classes live. 
Augusto Boal relates the rules in theatre to those in sport when 
he points out that the former 'allow[s] the spectators to know at 
every performance, the possibilities of the game' while the 
latter '[do] not hinder the improvisation and surprise of each 
8 
play'. We have in theatre roughly two ways of dealing with 
rules: on the one hand, we can live by the rules and enjoy the 
performance, which is different from but not unlike enjoying a 
game of football, or on the other hand we can make the rules an 
issue in themselves by changing them, by trying to break them, in 
whatever manipulative way. What 'Etty' experiences can be looked 
at as a performance on the brink of breaking a rule. The problem 
is, the above two ways do not always emerge separately; it is 
possible that a single production may contain both, or, further 
still, the two ways could subtly coexist at the same time in one 
action. The vulnerability of the terms 'performance' and 
'theatre' therefore implies that there never is a singular way of 
treating any of the rules. 
If rules are clearly established ones, they free us from the 
task of choosing what to see, hear, and how to react; the rules, 
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which we are familiar with, have already done the choosing for 
us. We can therefore concentrate on, for example, a symphony 
concert either as a member of an orchestra or as an audience 
without much trouble. A concert also being a performance, care 
may be taken over the appearance of the players or of the 
conductor, which might affect the audience's appreciation of the 
music; still, what eventually matters should be the sound. A 
fuss made over the appearance of the performers should never 
overrule our awareness of the importance of the sound that we 
hear. The hierarchies of importance in a symphony concert are 
also evident in the rules involved, such as that the audience 
must try to make as little noise as possible during the 
performance. The rules are built up in order to let us focus on 
what is most important. 
What Schechner and Kirby call 'performance' or 'theatre' 
lacks such clearly-discerned hierarchies of appreciation. Part 
of the reason why we do not need to search for what is important 
in a symphony concert is that we are given, as an object of 
appreciation, the 'sound'. Sound is highly abstract and yet also 
highly physical, something which vibrates our ear drums directly 
in the form of air pressures; some people may claim that they can 
visualise the sound of a symphony but it does not necessarily 
happen nor does it change the status of the sound as of primary 
importance. With 'performance' in Schechner's sense, we are 
bound to be left with rather overwhelming circumstances of having 
almost too many things to appreciate. When Keir Elam describes a 
kind of hierarchy in 'theatre', we must remember that Elam here 
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writes about a theatre which is based on 'Western theatrical 
tradition': 
In terms of the performance structure, the automatized state of 
affairs, in the Western theatrical tradition, occurs when the 
apex of the hierarchy is occupied by the actor, and in particular 
the 'lead' actor, who attracts the major part of the spectator's 
attention to his own person. The bringing of other elements to 
the foreground occurs when these are raised from their 
'transparent' functional roles to a position of unexpected 
prominence [. . . ]. 9 
Instead, if we take a hint from Peter Brook's 'I can take any 
empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this 
empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all 
10 
that is needed for an act of theatre to be engaged', we can 




A 'space' is offered a vital position in 'theatre', which leads 
us to believe that 'theatre' requires at least some kind of 
visualisation on our part, whether we are involved as a performer 
or as an audience. Although there certainly exists a form of 
performance which does not rely on any visual means, for example, 
a radio drama, even in such a case we somehow mentally visualise 
the picture of the event most likely with the help of the words 
and sound effects we get on the radio. When the purpose of a 
radio production leans towards the conveyance of certain sounds 
from the source to the listener rather than introducing sound as 
a signifier, it is nearer to the performance of music and is 
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little difficulty if the 
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sent concern. A visualisation presents 
performance is clearly rule-bound: we 
of importance by focussing our visual 
not be missed. Once the rule starts to 
see becomes a less easy task, which 
the audience laden with more information 
An 'empty space' actually is a figure of speech; there never 
exists a 'space' which does not have anything visible in it. 
A space made up of total darkness or a sheer flood of light can 
still be called a visible space by its own right, however 
different the quality of 'vision' may be when compared with a 
space filled up with concrete objects. 
Visual presentation takes many channels. It is possible to 
think of a performance in which the performer is not visible to 
the audience but is actively performing; a puppeteer during a 
performance can be openly visible to the audience, can be 
partially visible to the audience by revealing part of his or her 
body, and he or she can also be completely invisible from the 
audience by hiding somewhere and using the puppets which do not 
require any physical exposure of any part of the puppeteer's 
body. Whether or not the audience are conscious of the fact that 
the puppets are inanimate objects made to look as if they are 
'alive' is another matter. The point is, in such forms of 
performance the inanimate objects move within the constraints of 
their mechanisms and their functions. The mechanism of a puppet 
might reflect fairly simply the physical movements of the 
puppeteer's hand as in the case of puppets in Sesame Street; a 
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puppet might be two-dimensional as in the case of puppets used in 
a shadow play in Indonesia. In any case, the way those puppets 
move around in a space can never exceed what they are 
mechanically capable of doing. The audience are free to 'feel' 
anything they like from the space occupied by a puppet, but their 
sensations will be affected by the mechanical constraints of the 
puppet. 
Even if we physically put an actual human performer in the 
'space', constraints will not disappear altogether. A human 
being as a performer in a 'space' also has physiological 
limitations. Visual presentations cannot go beyond the capacity 
of a human body. On the other hand, a human body in space 
cannot completely hide what it is. A human performer generates 
movement which is plastic in nature, and plasticity is not what a 
puppet usually possesses. Such characteristics, though, may or 
may not be immediately apparent to the eye; it partly depends on 
what a performer wears, or does not wear, on his or her person. 
There might be a point when a hidden performer handling a puppet 
cannot be distinguished from a performer who is exposed in 
space but is completely clad in some material and is supposed to 
represent a non-human being, for example, a bear or an angel. 
The difference among these marginal cases can be regarded more as 
a difference of degree rather than that of quality. 
An immovable, inanimate object in space, such as a mannequin 
in a showcase, usually offers less visual information than a 
flexible, animate body in space does; the organic nature of human 
being is such that no one can ever really stop moving every-part 
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of her body nor can anyone repeat exactly the same movement 
twice. As long as she breathes, she is moving. This, at least 
in theory, results in a rich visual revelation for a person 
observing that particular body. To what extent the audience are 
allowed to observe a performer, or a performer is allowed to 
observe another performer, varies according to the dynamics 
involving space, the performer, and the audience. Given this, we 
suspect that an uncertainty-towards a performer's body is most 
likely to be felt when we do not have well-established rules in 
experiencing the performance. Johannes Birringer sums up: 
As a form of cultural production, the textlessness of performance 
art generally shifts critical attention toward the visual, or 
toward the perceived relationship between body, space, sound, 
light, and objects. This attention to the visual construction of 
the performances, and the functional relationships between the 
manipulation or display of the body and the manipulation of 
space, must be. considered crucial in terms of the historical 
trajectory of performance art. 11 
Birringer states that a human body is bound to be read as a 
code, which suggests that we are always 'reading' a performer one 
Way or another: 
[. . .] historical semiotics and structural anthropology 
today, 
supported by a Lacanian psychoanalytic theory of the psyche as 
representation or a kind of generalized sign economy that only 
touches upon the physical body at points where it is socially 
coded and gendered, would confirm our suspicion that the body, or 
a 'natural' body, never existed. Performers have always only 
performed representations of bodies inscribed by language, 
theatrical codes, and gestural/corporeal stances, and imprinted 
by history. (p. 212) 
The problem is, without a firm rule in observing a performance, a 
code will only function in fragments. It will not be consistent 
throughout the performance nor will it remain stable for the 
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audience to rely upon its significance: 
[W]here theatre is concerned, we must accept the fact that, on 
stage, there are no non-significant elements, none independent of 
all sign relation, for instance, no purely physiological codes. 
And we accept that we are in a particular discursive universe 
where the elements have been chosen specifically for the 
spectator to observe and interpret them during the theatrical 
event. [. . .] We presuppose that the elements on stage are 
already significative and that we are dealing with pre- 
established sign relations. Again, in contrast to linguistic 
theory, we cannot accept a single code -- the verbal, for 
example -- as being fundamental, but will have to employ a 
multitude of codes, changes in codes, and levels of codes. 12 
Herbert Blau apparently pushes what Peter Brook says about 
the 'theatre' further forward, putting a particular emphasis on 
the 'presence' of the body in the space: 
The actor is there (each one) before the space. The space is 
there, but it must be carved out. The Burrow is not-there until 
it is constructed. Silence. The actor moves (or is moved? ) into 
the space. [. . .] Now, the space is established -- until the 
other moves (each one). The step might have been retracted like 
the first word X'd out on an empty page, but while the page can 
be torn up, nobody the wiser, the actor is out there, seen, the 
others there -- the very pulse of thought is an observance, the 
flick of an eye; nor can the step really be retracted if you 
think. From any point of view, the structure extends, 
infinitely, breathing and being breathed, in thought, undeniably 
there. The structure is very simple, elemental, minimalist -- 
but it is a power structure. Absolute. [. . .] The entire being 
of the actor is summoned in the process of becoming to keep the 
structure as-it-was. 13 
We can argue that the body's tangible presence in the space is 
what distinguishes 'performance' or 'theatre' from a film. 
However, if we really want to pursue this point, it will first 
have to be realised that we, as an audience, do not usually 
'touch' the performer in its literal sense of the word; seeing a 
performer in a space and seeing a person on film actually come 
from the same action on our part, that is, taking in some visual 
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information from the stage or the screen. The line to be drawn 
between the two rather has to do with the 'time' which the 
performer and the audience respectively go through. If we turn 
to Blau again: '[t]he theatre is a far more skeptical form than 
film, by nature, whatever else is imposed upon it -- film having 
emerged in consonance with the novel out of the fictive 
aspirations of the legacy of romance. In theatre, the body's 
specific gravity is always there, subject to time, astride of a 
14 
grave. ' To say that a body is present in a space inevitably 
means that the body is sharing the 'present' time, and 
the space, with its observer. A performer often represents a 
character who is supposed to be living in some fictional time or 
some fictional space, but the performer's 'present' existence in 
the 'present' space can be recognised at the same time. Julian 
Beck writes: 
When I come out of the cinema I have a sense of having lost 
time and when I come out of the theater after a play I have 
the sense of having gained it. [. .] 
Time in the theater is real, time in the cinema illusory. 
The theater is primary, consequently it is first of all 
SPACE. E. . .] In the cinema it's all surprise, rapid, 
image after image. In the cinema it is images. In the 
theater it is the living actressor [sic], blood-filled flesh 
and consciousness. Yet both are dream states, like variant 
phases of sleep. In one the body is alert and the mind mostly 
at rest, in the other the dream is visualized but the body 
is in repose. 15 
The exposure of an animate body can arouse a feeling which 
comes directly from the fact that a performing human body is 
presently alive, subject to death; Blau writes, 'there is 
something lethal in a pure physiology of performance -- a 
desideratum of material murmurs that speak of forgetfulness and 
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16 
death'. Since a performer and an audience both have human 
bodies, it would be easy for an audience to quasi-experience a 
performer's actions not only on an emotional level but on a 
17 
physical level as well. What the performer's body experiences 
can somehow be 'felt' by the audience as if the same thing has 
almost happened to them, and there are many ways of eliciting 
that feeling. Some films deliberately target such reactions. 
Hence there are people who wince at a scene in a film, for 
example, of an injured person in a treatment room in hospital; 
even though the film is a total fiction and thus the viewer is 
supposed to be cognisant of the fact that the 'injured' person is 
actually only pretending, he or she could still quasi-experience 
the 'pain' of that 'injured' person especially when the scene is 
made to look extremely real. This might lead us to a conclusion 
that a 'human body' in an intricate animated cartoon will more 
likely be successful in evoking a sense of quasi-experience than 
a real human body in a very formal performance ever will. As we 
have already seen, however, a film does not share the present 
time with us. Only when the performer and the audience live in 
the same space and time do the feeling of being alive and the 
feeling towards death become boldly imminent both for the performer 
and the audience. In Peter Brook's words: 'The theatre E. . .] 
always asserts itself in the present. This is what can make it 
more real than the normal stream of consciousness. This also is 
18 
what can make it so disturbing. ' 
This does not mean that the audience must have a stock of 
experiences from every conceivable field of human affairs and 
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problems in order to fully appreciate, that is, quasi-experience, 
everything the performer does. On the contrary, we are more 
likely to witness a performance in which the movements by a 
performer happen to be so technically accomplished that he or she 
nearly looks non-human. The artistic charm emitted by a pianist 
playing a Prokofiev concerto or by a dancer dancing to a 
Prokofiev melody can find its solid basis only in the pianist's 
or the dancer's technique of incarnating and interpreting 
Prokofiev's music in the way people taking a piano or a ballet 
lesson on a casual basis never could. Such pianists or dancers 
would be appreciated at least in part because 'lay' people will 
not be able to do the same thing. We wonder at a performance 
which hardly seems possible but apparently is possible for the 
performer. However, we sometimes inadvertently witness a human 
side of such performers, their 'material murmurs' that even 
suggest a death, in a mishap during the performance; a dancer 
trips, a horn playing in an orchestra fails to hit the correct 
note at the most important moment in a symphony. If the 'lay' 
people could ever quasi-experience what goes on inside the 
performers, these accidents may be the only possible chances for 
us. Such human errors have to do with a failure in executing a 
technique, something to which any human being could connect 
himself or herself, based on his or her own experience in failing 
to execute a technique properly. 
This is not to say that making a human error in a concert or 
in the ballet can be regarded as a positive aspect of the 
performance. The fact is quite the opposite: a piano or an 
orchestra score, by its nature, distinguishes the 'right' sound 
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from the 'wrong' sound, and a tightly choreographed ballet piece 
makes one misstep obvious to a person who knows the piece. 
Mistakes in such performances will always be foregrounded as 
nothing but mistakes. Still, we must realise that making 
mistakes in fact does not automatically label the performance a 
'failure'; if the performance is radiant with an overall grasping 
of the piece or with whatever kind of charm which is strong 
enough to compensate mistakes, we may still enjoy the concerto or 
the ballet as a well-performed Prokofiev piece. In the case of a 
performance which does not offer a crystal-clear score or its 
equivalent to the audience, how are we to know if what we are 
seeing at this moment is not quite what the performer first 
intended? The same question actually can be asked to the 
performer; does it matter if what he or she performs turns out to 
be something that was carefully planned or something which 
slightly went astray from the plan? These questions will be 
asked when a performance features solely the human body in 
motion. When the handling of objects or instruments are 
concerned, mistakes are easier to detect. Considering that 
'mistakes' in the movement of the human body, including some 
unintended coordinations of various parts of the body, are still 
movements that fall within the range of possibilities of the 
human body, we might even claim that a human performance without 
clear-cut rules can be described as an anything-goes situation, 
so-called 'mistakes' forming part of it. In reality, 
'perfection' envisioned by a performer rarely happens. When 
'perfection' seems to descend on her, the chances are that she 
130 
already is on her way to yet another, different kind of 
'perfection'. 
Our general notion towards 'performance' or 'theatre' assumes 
the parallel existence of non-performance or non-theatre. We 
also generally refer to the non-performance part of the world as 
'reality'. The body is a reality in a space. The question is, 
can the performance or the theatre in Schechner's and Kirby's 
sense be called a reality simply because of the body's presence? 
We could reach a simple solution to this question if we were able 
to see a 'performance' as a totally detached object, that is, if 
a performance could be appreciated in the way not unlike we 
appreciate a 19th-century painting which originally had decorated 
a wall of someone's living room but presently is hung as a work 
among other paintings. It is difficult to put ourselves in a 
completely detached position when we are participating in, or 
even simply witnessing, a performance or a theatre. Even if we 
try hard not to connect what is being performed with our 
'reality', for example, our daily chores, the very presence of 
the body in the shared space, especially the fact that we would 
quite easily be led into a quasi-experience, will hinder us from 
detaching ourselves. Blau describes this point as follows: 
The forms of theater in turn depend on their attitude toward this 
appearance. With the ideological consciousness of the postmodern 
theater -- where performance is more or less dissociated from 
theater -- we have seen various attempts to minimize the look by 
exaggerating it or playing with it, if not insisting on its 
extrusion on behalf of demystification: this being theater, and 
that being reality. But the reality is immense, and like the 
slippage of the signifiers, not that, this, not this, that, the 
trouble with appearance is that it always gets in the way. 19 
If we apply Blau's 'appearance' specifically to human appearance, 
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interpreting it as a human body being observed in space, 
'appearance' will always hinder our attempt in deciding on the 
non-reality, or the reality, of the performance. In fact, as 
Charles Marowitz explains, such co-existence, or overlapping 
existence, of alleged reality and alleged non-reality does seem 
to be one of the factors by mean of which the theatre attracts 
people: 
On the variety stage, there was no pretence about fictional 
situations. The music hall performer was patently on that stage, 
playing to that audience; his only gesture to make-believe was 
the painted drop behind him. His theatre was as vitally 
existential as Brecht's tried to be; as Meyerhold's was. And 
yet, the music hall public was transported; the illusion created; 
the reality of the present moment transcended. Illusion is not 
the exclusive property of the stage; it is the built-in 
predisposition of the spectator. If one wanted to remove it 
really, one would have to lacerate the viscera of a man's 
imagination. But as long as that remains intact, everything that 
unfolds on a stage will be somewhat magical; somewhat unreal; 
somewhat illusionary -- and still thoroughly credible. 20 
There seems to be a tendency for people to create illusions even 
in non-illusionary settings of theatre. Hence 'reality' is 
everywhere, or, if expressed the other way, 'reality' is nowhere. 
Paul Thom asks about the relationship between performer and 
performance as follows: 'since performance is activity, not just 
the representation of activity, the performer's body is part of 
the being of the performance, not merely part of its cause. Thus 
it seems that there is in every performance another duality, 
namely, that between the performer's being and the performer's 
merely representing something. Can there be artistic performance 
21 
without representation? ' In other words, can a human body not 
represent anything outside of itself? 
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Although many people start their discussions on theatrical 
representation by quoting Antonin Artaud, that might not be very 
useful unless the quotation is carefully chosen: Artaud's writings 
actually are a problem by themselves. When Thom comments, 
'Well, despite Artaud, might there not be an entirely 
nonrepresentational performance? ' (p. 142), he seems to suggest 
that the possibility of nonrepresentational performance has been 
rejected by Artaud; on the other hand, Steven Connor asserts that 
Jacques Derrida's writing on Artaud 'point[s] out that Artaud's 
theatre of cruelty is, in fact, an impossibility. No matter how 
intensely spontaneous, or unpreconditioned, any act of theatre 
might seem, it must always to some degree involve representation 
22 
and repetition, by virtue of the fact of being theatre, ' by 
which we assume that Artaud's theatre of cruelty is supposed to 
be nonrepresentational for Derrida. Artaud himself writes: 
If fundamental theatre is like the plague, this is not because it 
is contagious, but because like the plague it is a revelation, 
urging forward the exteriorisation of a latent undercurrent of 
cruelty through which all the perversity of which the mind is 
capable, whether in a person or a nation, becomes localised. 23 
The theatre being a 'revelation' seems to imply that, first, the 
'fundamental' theatre's role is to uncover what has been covered 
so far and, second, there undeniably has to be an inherent 
'something' which has only awaited substantiation. In explaining 
the theatre of cruelty, Artaud puts his proposal about the 
possibilities for theatre the following way: 
Theatre can still derive possibilities for extension from speech 
outside words, the development in space of its dissociatory, 
vibratory action on our sensibility. We must take inflexion into 
account here, the particular way a word is pronounced, as well as 
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the visual language of things (audible, sound language aside), 
also movement, attitudes and gestures, providing their meanings 
are extended, their features connected even as far as those 
signs, making a kind or [sic] alphabet out of those signs. 
Having become conscious of this spatial language, theatre owes it 
to itself to organise these shouts, sounds, lights and 
onomatopoeic language, creating true hieroglyphs out of 
characters and objects, making use of their symbolism and 
interconnections in relation to every organ and on all levels. 
(p. 69) 
Artaud insists that such creation would be 'of no use' without 'a 
kind of real metaphysical temptation' (p. 69) since 'what matters 
is that our sensibility is put into a deeper, subtler state of 
perception by assured means, the very object of magic and ritual, 
of which theatre is only a reflection' (p. 70). Considering that 
24 
in his writings Artaud repeatedly uses the word 'poetry' to 
describe theatre, what he pursues in theatre seems to be something 
extremely refined but still very much down to earth, something 
that can deliver a direct and therapeutic sensation. The 
performing body, then, exists in a space to evoke such a 
sensation. In that sense, Artaud's theatre of cruelty is, as 
25 
Derrida writes, 'not a representation' but 'archi-manifestation 
of force or of life' (p. 238), since 'nonrepresentation is 
[. . .] original representation, 
if representation signifies, 
also, the unfolding of a volume, a multidimensional milieu, an 
experience which produces its own space' (p. 237). Paul Thom's 
supposition that, like 'the project of "absolute" music and the 
project of "concrete" art', nonrepresentational performance would 
26 
be something of a 'purism' therefore refers to a pure fantasy, 
something which we can reflect on but cannot put into action. A 
performing body will always represent and signify itself in 
performance. 
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What is 'performance'? If we argue that a performer cannot 
but represent, the question of what 'performance' is will be 
replaced by the acknowledgement of that particular argument. Read 
from such a point of view, Michael Chekhov's description of 
'performance' is quite exhaustive: 
The performance is the idea, the 'what', the realm of feelings, 
the atmosphere, and the will. Everything which we can see on the 
stage with our eyes, everything that is audible, belongs to the 
realm of the will of the performance. It moves, it is there, it 
is a constant process. 27 
Also indicating the same principle, Richard Schechner manages to 
sum up 'performance': 
playing is a mood, an attitude, a force. It erupts or one falls 
into it. It may persist for a fairly long time -- as specific 
games, rites, and artistic performances do -- or it comes and 
goes suddenly -- a wisecrack, an ironic glimpse of things, a bend 
or crack in behavior. 28 
4.2 Improvisation: Revealing the Nature of Performance 
Bertolt Brecht touches upon the question of what 'theatre' must 
offer: 
Even the street-corner demonstration includes artistic elements. 
Artistic abilities in some small degree are to be found in any 
man. It does no harm to remember this when one is confronted 
with great art. Undoubtedly what we call artistic abilities can 
be exercised at any time within the limits imposed by our street 
scene model. They will function as artistic abilities even 
though they do not exceed these limits [. . . 1. And true enough, 
the epic theatre is an extremely artistic affair, hardly 
thinkable without artists and virtuosity, imagination, humour and 
fellow-feeling; it cannot be practised without all these and much 
else too. It has got to be entertaining, it has got to be 
instinctive. 29 
Exactly how the 'entertaining' element of theatre should mingle 
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with Brecht's epic theatre is not our present concern; instead, 
we can focus on the fact that Brecht takes the entertaining 
aspect of theatre quite seriously. Herbert Blau points out: 
'[Brecht] understood that if one wants the theater to be 
explicitly instructive, the means to that end had better delight. 
The deeper pleasures of theater may be more perverse, but 
whatever the inheritance of ritual purpose, one goes there for 
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pleasure as well. ' The elements of 'entertainment' and 
'pleasure', although they would locate the theatre in one 
fundamental human desire, still leave us with only a vague idea 
of why we keep returning to theatre without being forced to do 
so. 'Pleasure' implies our instinctive preference towards 
something which we would rather see or experience in theatre over 
something else which we would rather not see, or something which 
we would not particularly care if we see it or not. When Lars 
Kleberg explains Sergey Eisenstein's theatre, we can interpret 
'attraction' as one way of enacting 'pleasure': 
In his manifesto Eisenstein had introduced the term 'attraction' 
to designate the minimal unit of a performance, by which he 
meant any strong sensual or psychological shock on the spectator 
through which the director structures the play. Although the 
term was new in the theatrical context (it was borrowed from the 
circus), Eisenstein maintained that the phenomenon itself was 
old. 'Attractions' included an actor's diction and the colour of 
the prima donna's tights, Romeo's monologue as well as 
firecrackers underneath the spectators' seats. Whereas 
attractions were earlier used as a means of mimetic, realistic 
illustration, the theatre Eisenstein wanted to develop was based 
on the 'free montage of arbitrarily selected independent ... 
effects (attractions)'. 31 
it is not enough, therefore, that theatre simply exists in a 
space for the performer and the audience; theatre can work, 
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according to the statements cited above, effectively only when it 
'shocks' people. The shock, Eisenstein seems to imply, may 
precisely be the element that shaped theatre in the first place 
and has let the theatre survive. As Richard Schechner points 
out: '[t]heatre history can be given an overall shape as a 
development along a core which is a braided structure constantly 
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inter-relating efficacy and entertainment'. If people get a 
shock which they duly expected to get, the satisfaction of having 
what they wanted is sensed as pleasure. The 'attraction', or the 
'shock', does not confine itself in overtly visual or sensual 
means, such as a surprising and dangerous-looking movement of the 
body, but it also works in subtler, and possibly more lasting 
ways, such as that which Eugenio Barba calls a power of 
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'seduction. ' Barba elaborates on it: 
Faced with certain actors, a spectator is attracted by an 
elementary energy which seduces without mediation, even before he 
has deciphered the individual actions or questioned himself about 
their meaning and understood it. [. . .] The flow of energies 
which characterize our daily behaviour has been derailed. The 
tensions which secretly govern our normal way of being physically 
present, come to the surface in the actor, become visible, 
unexpectedly. (pp. 13-14) 
'Seduction' in Barba's sense still is an incarnation of 'shock'; 
unless the performer shakes off what constitutes an outwardly 
'normal' human being and reveals what is always there but is 
hidden inside him or her, we would not be 'seduced'. Being 
seduced means the shock of seeing what we usually do not get to 
see, which subsequently might prompt a sense of pleasure. 
Jerzy Grotowski talks about theatre from a slightly different 
point of view, that is, directing attention to the rapport 
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among the participants and, as it were, within their 'selves': 
The core of the theatre is an encounter. The man who makes an 
act of self-revelation is, so to speak, one who establishes 
contact with himself. That is to say, an extreme confrontation, 
sincere, disciplined, precise and total -- not merely a 
confrontation with his thoughts, but one involving his whole 
being from his instincts and his unconscious right up to his most 
lucid state. 34 
Robert L. Benedetti also alludes to 'encounter', which in this 
case is a rapport between a performer and a viewer: 'We confront 
the actor in an uncapturable, unrepeatable moment in time when 
his mortality, heightened and clarified by his art, confronts our 
own. This human encounter will increasingly be the basis for our 
35 
theatre in years to come. ' Both uses of the word 'encounter' 
can be interpreted as trying to say the same thing as Artaud's 
concept of the theatre of cruelty, only that Grotowski and 
Benedetti rephrase Artaud on the level of individual performers 
and members of the audience. 'Encounter' is a highly charged 
exchange of what a performer needs to get and what she needs to 
give: a performer demands of her co-performers, of the audience, 
of some elements in the world, or of herself what she desperately 
needs in order to live the 'moment' of a performance, while she 
also has to give as much help to others and to herself so that 
the 'moment' will be fully shared and experienced. Without such 
an element in theatre, there can be no potentiality of shock or 
seduction either. Grotowski emphasises a performer's 'technical 
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competence' in such an encounter, which supports our discussion 
on the technique of performance improvisation in chapter 2. 
Theatre cannot necessarily be called a failure even when it 
shows a serious 'flaw' in any part of its structure. Seen on the 
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whole, theatre is more like a complicated and disproportionate 
mixture of what operates 'successfully' and what does not. As 
Meyerhold states, there can never be a complete unity of every 
element in the theatre: 'The theatre is constantly revealing a 
lack of harmony amongst those engaged in presenting their 
collective creative work to the public. One never sees an ideal 
blend of author, director, actor, designer, composer and 
property-master. For this reason, Wagner's notion of a synthesis 
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of the arts seems to me impossible. ' An incomplete theatre is 
still capable of shocking and seducing people. However, unless 
it can find ways of focussing its 'attractions', an incomplete 
theatre will always be boring and fail to hold its audience. The 
theatre's search of effective means of 'attraction' is embodied 
in a theatrical 'form'; we might even be able to say that finding 
a suitable form means discovering the way through to shock 
people. Meyerhold in the following supports such presumption: 
In the pantomime, the spectator is gripped not by the plot but by 
the manner in which the actor's free inspiration manifests itself 
through his sole desire to dominate the stage E. . .] Pantomime 
excites not through what is concealed within it but by how it is 
created, by the framework which confines its'heart, by the skill 
of the actor revealed through it. The actor's movements vary 
according to his costume, the properties and the setting. Far 
from arbitrary, costume is an integral part of the production; 
its cut and colour are of utmost importance. Make-up, too, is 
relative -- there are masks and masks. Theatricality presupposes 
an inevitability of form. 38 
Grotowski also discusses 'form': 
This elaboration of artificiality -- of the form's guiding rein 
-- is often based on a conscious searching of our organism for 
forms whose outlines we feel although their reality still escapes 
us. One assumes that these forms already exist, complete, within 
our organism. Here we touch on a type of acting which, as an 
0 
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art, is closer to sculpture than to painting. Painting involves 
the addition of colours, whereas the sculptor takes away what is 
concealing the form which, as it were, already exists within the 
block of stone, thus revealing it instead of building it up. 39 
'Form' is not to be considered in simple terms of opposition to 
content but more in line with Blau's definition: '[t]he 
disfigurement itself is an irruption of new content. It is also 
a breach of form trying to erase the difference between form and 
40 
content. ' 
According to Jean-Paul Sartre, theatre is 'gesture', which 
'can't be exactly defined as something which is not an act, for 
acts are often gestures too' but 'is an act which has no purpose 
in itself, an action, a movement intended to show something 
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else'. The following words by Blau seem to imply this point: 
I am particularly interested in the irruptive source of the 
theater's most compelling power, cutting across the pleasures of 
any of its various modes. As in the splitting action of the 
nuclear dream, there is the precipitating moment when, from 
whatever prior substance (or illusion of priority), it identifies 
or reveals or betrays itself as theater. 42 
Meanwhile, Blau also detects a somewhat wishful tendency within 
theatre towards 'something other than theater, if not in the 
symbolist spirit of music, then specifically more like life, 
though even in the spirit of realism it encounters life as a 
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dream'. Here, 'life' seems to refer to 'being' not yet 
represented in any form. 
Theatre never becomes life itself. While we are facing 
theatre, we are pouring what Blau calls 'memories' into what we 
witness, and Blau even goes as far as asserting that 'theater is, 
in whatever revisionist, futurist, or self-dissolving form -- or 
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in the most proleptic desire to forget the theater -- a function 
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of remembrance. Where memory is, theater is. ' Here, 'memory' 
does not only mean a recollection of specific events, dates, 
situations or experience related to what we see in the theatre. 
An individual who participates in the theatre lives through his 
or her own moment of 'memory' incited by that particular theatre. 
We can turn to Woolf's Between the Acts for an example of such 
'memories'. 'Mrs. Lynn Jones', one of the guests at the pageant 
performance, goes through her own memories when the scene of 
praising 'home' finishes: 
The gramophone warbled Home, Sweet Home, and Budge, swaying 
slightly, descended from his box and followed the procession off 
the stage. 
There was an interval. 
'Oh but it was beautiful, ' Mrs. Lynn Jones protested. Home 
she meant; the lampl. it room; the ruby curtains; and Papa reading 
aloud. 
[. . .] 
But Mrs. Lynn Jones still saw the home. Was there, she 
mused, as Budge's red baize pediment was rolled off, something -- 
not impure, that wasn't the word -- but perhaps 'unhygienic' 
about the home? Like a bit of meat gone sour, with whiskers, as 
the servants called it? Or why had it perished? Time went on 
and on like the hands of the kitchen clock. [. . .] If they had 
met with no resistance, she mused, nothing wrong, they'd still be 
going round and round and round. The Home would have remained; 
and Papa's beard, she thought, would have grown and grown; and 
Mama's knitting -- what did she do with all her knitting? 45 
Her chain of memories, first brought about by 'Budge' and 'Home, 
Sweet Home', is actually leading 'Mrs Lynn Jones' to a purely 
personal world which cannot possibly be experienced by any other 
person. Her memories have little to do with the pageant which 
she is presently seeing. A theatre of any kind exists precisely 
for such moments of living one's memories; as Blau states: 'we 
realize that we are enacting a text in the theatre even when 
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there is no text. What is delivered from the brain back to the 
mind is a sense of all behavior, every sound. It is, if it can 
be imagined, the source of our idea of illusion. If it can't be 
46 
imagined, it is a very shallow play. ' Whether 'memories' come 
out or not will be the watershed for the theatre if it intends to 
'shock' people. 
At first glance, improvisation seems primarily to explore 
physical as well as psychological 'memories'. Does it mean that 
improvisation is mainly a repetition, a 'moment' of being 
reminded of a known physical sensation, a 'moment' of re- 
experiencing certain sensations physically as well as mentally? 
Alan Read defines improvisation as '[relying] on a "saying" 
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rather than the "said"', which places improvisation opposite 
repetition. Read explains: 
The said is the discourse that is translatable, transferable and 
performable. The saying is the speech act itself that resists 
removal from its context however banal that arena might be. 
[. . .] Saying is more than speaking, it is a way of giving 
everything, of not keeping anything for oneself, and here 
embraces and challenges the politics of quietude. The 'said' of 
theatre exists in its repetition and reproduction; the 'saying' 
in its improvisation and innovation. It is in the everyday that 
the saying often discreetly occurs in and around the ethical 
relation. It resides in the micro-gestures of society, not in 
its flamboyant theatrical expressions concretised as the 
discourse of theatre. (p. 95) 
Read's viewpoint basically parallels J. L. Austin's speech-act 
theory in that a speech act for Austin always works within a 
certain context: 'to be performative a statement must be spoken 
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"seriously" and not be a joke or used in a play or poem'. Such 
an emphasis on the context-ridden aspect of improvisation helps 
us appreciate the special, ephemeral quality of each single 
142 
'moment', but it also undermines the very reason for a 
performer's polishing her improvisatory technique. Meanwhile, 
Derrida attacks the very concept of placing speech acts opposite 
theatre. Theatre can be levelled with speech acts if we choose 
to regard speech acts not exclusively as acts having a purpose 
for themselves but also as a means of representation. To 
Derrida, speech acts are repeatable, which is precisely what 
49 
makes the speech seriously 'performative'. 'Saying', if we 
follow his assertion, possesses the aspect of 'said' after all. 
Accordingly, performance improvisation relies both on the power 
of 'memories' and on the power of once-only 'moment'. 
The question of repeatability should not be underestimated. 
'Repeatability' and 'spontaneity' presuppose each other; 
improvisation looks most 'seducing' when things are repeated, 
when 'spontaneity' has something solid like a canon to fall back 
on. In Hollis Huston's metaphorical expression, the 
inevitability of repetition in improvisation is implied: 'A man 
walks across the stage. He walks across the stage again. The 
same man, walking in the same direction, in the same style, at 
the same tempo -- but we all know that it is not the same, the 
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man wears his difference on his sleeve. ' Herbert Blau views 
repetition in theatre as a solution to what might become an 
everlasting suspension of seeking for the so-called 'truth': 
As we could see way back in the stichomythia of Greek drama, the 
almost catechistic repetitions of what is surely clear to the 
audience, there is something of ritual purpose -- and a perverse 
quotient of pleasure -- in the deferral of the self-evident. 
[. , .] Obvious as 
it is, the theatre compulsively replays it, 
with more or less transgressive variations (historical and 
cultural) on the unavoidable theme, which is what we do with the 
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hidden banality of any repellent truth. The dramatic theatre is 
most guilty of this compulsion, but no theatre is entirely free 
of it, neither the compulsion nor the guilt [. . . ]. Saving 
desire from the warp of desire, it thus authenticates repression, 
and with it -- through the most strenuous and subversive 
resistance to its own illusory power -- the (dis)rupture of 
representation. 51 
'Spontaneity' is an experiment conducted under an enormous 
pressure of having to fill in the slot of infinite monotony. 
Improvisation, with its repetitive and once-only dichotomy, 
allows us to live 'memories' in a psychosomatic manner, that is, 
to live the 'moment' of a performance. Improvisation is an 
encounter, a shock, revealing the very nature of performance. 
4.3 The Idea of Improvisation 
Nikolai M. Gorchakov says of improvisation, 'You should not 
52 
prepare youself for it'. He explains: 
When we started our impromptus the first time, you tried to think 
them up. I don't deny the importance of thinking, inventing or 
planning, but if you have to improvise on the spot [. . . ], you 
must act and not think. It's action we must have -- wise, 
foolish or naive, simple or complicated, but action. (p. 140) 
Gorchakov attributes the above observation to Yevgeny Vakhtangov. 
In terms of the apparent supremacy of 'action' over 'thinking', 
one thing is quite clear here: according to Gorchakov, and 
Vakhtangov, any 'unprepared' action would be better than a 
'thinking-and-acting' if that action is going to be called an 
improvisation. Does 'thinking' only numb one's action and thus 
should be contained somewhere below the level of one's 
consciousness? Are improvisatory action and 'thinking' 
incompatible? Herbert Blau claims that the two are in fact 
incompatible: 
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The hardest thing for the actor to lea 
verbalizing of reflection begins -- to 
stop, the temptation being at first to 
internalizing thought. The actor will 
conventional rationalization about not 
speak. In this work, that preparation 
but an irrelevance. 53 
rn is -- once the 
keep speaking, not to 
withdraw into 
justify it with the 
being 'prepared' yet to 
is not only a hindrance, 
The vital importance in improvising will be to keep on acting, be 
it a physical movement or a verbal speech, and never to create a 
void by stopping what one is doing. During a void, we may not 
even be 'thinking' but instead may possibly be 'blank' in mind 
and petrified in body. When whatever has been going on ceases to 
proceed, the standstill breaks a certain rhythm and the general 
flow of the performance. 
Some forms of theatre serve as a basis for an overt or an 
intentionally devised improvisation better than some other forms 
do. In a tightly scripted play, for example, an improvisatory 
movement is not a priority, simply because the play otherwise 
could not be so 'tightly' scripted. Julian Beck takes up an 
allegedly 'improvised' nature of Pirandello's Tonight We 
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Improvise: the whole structure of the play reflects on a 
classic improvisatory situation, which is made possible by the 
tightly-specified script. On the other hand, it would be quite 
difficult for the performers to improvise without any script 
whatsoever or without any agreed-upon guideline. A preferable 
situation for improvising would lie somewhere between the above 
two extremes; one example is cited by Beck: 'With The Brig came 
The Living Theatre's first important art-of-acting discovery. 
Kenneth Brown had written a play in which the action was bound by 
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rules, but within those rules only improvisation was possible. 
He provided a situation in which improvisation was essential. It 
was real' (p. 80). As we saw in chapter 3, The Brig may be 
regarded as a 'test' to show that improvisation, however 
'essential', still abides by the rules in order not to lose 
control. On the more technical side of improvisation, Viola 
Spolin takes up the issue of 'pre-planning', which she asserts 
should only help a performer build a 'structure': 
Pre-planning how to do something throws the players into 
'performance' and/or playwriting, making the development of 
improvisers impossible and preventing the player in the formal 
theater from spontaneous stage behavior. [. . .] Pre-planning 
How constitutes the use of old material even if that material is 
but five minutes old. Pre-planned work on stage is the result of 
a rehearsal even if that rehearsal was but a few seconds of 
mental visualization. [. . .] Pre-planning is necessary only to 
the extent that the problems should have a structure. The 
structure is the Where, Who, and What plus POC [the Point of 
Concentration]. 55 
According to Keith Johnstone, it is the performers themselves 
who make use of 'offers', or make a preferable improvisation out 
of seemingly non-preferable offers: 
[An improvising performer] may accept offers which weren't really 
intended. I tell my actors never to think up an offer, but 
instead to assume that one has already been made. [. .] Once 
you learn to accept offers, then accidents can no longer 
interrupt the action. When someone's chair collapsed 
Stanislavsky berated him for not continuing, for not apologising 
to the character whose house he was in. This attitude makes for 
something really amazing in the theatre. The actor who will 
accept anything that happens seems supernatural; it's the most 
marvellous thing about improvisation: you are suddenly in contact 
with people who are unbounded, whose imagination seems to 
function without limit. 56 
Unless the performers possess a receptive 'sense' of coping with 
each small incident in the theatre, it is not possible to 
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introduce the kind of improvisation which, in Spolin's words, is 
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part of 'deeper experiences'. Furthermore, when the 
flexibility on the part of a performer is generated fully, the 
result will look less like an improvisatory action, which Spolin 
explains as follows: 'Spontaneous blocking appears to be 
carefully rehearsed when players are truly improvising' (p. 157). 
Johnstone says virtually the same thing: 'Good improvisers seem 
telepathic; everything looks prearranged. This is because they 
accept all offers made -- which is something no 'normal' person 
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would do'. These comments suggest that a performer can reach a 
point of being so acceptant that his or her improvisatory actions 
almost look like the structure to the viewer. 
Flexible actors improvise, not resorting to actions which are 
clich4, although improvisation may start with clich6 as Herbert 
Blau argues: 
[. . .] even when 
[the improvisational element is practiced, 
improvisation almost invariably starts with cliche [. . . ]. The 
purging of clich6 is a function of repetition and duration, the 
breaking down of defenses through either sustained challenge or 
boredom. [. . .] Since most of us are complexes of habits, 
attitudes, and instincts which are banal until refined by the 
stringencies of thought and method, what can we really expect of 
unprepared and instantaneous responses but the shallowness of 
which we know ourselves capable. 59 
Blau seems to regard improvisation itself as being not inevitably 
'shallow' in quality but almost certainly so at its inception. 
If an improvisatory action can be tried and re-tried during 
rehearsals, it will have a chance of being 'refined' and 
consequently getting 'better', that is, something not 'banal'. 
Peter Brook also uses the word 'clich4' and focusses upon its 
limitation: 
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Those who work in improvisation have the chance to see with 
frightening clarity how rapidly the boundaries of so-called 
freedom are reached. Our exercises in public with the Theatre of 
Cruelty quickly led the actors to the point where they were 
nightly ringing variations on their own cliches [. . . ]. 60 
Improvisatory actions during rehearsals, or in Brook's case 
during exercises open to the public, have time and occasions to 
go through changes: the process of improvising directly 
contributes to the resultant structure of the production. In 
such cases, the performer and the person who directs the 
structuring are often different: 'Improvisations are chaotic; 
they need somebody to edit them, to impose order on them, to 
suggest ways of transforming the small bits of usable stuff into 
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something whole. ' On the other hand, if an improvisatory 
action happens to be a once-only presentation for the audience, 
it cannot be re-tried but it will still blatantly reveal a 
performer's 'stringencies of thought and method', which have 
been cultivated by the performer outside the present performing 
moment. Johnstone's view on clich4 focusses on what comes first 
to the performer, which uncovers his or her improvisatory gist: 
Many students block their imaginations because they're afraid of 
being unoriginal. [. . .] The improviser has to realize that the 
more obvious he is, the more original he appears. [. . .] If 
someone says 'What's for supper? ' a bad improviser will 
desperately try to think up something original. Whatever he says 
he'll be too slow. He'll finally drag up some idea like 'fried 
mermaid. ' If he'd just said 'fish' the audience would have been 
delighted. 62 
Here, apart from the importance of being quick in reaction, 
which, as has already been seen, is a pulse of improvisation, an 
apparently paradoxical idea is presented: an 'obvious' reaction 
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is a most fascinating execution of improvisation. This can be 
associated with Spolin's assertions: 'Everyone ad-libs every 
waking hour of the day and responds to the world through his 
senses. It is the enriching, restructuring, and integration of 
all of these daily life responses for use in the art form that 
makes up the training of the actor for scene improvisation and 
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formal theater. ' Improvisation can also become a stepping- 
stone to another form of improvisation. Lee Strasberg explains, 
'Even the technically trained actor, who has a battery of devices 
for impelling his imagination, often does not realize to how 
great an extent improvisation in performance can rest upon prior 
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improvisation done during the rehearsal process. ' 
If the audience do not realise that what they are seeing is 
a performer's improvisatory action, their appreciation of the 
action more likely concerns aesthetic elements, not the 
performer's accomplished skills in coping with the circumstances. 
Whether or not an improvisation really falls into the realm of 
aesthetics is another question, which I will briefly take up 
later. The point is, any improvisatory action needs the audience 
who are equipped with appropriate backgrounds and knowledge to 
take the presented improvisation as improvisation; otherwise, an 
improvisation would be transformed into something else once in 
the hands of the audience. Blau states in the following that all 
improvisatory actions are tightly-knit: 
[T]he improvisational element is not merely random or 
associative. [. . .] for some academics worrying about the Text 
that they abuse in other ways, the word improvisation seems to 
signify everything reprehensible, even immoral, in alternative 
forms of theatre, an automatic sloppiness, or a loss of the 
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distinction between art and life. But, as in Barthes, one can 
imagine forms of theatre in which the single closure of 
interpretation is refused as reductive. The structure of 
proliferation is meant to be exact. The multiplicity is 
scored. 65 
Our appreciation of an improvisatory action in fact occurs within 
an intricate as well as rule-governed complex of agreements, in 
which sense we are not at all a 'free' viewer of an action. It 
also means that people from different backgrounds may decode an 
improvisatory action in different ways. Can a performer and the 
audience share the 'moment' of improvisation without the 
background of solid tradition or knowledge? This question will 
be discussed in chapter 5. 
Freedom and restriction are two strings that pull the whole 
idea of improvisation from opposite directions. Restriction 
relates to the form or the style of the theatre, an example of 
which is 'Happenings' as described by Michael Kirby. As far as 
Kirby is concerned, as we saw in chapter' 3, 'Happenings' and 
improvisation are different: improvisation is rule-bound and only 
to be realised within the existent format of 'theatre', according 
to Kirby, whereas 'Happenings' may easily defy the very basis of 
what constitutes such an idea of 'improvisation': 
In both Commedia dell'Arte and improvisational theatre, 
character, time and place are given: details within, and in terms 
of, the matrix are invented. Although Stanislavski's techniques 
are diverse enough to find use in ordinary nonmatrixed behavior, 
the actual application in countless acting classes and study 
groups is on the specific control of various aspects of 
personality and of imaginary time-place orientation. [. . .] [In 
Happenings], [i]f involved in a movement pattern, for example, [a 
performer] may get out of another's way or fall down if bumped by 
him, but he does not consciously adjust the qualities of his 
movement in order to fuse it visually with that of the other 
performers. The action in Happenings is often indeterminate but 
not improvised. 66 
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If we follow Kirby, an improvisatory action turns an accident 
during rehearsals or during the performance into something more 
usable. According to Kirby, the framework cannot change no 
matter what happens, since improvisation is a manifestation of an 
'accurate and successful functioning within the traditional 
matrices' (p. 18). In Happenings, such matrices do not exist in 
the first place. Rather than coping with some critical 
circumstances so that the reaction will look most 'natural' and 
thus 'prearranged' both to the performers and the audience, the 
performers in Happenings are allowed, if they like, to halt the 
flow of the performance or even change the course of the flow. 
When we focus on a performance by a couple or a group of people 
'in improvisational theatre and in jazz improvisation, one 
performer reacts to and adjusts his own work to that of another' 
(p. 18), whereas 'in Happenings, there is no momentary challenge. 
One performer reacts only functionally, and not esthetically or 
creatively, to the actions of another' (p. 18). A performer 
about to crash head on into another performer would try to avert 
the accident in a traditional improvisation not only because it 
would look like an unprofessional mistake to the audience but 
because it would probably disturb the framework of that 
particular theatre. Under the same circumstances a performer in 
Happenings could, as Kirby implies, actually crash into another 
performer and see what happens. 
Improvisation always has to live with restrictions. Asked 
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how he 'combine[s] spontaneity and formal discipline', 
Grotowski stresses the importance of 'forming a miniature score 
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for each part of the body' (p. 39) and continues: 
[T]he more we become absorbed in what is hidden inside us, in the 
excess, in the exposure, in the self-penetration, the more rigid 
must be the external discipline; that is to say the form, the 
artificiality, the ideogram, the sign. Here lies the whole 
principle of expressiveness. (p. 39) 
Unless the focus is sharp and well-disciplined in each movement 
of the body, a performer may not be able to 'express' what she 
wants to convey to the outside world. Grotowski also discusses 
the matter in a more general perspective when he refers to 
Artaud: 
[I]n his description [Artaud] touches something essential, of 
which he is not quite aware. It is the true lesson of the sacred 
theatre; whether we speak of the medieval European drama, the 
Balinese, or the Indian Kathakali: this knowledge that 
spontaneity and discipline, far from weakening each other, 
mutually reinforce themselves; that what is elementary feeds what 
is constructed and vice versa, to become the real source of a 
kind of acting that glows. (p. 121) 
Grotowski's remarks to some extent reiterate the importance of 
technique, which we looked at in chapter 2, and the idea that 
improvisation reveals the fundamental nature of performance, 
which we have discussed so far in this chapter. How performers 
regard their performance is another question. For example, what 
one sees as spontaneous aspects of a Balinese dance might not be 
taken as such by the dancers themselves. When Strasberg states 
that spontaneity has to be grasped consciously by the performer 
and thus to be under discipline, he is not discussing the - 
Balinese theatre and other manifestations of a similar style: 
In all great acting there is the element of spontaneity within a 
performance that yet keeps a shape and an outline. In great 
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acting there are constant improvisational elements that come 
through. The performance varies, but the outline remains the 
same. 
Both the spontaneity and the outline have to be accomplished 
by the actor, as by any other craftsman, deliberately. [. . .] 
the thing that happens spontaneously in life must on the stage be 
created by the actor so that he knows he is creating it. It must 
be spontaneous and yet under the control of the actor. He must 
be aware and yet caught up in it. 68 
Discipline also takes the form of external pressure or 
conditions which a performer cannot avoid. A most blatant 
example'is a restriction coming from the condition of the 
performance space: 
The things that do change are very delicate, very fine nuances of 
expression: something can be played more broadly, something more 
subtly. During the first performances we don't always know how 
things should be done. The actors try to put themselves in the 
place of the'spectators. Because playing in a small, crowded 
club for 200 people is different than playing in a church for 
1000 people scattered in a big empty space, you have to use 
different means. This is improvising with the means rather than 
with the core. The core remains constant while the actors adjust 
the means in order to reach the spectators. 69 
Here again the matrix-oriented nature of improvisation is 
emphasised; the very fact that the core keeps firm and strong 
makes it possible for improvisatory actions to go through an 
incessant process of trial-and-error. 
Improvisation may be regarded as a practical skill, which is 
useful in rehearsals and in performance and will 'enrich' the 
whole procession of theatre we are engaged in. If we foreground 
the technical aspects of improvisation strongly, we might define 
improvisation in quite straightforward terms: already being 
encased in a tradition of theatre, an improvising performer 
cannot be expected to flout the traditional lines or try to be 
stylistically 'new'; instead, his or her task is to demonstrate 
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the skill within that tradition. Accordingly, if a flouting 
occurs, it would no longer be an improvisatory action in the 
strict sense of the term, but it would be a newly-created genre, 
or style, of theatre. Such a definition seems to explain 
improvisation/non-improvisation of some of the most tradition- 
oriented theatres that we find. Because performance is always 
subject to time, it has to adjust to each 'moment', which may 
lead to the change of the very principles of discipline, 
restriction, or technique. Such a change may not always be 
detected easily from the outside or even be recognised by the 
performers themselves. Schechner touches upon the issue when 
discussing one of the most traditional of the traditional 
theatres, the Kathakali performance: 
As basic work becomes second nature, subtleties emerge that 
reflect very precisely the personality of the performer. It is 
not as an American might think: creativity has not been stifled 
by all the apparently mechanical training. Rather, when the time 
comes for individuality to be expressed it emerges from a wholly 
mastered technique that no longer feels 'technical' either to the 
performer or to the audience. Masters contribute from themselves 
-- even if they are not always conscious that they are doing so. 
From their point of view, they are doing what they know how to 
do, pouring themselves into the vessels of their scores. But 
these vessels are not stone-hard, they are surprisingly 
malleable, not only during the times of allowed improvisation 
but, even in the details of the scores themselves. 70 
In the case of a performance by a 'master', improvisation can 
totally be absorbed in the performer's confidence: the performer 
believes that he or she is merely a follower of an 'authentic' 
way of performing. According to Schechner, such confidence is 
actually wrong. In the hands of a 'master', an 'authenticity' 
subjects itself to a change, which means that improvisatory 
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actions have a power to push the history of authenticity forward. 
In such cases, improvisation is a technique but can be an 
incentive for the reshaping of a tradition, too. Schechner's 
argument seems to draw on the notion of 'orality' as opposed to 
'literacy', which William Frawley defines as follows: 1110rality" 
is a descriptive term for strategies which individuals use to 
gain or organize knowledge from a non-textual standpoint. 
"Literacy" is a descriptive term for strategies which individuals 
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bring to bear to gain or organize textual knowledge. ' 'Textual 
knowledge' here refers to a rather traditional meaning of the 
term, that gained by 'reading, writing, and arithmetic' (p. 40). 
Granted that Frawley himself does not put 'orality' against 
'literacy' (p. 39) and that traditional theatres do have texts in 
one form or another, we will, for the sake of the argument, put 
the kind of traditional theatre that Schechner takes up in the 
'orality' group, mainly because of the presence of a human 
'master' as an 'authority', who can override a written 'text' 
if he or she wants to. Frawley's argument on 'orality' may then 
be followed in accordance with Schechner's argument: 
Because language and knowledge under oral circumstances are 
developed experientially in face-to-face interaction, there is a 
tendency [. . .] to maintain internal stability and to regulate 
the flow and development of knowledge all for the purpose of the 
reiteration of the status quo. This does not mean that non- 
textuality rules out the acquisition of new knowledge; quite the 
contrary: new knowledge is introduced, but only at the expense of 
existing knowledge. Thus, culture as a system of knowledge in 
non-textuality is closed, or, at least, tends toward stability. 
E. . .] The point here is that non-textuality involves knowledge 
as something which is noncumulative and not stored. Knowledge is 
fluid; epistemologies are adapted. This homeostasis -- the 
system stabilizing itself -- requires no need to accumulate 
knowledge because knowledge is not something which is built up 
over time, but a self-adjusting aggregate. (Frawley, pp. 42-43) 
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A 'master', however inadvertently, can change what people thought 
was the canon of their theatre. The new codes introduced by the 
change have little difficulty in becoming part of the 'stable' 
whole, because a face-to-face interaction of the performer and 
the other participants makes it easy for the performer to let the 
people know the 'meaning' of the new codes on the spot. This is 
possible because, Frawley argues, a homeostatic world implies a 
world where we find 'a sense of cultural unity' (p. 56), which 
means: 
[U]nder conditions of non-textuality, the individuals and the 
culture are not distinct. [. . .] dream interpretation in non- 
textuality often takes the form of individuals consulting the 
person who knows the standard dream interpretations in a culture 
for the 'correct' reading of the dream. Such activity, 
furthermore, is most often done in the presence of many members 
of the culture. What results is an interpretation of, and 
solution to, a new problem by means of resorting to one source of 
information in the context of the totality of the culture. 
[. . .] All problems in non-textuality are, in a sense, already 
solved since new information is either excluded or immediately 
incorporated into the system of knowledge in existence. (p. 57) 
In other words, what the 'master' does becomes at once a newly 
moulded theatrical canon for all the people from the same culture 
or the cognoscenti. We might even say that an improvisatory 
action in such cases would cease to be 'improvisatory' the moment 
it is performed. 
Actually, applying 'orality' or 'literacy' to various styles 
of theatre would not be as simple as we might think especially 
because in doing so we would have to take into consideration the 
type of audience, the condition of the performance, and many 
other factors. For example, the 'core' can also change in non- 
traditional theatres, which lack one absolute 'master' and 
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cultural closeness. In this case, a process would be more 
heuristic and thus more plainly experimental, which may or may 
not result in a stability. Lech Raczak explains from a 
director's point of view: 
Most of each piece remains constant from performance to 
performance, although sometimes sections are improvised anew each 
night. Of course, only to some extent; there are limits to 
improvisation. Besides, you can improvise only during the first 
20 or 30 performances. Later everything becomes more or less 
fixed. That means we take the best improvisations and convert 
them into fixed elements. A scene may look improvised in 
performance when in fact it no longer is. 72 
An improvisatory action is tried and re-tried, refined and 
modified, and it may gradually develop into a fixed form, at 
which point it becomes a new element in the 'core'. This is to 
say that the 'core' has changed its shape, if not totally 
transformed. 
Coming back to the question of aesthetics and improvisation, 
we might assert that improvisatory actions take part in building 
a theatrical piece but are not 'art' themselves. Improvisation 
never exists for its own sake; it always functions so that the 
core, or the principle, of the piece will be facilitated 
'better'. As Paul Thom states, 'the nature and the value of 
improvisations' are not to 'be reduced to the nature and value of 
works of art', since '[t]he ability to improvise is a different 
ability from the ability to compose, even though they are 
73 
related'. Whatever shape it may take, the core would have to 
be 'art' if the whole work will be called a 'work of art'. 
Otherwise, an improvisatory action in our daily lives would have 
a chance of being called 'art', which is not the case; Bach's 
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organ piece may leave many of its notes open for the organist's 
improvisatory contribution, and yet the crucial notes or chords 
remain Bach's; a film made up of improvisatory scenes is a work 
of art if its entire sequence as a whole can be regarded as 
'art'. Susanne K. Langer clarifies this point: 
[. . .] pure show, not assimilated to any art, does not 
constitute a 'work'. Acrobatics, tennis playing, some beautiful 
occupational rhythms such as hauling nets, swinging hammers, or 
the evolutions of boats in a race, are fascinating, aesthetically 
thrilling, so they hold the spectator in a joyful trance; but 
they are not art. For a work of art, this trance is only one 
requisite. Spectacle, however beautiful, is always an element in 
art. It may well be a major element, as it was in Noverre's 
ballets, and in the court masques, but even these largely 
spectacular products are rated as 'works' because they had 
something else that motivated the display: an imaginative core, a 
'commanding form'. A circus could be a work of art if it had 
some central feeling and some primary, unfailing illusion. As it 
is, the circus sometimes contains genuine little 'works' -- a 
riding act that is really an equestrian dance, a piece of 
clowning that rises to genuine comedy. But on the whole the 
circus is a 'show', not a work of art, though it is a work of 
skill, planning and fitting, and sometimes copes with problems 
that arise also in the arts. What it lacks is the first 
requisite for art -- a conception of feeling, something to 
express. 74 
Since it is not our present concern to examine what in 
fact constitutes 'art', we will not discuss the 'core' of 
theatre/performance here; we simply make an agreement that a 
certain piece is a work of art and start looking at improvisation 
from there. Thom calls improvisation a 'routine': 
The routines. [. . .] will be works for performance only if they 
can be recovered in the form of directives for performance. If 
they are not so recoverable, then the improvisation is a 
performance of a routine but not the performance of any work. (p. 
69) 
Here, the 'recoverability' offers a line which divides 'art' from 
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non-art. Thom's suspicion towards making 'art' out of 
improvisation clearly shows when he refers to a wholly improvised 
performance. A certain 'complexity', one of the requisites for 
'art' according to Thom, cannot be hoped for in a wholly 
improvised performance: 
If the author's work is removed from the structure of performance 
but the performers themselves do not become authors, so that 
genuinely there is no work performed, then the whole performance 
must be improvised. In these circumstances it is difficult to 
imagine that anything having the complexity of an interpreted 
work of art could be conceived and executed sur le champs. At 
any rate, it seems clear that performers who had been trained as 
executants would be most unlikely, in performing without works, 
to produce an aesthetic object comparable in value to what can be 
produced in the performance of a work. The most likely outcome 
in such circumstances is that the performers would be reduced, in 
one way or another, to exhibiting themselves and their physical 
capacities, like circus performers. (p. 71) 
Thom's argument once again brings us back to Blau's 'shallow' 
improvisation, an action which is deprived of 'memories', of our 
refining the idea and the technique. Granted that any 
improvisation might end up in 'a loose gestalt and a sterile 
formalism; at worst, parody, paranoia, and melodrama, illusion's 
75 
revenge upon itself', what we must aim at in order to avoid the 
'shallowness' is 'performance improvisation', not mere 
'improvisation'. 
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5. Performer-Audience Relationship in Space and Time 
5.1 Gap 
Throughout chapters 1,2,3, and 4, performance improvisation was 
discussed in the context of the 'moment'. A performer makes some 
kind of performative decision in this 'moment'. In the commedia 
dell'arte, such decision-making seems to be influenced by the 
presence of the well-informed audience. The Commedia performers 
and their audience share the background knowledge, tradition, and 
conventions, which to a considerable extent determine the 
criteria for 'successful' improvisation. The performers aim at 
the target, namely, the audience's expectations, which is 
possible because both the performers and the audience know what 
'improvisation' in Commedia is. The 'encounter' of the Commedia 
performers and their audience is thus fierce and demanding on 
either side: performers' skill ideally will improve because of 
the refined audience's eye, which means that the audience are as 
much responsible as the performers for keeping up the standards 
and quality of the Commedia performance. When we dealt with 
technique in chapter 2, we saw that a performer's improvisatory 
decision-making has to be 'clear'. In the commedia dell'arte, 
such clarity is important in a twofold sense. First, clarity is 
vital among performers who build their technique on the continual 
process of decision-making and who also have to rely on various 
cues and signs given by their co-performers. Second, the 
audience, however experienced they may be, still demand a 
performance with improvisatory technique which is 'clear' enough 
for them to judge and appreciate on the spot. Our discussion in 
chapter 2 mainly referred to the technical clarity concerning 
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performers themselves. Whether or not any technical clarity 
exists between the performers and the audience seems to depend on 
the performance style or genre. Whereas the commedia dell'arte 
seems to have such 'clarity', an ambivalent relationship between 
the performer and the audience is especially evident in a 
performance which is not based on a fixed performer-audience 
agreement. To call some action an 'improvisatory' action without 
a performer-audience agreement is a one-sided view. Although 
this particular problem of gap was touched upon briefly in 
chapters 3 and 4, we did not pursue it very far. Here 
in this chapter, we discuss the performance-audience relationship 
in the 'moment' of performance. The question, how a gap between 
a performer and the audience is produced in a space-time 
dimension, will bring us to the problem of that very gap 
affecting our attempt to define 'performance improvisation'. 
Since the performer-audience relationship directly involves the 
idea and the practice of the audience interpreting a performer, 
we will also review a semiotic study of theatrical interpretation 
in this chapter. We will conclude at the end of the chapter that 
'performance improvisation' is basically a performer's domain 
rather than the audience's. 
5.2 What the Audience Sense 
Richard Schechner uses the word 'experience' when he draws our 
attention to 'the feelings or moods of those participating as 
1 
players, directors, spectators, and observers'. Schechner uses 
the word 'frame (or net)' when asking 'how do players, directors, 
spectators, and observers know when a play act begins, is taking 
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place, and is over? ' (p. 25). Both the performers and the 
audience 'experience' the 'moment' of performance and they 
respectively have some kind of 'frame' when participating in that 
performance. 'Frame' relates to what Langer calls 'form' in 
chapter 3. In an interview with John Cage, Schechner asks Cage 
about the change of 'structure' in a performance. In Cage's 
answer-we find that 'structuring' is a process initiated by any 
member of the audience, who is put in the position of 
interpreting a performance: 
The structure we should think about is that of each person in the 
audience. In other words, his consciousness is structuring the 
experience differently from anybody else's in the audience. So 
the less we structure the theatrical occasion and the more it is 
like unstructured daily life, the greater will be the stimulus to 
the structuring faculty of each person in the audience. 3 
'Experience' and 'frame', or 'structure', will be taken 
differently by different individuals. Accordingly, the space and 
the time in those 'experience' and 'frame' are shared by the 
audience and the performer but interpreted differently. Time and 
space then acquire the meaning of a 'sense' of space and a 
'sense' of time felt by individual participants. In Schechner's 
definition of what he calls an 'actual', he refers to the 
'consequential[ity]', 'irremediab[ility]', and 'irrevocab[ility]' 
4 
of an 'actual', which especially seem applicable to the concept 
of improvisation. Irrevocable space and time in the first place 
are the laws of nature and thus existent with or without the 
participants. To sense space or to sense time means that 
participants are consciously, or subconsciously, recognising its 
irrevocability. Schechner writes that such recognition occurs in 
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'the new theatre' when it 'allow[s] the event to flow freely 
through space and [. . .] design[s] whole spaces entirely for 
specific performances' (p. 29). 
The audience live in the space and the time which a performer 
can influence but cannot always control. For example, Elaine 
Aston and George Savona point out that there are times when 
'breaks' indicated in various ways during a performance may not 
be recognised by a 'spectator', who remains 'unaware of the units 
5 
of text' and instead 'experiences continuity'. This implies 
that the audience tend to 'experience' the performance more in 
line with the time-span of their own perception than with the 
time-slot devised by the performer. A member of the audience 
'experiences' performance space and performance time by 
exercising her visual and auditory senses, or occasionally her 
other senses, which will culminate in the overall 'sense' of 
being at the scene of that performance. Her 'experience' is 
bound to be extremely subjective and idiosyncratic. As we have 
already seen, each member of the audience reacts to the village 
pageant in Woolf's Between the Acts through his or her own 'net'; 
for some of the audience, the present pageant performance is 
mixed with their personal histories to such an extent that their 
sense of 'continuity' lets them re-experience the past while 
experiencing the present. Gertrude Stein uses the word 'nervous' 
to describe the audience being either consciously or 
subconsciously aware of their own frame of time and space not 
matching the space and the time set up by the performers: 
that the thing seen and the thing felt about the thing 
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seen not going on at the same tempo is what makes the being at 
the theatre something that makes anybody nervous. 
The jazz bands made of this thing, the thing that makes you 
nervous at the theatre, they made of this thing an end in itself. 
They made of this different tempo a something that was nothing 
but a difference in tempo between anybody and everybody including 
all those doing it and all those hearing and seeing it. In the 
theatre of course this difference in tempo is less violent but 
still it is there and its does make anybody nervous. 6 
On the one hand, performers can intentionally try to extract a 
sense of strong 'continuity' or a 'nervous' reaction from the 
audience. Aston and Savona list four 'temporal planes', which 
are 'time present', 'chronological time', 'plot time', and 
'performance time' (p. 27; p. 29). They explain that '[i]n a 
performance context, the spectator's awareness of these temporal 
planes in relation to the dramatic action may be signified by the 
development of systems of staging in both time and space' (p. 
30). We may enlarge the argument to include actions that are not 
strictly 'dramatic' in Aston and Savona's sense: depending on how 
both time and space are 'developed', arranged, and presented, the 
audience's 'awareness' of time and place may change from a 
virtual non-awareness to an acute awareness. As Susan Sontag 
points out, awareness can be prompted through a performance which 
emphasises some 'trivial' or 'unimportant' aspects of the 
'experience': 
[. . .] in principle, one should desire to pay attention to 
everything. It's this view, most elegantly formulated by Cage 
though its practice is found everywhere, that leads to the art 
of the inventory, the catalogue, surfaces; also 'chance'. The 
function of art isn't to sanction any specific experience, except 
the state of being open to the multiplicity of experience -- 
which ends in practice by a decided stress on things usually 
considered trivial or unimportant. 7 
On the other hand, an attempt on the part of the performer does 
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not guarantee a particular reaction on the part of the audience. 
Whether or not such a reaction is needed or sought for depends on 
the performance. 
Apart from some exceptional cases such as the commedia 
dell'arte, it seems that performers using improvisation do not 
necessarily expect the audience to detect 'improvisation' as 
'improvisation'. The performers use improvisation for the sake 
of their performance, not for the sake of 'improvisation' itself. 
As long as 'improvisation' proves to be effective from their 
point of view, the performers may not even care if the audience 
take some 'improvisatory' action as a tightly-choreographed 
action or as any other kind of action. The concept of 
improvisation, then, is strongly performer-centred. This is 
detected when we read of Augusto Boal and his group's 
performances on a Paris metro or on a boat in Sweden. They used 
'choreography' and 'improvisation', involving the 'audience' in 
quite an aggressive manner: the majority of the members of the 
alleged 'audience' did not even know that they were part of a 
8 
'performance'. To those who did not know, Boal and his 
group's performances were natural incidents. What the group 
might call an excitingly lively 'audience' participation may 
then be a manipulation of the 'audience' by 'original' 
performers. The alleged 'audience' might not even realise that 
they are being manipulated; rather, as Boal himself explains, 
they would find Boal and his group's performances quite 
'convincing': 
.] every idea, however abstract, can be theatrical to the 
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extent that it manifests itself in a concrete form in particular 
circumstances in terms of will. From which the following 
relationship can be formulated: idea=will=emotion=theatrical 
form; in other words, the abstract idea when transformed into a 
concrete will in particular circumstances will give rise in the 
actor to the emotion which will spontaneously find a theatrical 
form which is adequate, valid and convincing for the spectator. 
Problems of style and other questions come afterwards. (p. 54) 
The 'will' of the performers does not always result in the 
audience recognising that 'will', not to mention the performers' 
improvisatory actions. 
Paul Thom explains the agreement/non-agreement between the 
performer and the audience by putting performance in two 
categories, the artistic performance and the nonartistic 
performance: 
In the case of true performances, there is an implicit social 
agreement that the performance will be given at a particular time 
and place and that both performers and audience will behave by 
mutual consent in more-or-less expected ways. None of this 
applies to as-if performances [nonartistic performances]. We, 
their unwilling audience, do not know when or where to expect 
them and have no agreed expectations regarding their decorum. 
What we find most displeasing about them is that, contrary to the 
facts, we are treated as if we had made an agreement on their 
conduct. If such an agreement were made on a particular 
occasion, then the as-if performance would become a true 
performance (and probably a pretty bad one). 9 
If we follow Thom's argument, the sense of 'moment' is evoked 
both in the performer and in the audience only when the 
performance is a 'true' one, that is, an 'artistic' one. In an 
'as-if' performance, an advantage enjoyed by the performer 
results in the creation of 'unwilling' audiences. On the other 
hand, Thom adds that an as-if performance with an agreement 'on a 
particular occasion' can 'become' a 'true' performance. This in 
turn suggests that, however 'bad' it may be, a performance which 
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makes at least some kind of agreement between the performer and 
the audience will justify its 'true' status. The 'moment' of 
establishing a performer-audience agreement, however brief it may 
be or however inexplicable it may be, can possibly be a 'moment' 
when the audience most acutely feel performance time and 
performance space. Robert Ayers' introduction to 'live art' 
seems relevant here: 
[.. .] live art allows the artist to enter into the everyday 
lives of its audience and -- quite literally -- to touch them. 
And it is that moment free of preconceptions when flesh touches 
flesh, which as often as not is as unsettling -- let's face it, 
as terrifying -- for the artist as for the audience that, no 
matter what else they build upon it, is the essence of live art 
for many of the artists who make it. 10 
Improvisation can then be used in an 'as-if' performance to 
produce a flash of performer-audience agreement on the 
performance time and the performance space, and this is the 
reverse of the traditional improvisation which requires an 
already well-established performer-audience agreement. The 
problem is, there always remains a possibility that people might 
interpret improvisatory actions in an 'as-if' circumstance as 
everyday-actions of a 'mad' or 'insane' person rather than a call 
for making a 'true' performance. Richard Layzell explains: 'My 
experience of this kind of audience [the casual passer-by in a 
street performance] is that they don't usually stay for long, 
unless you find a way of stopping them or involving, enthralling 
or scandalising them. [. . .]A performance artist on the street 
is likely to elicit the same kind of response as a 'freak' of 
11 
some kind to be avoided'. 
A performer makes certain that the audience somehow 'sense' 
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the space and the time of a performance. Improvisation may be a 
useful 'tool' to achieve that aim, as we will see in the 
following sections. The audience do not need to recognise the 
'tool' when they recognise its effect. 
5.3 Presence and Reality in Space and Time 
Patrice Pavis groups together Peter Handke, Michel Vinaver, 
Samuel Beckett, and Heiner Müller as playwrights by pointing out 
that their works 'no longer attempt to imitate speakers in the 
act of communicating, nor [. . .] lock themselves into 12 
indecipherable words'. When 'text [. . .] can no longer be 
recapitulated or resolved or lead to action', states Pavis, it 
'addresses itself as a whole to the audience, like a global poem 
tossed in the hearers' laps to be taken or left as they please' 
(p. 57). The audience do not necessarily catch every detail of 
such 'wholeness' nor do they always put the 'whole' in 
perspective. From what Pavis describes, we can assume that the 
works by those people cited above produce in performance an 
'atmosphere' which operates in space and time, which is at the 
same time general and particular, and which can be seen or 
interpreted from any angle. 
The 'presence' of the audience in space and time may take 
various forms. Evoking the awareness of the 'moment' looks easy 
when the 'presence' actually refers to the bodily presence of the 
audience receiving a 'whole' performance. The fact is, even the 
audience who are potentially in the position of closely watching 
and hearing what goes on in the performance might not become 
sensitive towards the performance 'moment' until some aspects of 
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the performance shake them from their apathetic reactions. 
Being 'present' in a performance enables the audience to 
experience an 'encounter' in a most direct and pure manner. At 
the same time, being 'present' in a performance is such a usual 
and common way of participating in the performance that the 
simple fact of 'presence' may not in itself be enough to arouse 
the audience's sensitivity towards the performance time and the 
performance space. How does a performer's action, and especially 
her improvisatory action, arouse the sensitivity towards space 
and time within the audience who are in close proximity of this 
performer and thus capable of absorbing the performer's action in 
detail if they so desire? A performer can emphasise her own 
vulnerability to time and space, her own 'presence' in front of 
the audience, by which she may be able to prompt the 'sense' of 
time and place, of 'presence', in the audience. Both the 
audience and the performer 'sense' their special moment of 
performance through the 'presence' of one another. As a person 
who has planned a performance and has invited the audience to it, 
a performer is responsible for initiating such an 'encounter' 
successfully. 
Highlighting the 'reality' of the 'moment' may be one way of 
leading the audience to focus on their 'presence'. 'Reality' 
here refers to, for example, our feeling towards someone as a 
living human performer, who may even die right in front of our 
eyes. When the audience strongly feel the 'real' nature of the 
performer, that 'reality' instantly reflects on the audience's 
own presence in that 'real' moment. When, for example, the 
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audience are made to be acutely aware of a performer inflicting 
some real pain on her body during a performance, that awareness 
is likely to transcend any ideology, explanations, or rationality 
which otherwise may occupy the audience's attention. The 
audience at such a 'moment' of witnessing real pain may possibly 
only feel the 'reality' of what is going on, even though they 
know that it is a 'performance' and it is not likely that a 
performer actually hurts herself seriously in a performance. A 
similar reaction can be expected from the audience in a situation 
involving a performer's action which seems highly dangerous to 
13 
the audience but which in fact is quite safe. In either case, 
the audience tend to regard the performer as a living human being 
rather than as a performer, and they just as strongly regard 
themselves as living human beings. Nevertheless, we have to 
remember that 'performance improvisation' is not about any life- 
threatening action by a performer but is a way of revealing, in a 
concrete manner, the fundamental nature of what we regard as 
'performance'. 'Reality' has less to do with how a performer or 
a member of the audience lives with some physical danger than 
with how the participants mix the performance 'frame' with their 
living, human nature. Susan Melrose describes 'real' in theatre: 
[T]heatre's role is no longer to represent effectively a 'real 
out there', but rather to present a vitally forceful 'real in 
here', whose status as 'real' derives precisely from its 
investiture of concentrated and mastered human energies. These 
are forged by the conditions of live performance itself, and 
hover constantly E. . .] on the borderline between a closely- 
watched strength and fragility. It is this combination of 
controlled energies, caught in the real event of their precarious 
production, which makes theatre so dangerously pleasing to some 
of us. 14 
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Theatre, according to Melrose, is 'real' for its participants 
only when 'human energies' are fully activated, energies which 
are firm and yet vulnerable, immediate, and concrete for its 
participants. 
Granted that energies will be, in one way or another, 
continuously generated and spent as long as the performance 
lasts, they cannot possibly keep up the same amount and quality 
of force throughout the performance. There have to be 
fluctuations of energies, which will produce moments of very 
tense reality and also those of rather relaxed reality. 
'Reality' can also be a relative term, which Blau sums up: 'What 
we take to be real, to be sure, is often in contrast to something 
we consider less real. The frame can shift, and what was unreal 
can suddenly seem real, with the shock of recognition or a more 
15 
or less fine suddenness'. Blau attributes such 'shifting' to 
our 'vulnerab[ility] to time' (p. 99); this 'vulnerability' 
enables the audience to experience each 'moment' of a performance 
unpredictably. 
From what we have looked at so far in this section, 'reality' 
and improvisation, or 'presence' and improvisation, seem to go 
hand in hand only when we consider such performances as the commedia 
dell'arte. In other circumstances without a firm rule or 
agreement between the performers and the audience, we may expect 
to find 'reality' highlighted by improvisation only on the 
performers' side. As we discussed in chapter 2, a performer's 
decision-making involves her whole physical and mental 
capacities, whether inherently-given or acquired by training, and 
this is nothing but one of the most tense moments of 'reality' as 
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far as the performer is concerned. 'Reality' for the audience, 
on the other hand, may or may not overlap the moment of a 
performer's improvisation. 
We should note that there are some performances which 
deliberately mix the off-performance reality with the 
performance-reality, showing us that off-performance/performance 
differences are not clear to a human being in the first place. 
Stanton B. Garner Jr cites one of the performances by Joseph 
Chaikin which, from Garner's phenomenological point of view, 
manifests a human body's vulnerability as well as its unavoidable 
presence at the centre of reality. Struck Dumb was a play in 
which Chaikin, who was recovering from aphasia, said his lines 
'with concentration and difficulty, occasionally stumbling over 
words [. . . ]', in other words, with his physical condition 16 
presented as it was. We note here that Struck Dumb did not 
set out to emphasise Chaikin's disrupted speech. It was enough 
for Chaikin to present himself and try to talk. As Garner 
explains, the play had an intricately planned structure, whose 
very theatricality and formality ended up foregrounding Chaikin's 
'real' presence: 
In its urgent concern with delivery and its obstacles, Chaikin's 
play highlighted the interaction of textuality and utterance, the 
uniquely theatrical moment when writing stumbles, as it were, on 
the phenomenon of speech. Though he performed Struck Dumb in a 
'textualized' performance space -- his lines literally written 
in front of him and throughout the stage and auditorium -- 
Chaikin seized this text, physicalized its words in moments of 
delivery whose corporeality was powerfully evident in the strains 
of bearing and enunciation. (p. 122) 
To use Blau's words, Struck Dumb 'shifted' the definition of 
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performance from being exclusive of the off-performance 'reality' 
to being complementary to, or even inclusive of, the off- 
performance reality. Sidney Homan asserts that reality in 
performance and reality off performance verify each other: 
[W]hat distinguishes the theater from real life is that the 
former is always conscious, the latter most often unconscious of 
its fakery, of its role playing; and, thus, the more the theater 
underscores its artifice, the more true or real it becomes. Far 
from distancing the audience, the play's metadramatic dimension 
only reminds us of the common reality to which those off- and 
onstage, contribute during the production. 17 
If improvisation can be part of the 'artifice' being 
'underscored', that is, if improvisation can help the audience 
experience the 'reality' of performance, it also means that 
improvisation is helping the audience experience the 'common 
reality'. As briefly stated before, whether or not the audience 
connect 'common experience' to 'improvisation' is another 
question. 
5.4 Perception in Space and Time 
The most traditional means of transmitting the performer's 
intention to the audience are visual and auditory ones, though we 
cannot ignore some other possible means. Marco De Marinis marks 
out some alternative means of communication in performance: 
[W]e find examples of texts that are [. . .] doubly heterogeneous 
-- and also involving more than one avenue of sensory 
transmission -- in sound cinema and television broadcasting, in 
addition to, above all, theatrical performance. The performance 
text is thus multi-coded, which is to say heterogeneous, in its 
codes, multimedia (or 'composite'), and also multidimensional, 
since it involves more than one channel of perception: in all 
cases, at least two (the acoustic and the visual), sometimes 
three (the acoustic, the visual, and the tactile, as in 
performances that involve the active participation of the 
audience), more rarely four or five, as in the 'happenings' of 
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the 1960s, or more recently, in performance art, where smell and 
taste are sometimes activated. 18 
How these channels of perception function will vary according to 
individual participants' alertness, concentration, interest, or 
lack of any of those factors. Architectural settings and other 
environmental factors would also affect the depth of perception. 
For example, if some soup is brought onto the stage during a 
performance and its smell is detected by the audience, the fact 
of their actually smelling the soup and recognising that the soup 
is real does not have the same meaning as when we smell some soup 
outside performance. The audience are accepting the performer's 
deliberate intention to let them smell the soup and to make them 
realise that a sense of smell, which is not a traditional channel 
of sense in performance, has now been used. Ordinary 
connotations of smell, soup, meal, and eating do not apply in 
this circumstance, although they are never rejected completely. 
The smell of the soup in this case functions primarily to help 
the audience recognise the performance space and the performance 
time by means of an unusual channel of perception. Having real 
soup during the performance also gives the 'moment' to the 
performer herself, simply because she is reacting to the real 
soup at this particular time in this particular space instead of 
having fake soup and pretending that it is real soup. 
'Perception' may also involve a bodily encounter between a 
performer and a member of the audience, for example, the 
performers and the audience physically touching one another, 
which was characteristically popular in the 1960s. A very 
'real', tactile sense elicited has the purpose of letting the 
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audience feel for themselves that they are 'concretely' 
experiencing a performance. 
Improvised or not, a performer's action conveyed to the 
audience through whatever channels of perception has to be 
controlled so that the purpose of stimulating such perceptual 
aspects of the participants will not be lost. 'Perception' may 
be useful in emphasising the 'reality' of a performance, but 
there also is the possibility of our definition of 'performance' 
being confused because of a strong, 'concrete', perceptual sense. 
If a performance 'frame' is clear for the audience who are 
witnessing or experiencing some kind of strongly perceptual 
'encounter', it means that the audience are at the same time 
aware, consciously or subconsciously, of the performer's 
intentions in using those particular channels of perception. 
This is to say that the audience in a certain performance 'frame' 
know that they are being 'fooled' by the performer. In John 
Harrop's words on the audience observing the 'skill' of the 
performer: 
Once a person is aware of the skills that are operating on the 
stage, a performance may be watched with what might be termed a 
bifocalism. This is the audience equivalent of what we have 
termed the actor's controlled schizophrenic or doubleness. Not 
by a conscious suspension of belief, but by an awareness of how 
an effect is being made, an audience member can both experience 
and appreciate the effect at the same time. Possibly some 
marginal experience of the emotional moment is lost by the 
intellectual withholding of some empathy, but this is at least 
compensated for by the extra experience of the conscious art of 
the moment and the appreciation of the actor's skill. 19 
If a tactile encounter between a performer and the audience 
becomes the primary and the only 'meaning' of that performance, 
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the audience's physical as well as emotional involvement will be 
quite 'pure', which will hardly leave room for any 'bifocal' 
20 
interpretation of the performance. In such performances, the 
question of how to define 'performance' may even cease to be an 
issue. 
Controlling our perception is easier said than done; 
sometimes our perception seems to overwhelm our intellectual 
knowledge or the framework we set up for a performance. 'Real' 
perception at times proves so convincing that it momentarily 
occupies our whole attention and becomes the experience itself. 
From what Melrose explains in the following, which is about a 
production of Electra, we may infer that there are performances 
which take advantage of the performers' capacity for prompting 
some 'real' perception in the audience. In such performances, 
the audience are led to make a 'drama' out of some strongly 
'concrete' perception rather than out of their intelligent 
interpretation of the 'coded' function of the performers who act 
out the text: 
What is striking in the work [Deborah] Warner and [Fiona] Shaw 
produce [. . .] is the extent to which the dramas I could play 
out were instigated by an intensity of body-work, within which 
the dramatic writing resonated first as voice, second as means to 
'organise' fields of force. When I combine the somatic- 
discursive practice with those other dramas it can activate in 
the spectator, it begins to become clear that what we are dealing 
with in dramatic theatre [. . .] is [. . .] working like a 
somatography [. . . ]. Such a somatography is far from 'already 
given' [. . . ]. It emerges in the intersection between 
production and spectator-experience of performance, not just in 
that it involves a multifaceted body graphy [sic] (with no 
'depth' necessary) worked on the active stage, but because it 
elicits in the singular practice of each spectator a voyage of 
the eye resistant to authorial control. 21 
In this case, the 'body-work' of the performer is so 'intense' 
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that the audience cannot be confined to traditional modes of 
interpretation such as a coding-decoding relationship between 
what the performer does and how the audience take that 
performance. We will look at the 'codes' further in the 
following section. Here, each intense 'body-work' momentarily 
attracts the audience's perception so overwhelmingly that the 
audience can only perceive each 'body-work' somatically. Any 
'intellectual' interpretation of the 'body-work' will come after 
each somatic experience. Shaw's 'body-work' is so highly intense 
that the information which her 'body-work' gives to the audience 
will be too complex for them to decipher quickly and easily. In 
other words, a perceptual activity itself is 'real', an activity 
which is not predictable, or not determined until we observe the 
actual body-work. 
Since a detailed study of'the functions and the mechanism of 
human perceptions would involve the knowledge of physiology, of 
neurology, of psychology, among others, which cannot be carried 
out in the present discussion, all we attempt here is to think 
about human perception in space and time from a performer's and 
the audience's points of view. Humanistic analyses and anecdotes 
of perception written or told by performers or the audience or 
the critics are particularly problematic on the issue of an 
extremely 'concrete' experience, simply because such an 
experience is difficult to explain. We saw in chapter 4 that the 
participants in a 'trance' situation will be able to realise what 
they have experienced in 'trance' only after they actually regain 
themselves. Melrose's-'voyage of the eye' does not refer to a 
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'trance', but what she describes can be taken as a momentary 
near-trance situation as far as the audience are concerned. As 
we discussed in chapter 2, exactly how a very 'concrete', trance- 
like perception is experienced cannot be discerned easily, partly 
because a 'trance' situation is only revealed to those who are 
right in the middle of experiencing a 'trance'. Once they are 
out of trance, that is, once they come back to the state which 
allows them to interpret that experience, those people are only 
able to see the 'trance' from the outside. What they remember 
about the 'trance' is actually part of their post-experience 
interpretation. If they were truly in trance, their 
concentration on their experience would be too pure and 
heightened to leave room for thinking about it. In this vein, 
the very notion of 'performance improvisation' and that of 
'trance', or near-'trance', are not compatible. A highly active 
and intense perceptual sense is always placed within some kind of 
'frame' if such a perception enables us to 'sense' the 'moment' 
of a performance. The audience who have been in a near-trance 
situation find themselves in the position to be able to interpret 
a performance only when they are out of trance, when they can 
reassemble the performance parts in perspective either 
consciously or subconsciously. 
5.5 Signifier, Signified, and Referent in Space and Time 
Given that the audience need to go through some kind of 
interpretative action in 'sensing' the 'moment' of a performance, 
our next question will be: How exactly do the audience interpret? 
The question re-invokes a gap between the performer and the 
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audience. If, as we have discussed so far in this chapter, the 
gap is an inevitable outcome of the performers and the audience 
not agreeing on rules or conventions among other factors, we 
might state further that it is the performers who first 'violate' 
the conventions, not the audience. This does not mean that any 
'violation' has to be 'sensed' by the performers themselves 
before it will ever have a chance of being 'sensed' by the 
audience. Whether or not the performers are conscious of 
'violating' some rules and conventions, or are deliberately 
'violating' them, does not matter to the audience so long as the 
audience on their part are able to judge, consciously or 
subconsciously, the nature and the degree of the violation. The 
audience in the process of interpreting such a violation are 
negotiating with all their senses, experience, expectations, 
prior knowledge, and intelligence so that they can decide for 
themselves how to tackle that violation. The audience's chain of 
reactions as they evaluate a 'violation' may possibly include 
what Blau calls 'credibility': 
Credibility is the measure of displacement or disfigurement. 
[. . .] The theatrical enigma is analogous to the structure of 
metaphor, where one thing is also being referred to another. 
[. . .] but whether we 'believe' it or not, it is really not the 
metaphor but the nature of belief which is at stake. [. . .] The 
old conventions -- which is to say, habits of belief -- can 
contain only so much new, and hence devaluing, content. The 
disfigurement itself is an irruption of new content. It is also 
a breach of form trying to erase the difference between form and 
content. In performance, there is a contradiction at the groin: 
between the requirements of the form, conventionally remembered, 
and the insistent, irredeemably human violation -- which is 
always disfiguring, because subject to time. Credibility defines 
the space in which the contradiction is not absent but no longer 
felt. That, too, is subject to time. 22 
For the audience to accept 'contradiction', they first have to 
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accept the fact that the actual performance is undeniably 
happening within the space and the time in which the audience 
find themselves; whether or not the audience smoothly digest its 
structure, form, or content, they must know that what is 
happening in front of their eyes is actually a performance. 
Secondly, the audience have to be aware of the fact that they are 
automatically pressured by time limitations. Time does not wait 
for the audience to take their time in interpreting the 
performance, although it does not necessarily mean that the 
audience are always pushed to judge and interpret the instant 
they experience the performance. They will simply have to give 
up a perfectionist's attitude and give up trying to 'understand' 
every single detail of the performance. Otherwise, the audience 
would lose track of the performance procedure or would find the 
pressure of time unbearable for them. These two conditions 
understood, the audience are free to see and decide for 
themselves how and to what extent 'violations' of conventions 
occur in the performance. 
Michael Issacharoff's schematic signifier-signified-referent 
triad clearly shows that what we usually call 'signified' should 
actually be considered from the 'encoder' s point of view on the 
one hand and from the 'decoder ''s point of view on the other: 
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R Sa [the signifier with its three levels 
(the playscript; the playscript 
produced; or the playscript in a 
given performance)] 
sei Set R [the referent, extratextual or 
intratextual] 
Se 1 Se 2 
[the encoder's signified] [the decoder's signified] 
[the signified common to both 
interlocutors] 23 
The audience, in this case mainly the 'decoder', have an 
independent 'signified' which, as the scheme above indicates, has 
only a portion of common elements with the encoder's signified. 
As Elaine Aston and George Savona state, we 'have no way of 
24 
knowing whether they are truly meant' when we try to 'read' (p. 
99) into the dress worn by a person. Issacharoff, who states 
that 'the signified and referent are not interchangeable, 
although they are often confused' (p. 59), seems to imply here 
that the same 'referent' can elicit a variety of reactions from 
the audience. Each of the reactions, we assume, will become a 
'concrete' experience for the respective members of the audience. 
Here, we are again reminded of what Susan Melrose states: 
As spectator I cannot fully know, through the objectifying 
senses, what the actor knows through feeling and doing, nor what 
has gone into that feeling and doing in the space between writing 
and performance -- so that the conventional 'page to stage' 
formula which hints at understanding on the part of the analyst 
needs to be questioned. What follows from that assertion is 
this: as spectator I lack the means to analyse a number of real 
causal factors [. . . ], which in a given instance have 
transformed writing into performance. 25 
The encoder may try to bring the decoder's attention to certain 
elements of the performance; she organises the 'referents' in 
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such a way that their 'signifieds' will be well-focussed ones 
for the decoder, the ones which the encoder intended. Still, the 
decoder can follow where her natural, instinctive perceptions 
direct and reach her own decision on her 'signified'. Alexander 
Alland Jr explains the inevitable gap between the encoder and the 
decoder in a performance experience: 
When an audience observes or listens to an artistic product it 
enters with the artist into one kind of communication game. This 
is the essence of the social aspect of art. The funny thing 
about art, however, is that it can 'get away' from its creator. 
Once a piece of art is finished and enters the public domain, its 
interpretation becomes variable, depending upon the cultural and 
psychological characteristics of its audience. In this sense art 
is autonomous. 26 
When some 'violations' occur, it is the moment of a new 
branch being created between the referent-signified relationship. 
'Violations' of conventional performer-audience agreements will 
never destroy the referent-signified relationship itself, since 
the decoder still decodes the 'violation', or, more precisely, 
the audience have to go through the process of 'interpretation' 
whether they like it or not. A new branch created by the 
emerging 'violation' depends much on the audience's concrete 
perceptions, which compensates for the lack of conventionality in 
that branch. Being highly 'concrete', such a branch proves to be 
unique to each and every occasion, hence the 'violation' label, 
but its principle, namely, the decoder's independent decision on 
a referent-signified relationship, remains the same. We find an 
example of 'violation' in Susan Melrose's comments on Deborah 
Warner's Electra: 
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The infinitely fine network of muscular worked control of [Fiona] 
Shaw's conjuring is stimulated and caught by the performance 
conditions themselves. These project a massed and relatively 
fixed, quasi-compulsive spectatorial gaze, onto a woman's body 
and bodywork. That gaze on a woman is brought to the Sophoclean 
complex, but it is not foreseen by it: this is Warner's Electra, 
a metapraxis politically charged in late-twentieth-century terms, 
and no longer the 'male writing' some critics continue to see 
there. 27 
It is not unusual that the 'bodywork' of a performer on stage 
becomes a 'referent'; nevertheless, here in this production, the 
relationship between a performer and the audience seems to be a 
relationship of a less familiar nature. Since the play happens 
to be one of the classics with a long history of productions, the 
audience's 'signified' is likely to shape itself not only around 
the current Warner production but also around 'the Sophoclean 
complex' and around the knowledge of how past productions or the 
critics saw the play. The performer's body and bodywork as 
described by Melrose may be observed and noted by the audience in 
any production, but a 'quasi-compulsive' gaze will only be 
possible when the bodywork is perceptually so appealing that it 
overrides the other elements of the audience's 'signified'. In 
the case of Warner's Electra, the audience who are almost 
paralysed by Shaw's body and bodywork go through a highly 
concrete experience, which leads to an. idiosyncratic and once- 
only referent-signified relationship. What is signified in that 
particular 'moment' is the experience of the 'gaze' itself, 
which, at least during that moment, is much stronger than the 
'signified' established on the basis of the Sophoclean complex or 
of the production history. For the audience who are not 
particularly impressed by Shaw's bodywork, this probably will not 
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happen. 
Another example of 'violation' can be found in Issacharoff 
when he takes up the birth of 'comic discourse', which he 
attributes to a collapse of levelled relationship among the 
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signifier, the signified, and the referent. When 'the 
signifier is distorted and even undermined -- phonologically, 
morphologically, or lexically', it 'may proliferate and become 
specular, that is, intertextual' (p. 101). Accordingly, the 
signified 'can be subverted and undermined, especially by a 
quiproquo [sic], or by the device that consists of making 
speakers appear absurd' (p. 101). As for the referent, it 
'occupies a central place' by making itself 'visible onstage to 
an exaggerated extent' (p. 101) among other alternatives. As a 
result, the referent now has the power of manipulating a 
previously agreed-upon relationship between itself and the 
signified and of creating an uneven and disproportionate 
discourse. It is a 'concrete' discourse for the audience who are 
not used to seeing such a disproportionate presentation of 
performance. Once it acquires a position as part of the 
establishment, then the discourse is awarded the title of the 
'comic' discourse. 
Turning to another genre of performance, we can detect a gap 
between the referent and the signified in productions such as L. 
S. D. by the Wooster Group. From what David Savran describes, we 
assume that a gap is deliberately and meticulously planned and 
presented by the encoders. Savran defines the 'purpose' of L. S. 
D. as 'to expose the illusional, manufactured quality of history 
and the ways in which politics, economics and ideology determine 
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what is recorded and how'. The production seems to pursue this 
'purpose' by means of 'difference, the gap between present and 
various pasts, between reading and writing, between disparate 
perspectives' (p. 175). 'Gaps' are created mainly by the 
'reading' task and the 'dancing' task within the performance, 
neither of which has been intended by the encoders to show 
continuity in the first place, whether it be 'temporal' 
continuity or 'spatial' continuity (pp. 170,172). In that 
respect, there already exists a 'gap' within the structure of the 
performance, that is, within the tasks themselves. The encoder's 
intention in presenting these two tasks, however, goes much 
further: 
Although the one is verbal and the other kinetic and gestual, L. 
S. D. reveals their structural equivalency, the fact that reading 
is itself a dance -- of denotation, connotation, memory and 
association. [. . .] All the action of the piece takes place 
within the framework of this open-ended reading (which is also a 
dance) in which the performers are gradually infected by the mood 
of the texts that they are reading. [. . .] As the years pass 
fictively in Parts III and IV, the reading disintegrates, the 
dance breaks down. Character and text become recognizable for 
what they are: memories, hallucinations, random fragments, a 
story here, a line there. (p. 197) 
The deliberately created 'gap' does not simply prompt the 
audience to take notice of it; the 'gap' shows the audience the 
moment of 'reading' and 'dancing' melting together. This is a 
violation of what 'reading' and 'dancing' conventionally refer to 
in the English language. In this production, 'reading' and 
'dancing' tasks ultimately transform themselves into the 
performers' animalistic expressions. The audience 'concretely' 
experience those expressions even if they find it difficult to 
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keep up with the whole concept of the performance. What at first 
seemed to be a gap between the referent and the signified has 
developed into the emergence of an idiosyncratic blending between 
the referent and the signified. 
In theory, a performer may deliberately take advantage of a 
gap between the referent and the signified especially when part 
of the performer's intention is to let the audience recognise the 
existence of improvisatory actions in the performance. The 
encoder pre-plans the gap, and she also foresees how that gap 
will be interpreted by the audience. Provided that the encoder 
has a fairly accurate foresight into the 'gap', she will find it 
easier to improvise and also to make that improvisation more 
evident to the audience. In practice, though, the gap between 
the performer and the audience cannot be controlled very easily. 
From the audience's point of view, to decide on the 
improvisatory/non-improvisatory nature of the 'referent' will be 
especially difficult when that 'referent' is the performer's body 
as it is rather than other elements such as verbal lines or the 
body performing some acrobatic skills. Body-as-it-is happens 
when we start to 'consider the body and object as 
interchangeable', which 'inevitably emphasize[s] the body itself 
as the individual measure of space: as our first means of 
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perceiving space'. Sally Banes describes Room Service by 
Yvonne Rainer: 
The ordinary movement in Room Service is not marked by 'the 
intensified way' in which it is carried out. The point of the 
dance is to make ordinary movement qua ordinary movement 
perceptible. The audience observes the performers navigating a 
cumbersome object, noting how the working bodies adjust their 
muscles, weights, and angles. If the dance is performed 
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correctly, there can be no question of superfluity of expression 
over the requirements of practical purposes, because the raison 
d'etre of the piece is to display the practical intelligence of 
the body in pursuit of a mundane, goal-oriented type of action -- 
moving a mattress. [. . .] Room Service is not a representation 
of a working: it is a working. But it is also a dance -- 
partially because through its aesthetic context it transforms an 
ordinary working [. . .] into an object for close scrutiny. 31 
When there is only the performer's body to observe and when that 
body seemingly shows nothing but ordinary movements, the audience 
have to interpret that body as it is. A human body's existence 
bears a special meaning once it is put in the performance space 
and the performance time, in other words, once it starts assuming 
the role of a referent. In the above case, what Banes calls an 
'aesthetic context' justifies the 'ordinary movements' acquiring 
a particular meaning, in this instance, acquiring a 'dance' 
status. Still, the problem of the human body persists. When, 
for example, we, are observing a performer who is seemingly simply 
standing, we as an audience have no definite criteria on which to 
make definite interpretative decisions: are the performer's 
particular muscular movements indeed all 'referents' or are they 
natural and inevitable physiological constraints that bind any 
human body, which this performer has no choice but to express as 
a human being? The question can be rephrased as: is this body to 
be regarded as a 'signified' of something more than simply the 
performer's body, or is it to be regarded as a 'signified' of 
this particular performer's body and nothing else, or is it the 
combination of the two? Difficult though it may be for the 
audience to decide, if 'detecting' improvisation as the 
'signified' is ever possible from the audience's point of view in 
a non-Commedia performance, it is only possible in such uncertain 
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circumstances. In other words, the very uncertainty of 
signification leaves some room for the audience to make their own 
decisions on the 'referent ''s improvisatory/non-improvisatory 
nature. 
5.6 Space and Time as Physical Existence 
A performer belonging to a traditional theatre seeks in the 
theatrical architecture an atmosphere which brings about a 
rapport between the performer and the audience in a smooth and 
efficient manner. As Lain Mackintosh explains: 
Since smaller theatre spaces [. . .] have always proved more 
successful for creative theatre than larger auditoriums and since 
the performer's success is largely measured by the response of 
the audience, it follows that the density of audience as well as 
the size of the auditorium is central to theatre architecture. 
Less densely packed auditoriums dilute the response received by 
the performer. A single-tier auditorium is less space efficient 
than a multi-tier auditorium and hence more difficult for the 
actor to animate. In addition a more comfortable audience is 
generally less alert. 32 
When, for example, a performance seems to ask for the audience's 
very close attention to a performer's subtle bodily movement, 
there certainly exists an interpretative discrepancy, or 
difference, between the audience who are in the position of 
observing the performer from a close range and those who are 
seated at the top of a multi-tier auditorium. Our question, 
though, lies in how exactly the performance space and the 
performance time involve the audience so that the audience will 
be sharply aware of the 'moment'. A performance environment will 
be here looked at from the viewpoint of space and time physically 
aiding, or in some cases, distracting, the audience's recognition 
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of a 'moment'. 
The audience will be able to deal with space and time in 
performance easily if the performer and the audience are both 
tightly involved in mise en scene, which Patrice Pavis defines 
as: 'a theoretical "fitting" which consists in putting the text 
under dramatic and stage tension, in order to test how stage 
utterance challenges the text and initiates a hermeneutic circle 
between the text and its enunciation [. . . ], thus opening up the 33 
text to several possible interpretations'. We can infer from 
this definition that mise en sAne brings about the 'moment' by 
means of 'tension', which the participants feel for themselves 
and which Pavis sees in 'a state of becoming' (p. 30). 
Generating 'tension' would be helped by architectural and other 
surrounding environments as summed up by Mackintosh, but the 
principles of mise en scene will concern the sense or the 
recognition of 'text and stage [being] perceived at the same time 
and in the same place, making it impossible to declare that the 
one precedes the other' (p. 29). Although Pavis excludes 
improvisation from the discussion of mise en sAne (p. 24), which 
we assume has to do with the problem of including improvisation 
in 'text', his concept can still be applied to our present 
discussion on improvisation. The audience play a vital role in 
developing such 'tension', since what Pavis calls a 'hermeneutic 
circle' would not be completed unless there existed the eye of 
the audience. 
Michael Issacharoff cites Cocteau's Impromptu du Palais-Royal 
and describes a theatre discourse which apparently violated what 
the audience of Cocteau believed to be the framework of their 
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theatre. The play by 'the Artaud-influenced dramatist' discards 
the 'traditional barrier between stage and auditorium through the 
use of a pseudo "playgoer" who interrupts the cast when she feels 
34 
like it'. Theatre discourse, which has always been 'closely' 
(p. 89) linked to space according to Issacharoff, has 
traditionally placed speech in a position where it has to be 
'constrained' (p. 89) to match the mode, for example, a 'tragic 
mode' (p. 89) of theatre. Cocteau, by breaking the established 
framework of stage and that of auditorium, overturns the 'very 
basis of the constraint' and instead introduces 'the theater 
itself, during the performance' (p. 89). A tragic mode now loses 
its meaning and is replaced by some different mode of discourse. 
Rather than a mere shift of framework, Cocteau's attempt proves 
to be a blatant example of the creation of a gap concerning the 
signified and the referent, leading to the participants' possible 
awareness of experiencing a 'concrete' event, that is, a 
'discourse itself turned into spectacle' (p. 119). The physical 
reality of stage/auditorium on the one hand provides the audience 
with a 'moment', including some improvisation which the audience 
may or may not detect. On the other hand, that kind of physical 
reality is likely to baffle the audience who are used to seeing a 
stage or an auditorium according to its own framework. In a 
stage/auditorium circumstance, the audience are left uncertain 
about any possibility of improvisation, or how to interpret the 
performers' action. Whichever way the audience's interpretative 
response falls, their experience in such circumstances most 
likely takes the shape of naive and straightforward surprise at 
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having been thrown into the 'moment' of a broken framework. 
How exactly a performer uses space can be roughly categorised 
into two possibilities according to Schechner: 
First, there is what one can do with and in a space; secondly, 
there is the acceptance of a given space. In the first case, one 
creates an environment by transforming a space; in the second 
case, one negotiates with an environment, engaging in a scenic 
dialogue with a space. In the created environment transformed 
space engineers the arrangement and behavior of the spectators; 
in a negotiated environment a more fluid situation leads 
sometimes to the performance being controlled by the 
spectators. 35 
In practical terms, most performances contain at least some 
portions of both created and negotiated environments, the 
proportion of which will vary from production to production or 
from performance to performance. The audience in an elaborately 
'transformed' space seem to be able to react to the performance, 
but, since the space already frames the audience to suit the 
performer's intentions, the audience's apparently spur-of-the- 
moment reactions actually tend to be straitjacketed as long as 
they remain a reasonably peaceful audience. Improvisation in 
such a space may be planned with a specific effect in mind and 
may be conducted efficiently. The audience who go along with a 
highly 'artificial' space, for example, who readily accept the 
world of a forest created with cardboard on stage, feel 
confident in appreciating and interpreting the performance 
partly because the created environment keep the audience's 
attention in focus. The audience are likely to take note of any 
element that however slightly incites alarm or some unexpected 
excitement within that particular 'world'. Whether or not such 
disturbance of an 'artificial' space is an accident or a 
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carefully laid-out plan or improvisation will be judged by the 
audience based on their own assessment of the 'gap' between what 
is presented to them and what they expect from the created 
environment. Nevertheless, a transformed space can also be quite 
baffling to the audience, if 'concretely' enjoyable, when the 
creativity of a performance space goes far beyond the area of 
familiarity which the audience have built up from the past 
experiences with theatre and performance. The audience then 
would have to make their own decisions despite having no reliable 
frameworks. In the case of a 'given' environment, the audience 
may be more consciously aware of a once-and-only particularity of 
the space. An extreme particularity means the lack of a reliable 
'norm' for interpretation. A negotiated space sometimes depends 
so much on how the audience participate in the space as pointed 
out by Schechner, which justifies the non-existence of a definite 
'norm'. Such highly concrete and particular space-performer- 
audience circumstances may result in a nearly total freedom for 
some members of the audience in their interpretative decision- 
making, whereas for other members the circumstances may seem 
nearly impossible to make decisions. 
Space and time physically influence, and sometimes even 
shape, the audience's interpretation of a performance. Still, 
the actual scale and the quality of space and time hardly matter 
unless the audience choose to, or are tempted to, 'sense' the 
'moment' of a performance. 
5,7 Performers' Responsibility and the Role of the Audience 
The notion of performance seems to give way to that of performer 
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in the sense that it is the performer who calls the final shot in 
the space and at the time of the performance. Improvisation is 
an action of a performer even if planned by someone else, for 
example, the director. According to Sally Banes, who writes on 
the field of, dance, improvisation differs from 'chance 
techniques'. Banes describes 'chance techniques' in Cunningham: 
Through the use of chance -- employing charts, coin-tossing, 
dice-throwing, and clues from the I 
, 
Ching to select elements in a 
predetermined gamut of movements, body parts, or stage spaces -- 
[Merce] Cunningham had developed a technical style characterized 
by unexpected juxtapositions of actions. 36 
These chance techniques 'had the salutary effect of loosening the 
choreographer's conscious control over the dance' (p. 103), while 
'the initial gamut of movement choices from which the chance 
combinations were made still came from Cunningham's personal 
inventions' (p. 103). Although the dancers in Story are 
supposedly given a 'choice' at certain moments of performance, 
Banes concludes that 'chances' in Story are not to be identified 
with improvisation (p. 108). What chance techniques require 
inevitably brings the director and the choreographer, in this 
case Cunningham himself, to the centre of the process of making 
choices, since: 
In giving up control (via chance techniques) over such elements 
as timing, spacing, and sequencing, Cunningham needed to assert 
even more careful control in a different direction over his 
dancers. For one thing, if the dancers were not carefully 
coordinated, the varying speeds and complicated movement patterns 
might lead to accidents. For another, strict direction was 
necessary since the dancers could not rely on musical phrasing or 
other conventional methods to synchronize their movements. In 
other words, the creator's vast freedom in handling his 
compositional materials led to a richness of content but, 
simultaneously, to a tightening of the reins over his performers. 
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(p. 109) 
Although not taking 'full' control of spatial and temporal 
factors of the performance, Cunningham in fact takes control of 
performers' spatial and temporal movements, which in the end 
hinders the performers in Story from calling the shots of their 
own. In using 'chance techniques', it is not Cunningham's 
intention to hand freedom to the only people who have the power 
to exert a sense of 'living' during performance. The freedom, if 
given, would enable the performers to establish some kind of 
'sharing' relationship with the audience. In Story, freedom 
seems to be almost non-existent: the performers are too squarely 
framed by the obligation to follow 'chance' for the sake of 
accomplishing 'chance'. The audience of Merce Cunningham and his 
company may have prior knowledge of Cunningham's interest in 
'improvisation'; the audience therefore may expect the company's 
actual performance to look improvisatory to them. It is likely 
that the real performance in fact will look highly structured 
rather than improvisatory. 
Improvisation, as Banes explains, 'allows for movement 
content and performance style beyond any gamut of the 
choreographer's imagination' (p. 109), giving the power of 
control to performers themselves. Among other performers 
discussed by Banes is Yvonne Rainer, who, during her Some 
Thoouughts on Improvisation, 'lists three aspects of choice: 
impulses, anti-impulses, ideas' (p. 224) to '(dissect] the 
choicemaking patterns of improvisation' (p. 224). Rainer 
demonstrates the performer's inalienable, and righteous, action 
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to follow 'instinct' (p. 224). A 'failed' performance (p. 109) 
will be more likely to occur in improvisation than in chance 
techniques for the very reason that no one will be able to 
predict exactly how the 'living' moment will turn out until that 
moment is lived by the performer and the audience. 
Once the performer is in the position of drawing concentrated 
attention from the audience, the performance becomes a spatial 
and temporal opportunity for the performer to submit herself to 
some kind of experiment, of which the same performer will take 
direct responsibility as well as credit. Spalding Gray writes: 
The way that I interpreted Schechner's theories was that I was 
free to do what I wanted, be who I was, and trust that the text 
would give this freedom a structure. The text was like a wave I 
was riding, and the way in which I rode that wave was up to me. 
This was liberating for me because it allowed me to be more 
creative. This process seemed to work. The audience seemed to 
make the internal connections necessary to bring the text and 
actions together. There was a kind of counterpoint, or 
dialectic, that met in a third place, the eye of the audience. 
It became a creative act for them. [. . .] Second, I discovered 
that text and action could exist separately and be understood. 
This led to the way in which we constructed our first original 
work, Sakonnet Point. It led me to the desire to create an open 
narrative of personal actions and to see if the audience could, 
and would, tie them together. It was maintaining the same 
dialectic, but dropping the text and allowing the mind of each 
audience member the chance to create its own text. I was the 
role, and the text into which I fit was to be within the 
audiences' imaginations. This was my idea of audience 
participation. 37 
Granted that Gray does not use the term 'improvisation' nor does 
he employ any word comparable to it, Gray's description of his 
own approach to the performance nevertheless can be regarded as 
evidence to the supposition that the performer is assuming 
control of the performance when he or she is allowed to 'create'. 
The actual result of the creation itself matters less than the 
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fact that the performer is creating and also that the audience 
somehow 'participate' in the creating exercise. Such an 
experience-oriented objective of a performance seems to concur 
with Lars Kleberg's explanation on the 'focus' of 'production 
artists': 
It was not until the centre of gravity shifted from the producer 
viewed as a solitary subject to the relationship between producer 
and audience, and thus to the question of how art exerted its 
influence, that the old opposition between form and content 
[. . .] could be reformulated. 
38 
Focussing attention on the interaction between the performer 
and the audience eventually leads to our appreciation of such 
interaction itself as a performance. When the performer-audience 
interaction is pushed to a near extreme, then we have 
performances such as happenings or environmental theatre as 
described by Schechner, in which 'the audience is encouraged to 
structure the events as they wish -- there is no "best" and 
"worst" seat because the game has no single, all-encompassing, 
39 
and immutable structure'. To use Stanton B. Garner Jr's 
40 
words, the 'circuitry linking performer and spectator' is what 
a performance needs when it drops everything else. When such 
'circuitry' happens, both the performer and the audience have 
every opportunity to sense the 'moment', which is ideal for the 
performer to explore improvisatory elements. 
For some performers in dance, Yvonne Meier among them, 
improvisation is 'a statement about what dance is and what bodies 
mean in our culture' rather than 'a means to a finished 
41 
product', which can be regarded as one way of understanding the 
ultimate situation, namely, showing the performers themselves to 
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the audience. Meier thinks that the audience, on their part, 
will be 'made privy to the dancer's creative process' (p. 345), 
which means the breaking up of 'hierarchies' (p. 345) that divide 
the performer and the audience apart. Performers' willingness to 
present themselves, especially their bodies, to the audience has 
to be counterbalanced by the audience who are ready to accept 
such performers as being in the 'creative process' and to regard 
the very process as a performance. The 'circuitry' fails if the 
balance cannot be maintained, and this seems to explain a 
practical difficulty in attempting improvisation for an audience 
of unspecified number or quality: 
Three or four times we did wholly improvisatory shows for small, 
selected audiences. There was no publicity. These were one-shot 
things. This kind of performing cannot be repeated too often. 
The atmosphere is special too. There is the risk that the 
improvisation may fail; the public must be aware of that and 
prepared to accept it. You can improvise in this way during 
festivals or workshops. You can't do it for an audience off the 
street. 42 
When the audience are expected to observe the performer inside 
out so that the performer's 'self' will come out in the open, the 
performer-audience circuitry requires certain environmental 
conditions, as we saw in the preceding section, which will enable 
the performer to concentrate on presenting herself, or her body, 
and the audience to concentrate on absorbing that 'self' or 
'body'. 
5.8 Breaking Down the Performer-Audience Hierarchy 
If such a circuitry helps to disintegrate the performer-audience 
hierarchy that allegedly exists in performance, we might think 
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that the breaking-up of the hierarchy is a realisation of what 
Alan Read describes with regard to Derrida: 
The question of the 'Public' and its disappearance in the theatre 
act is one which is central to the proposition of a relation 
between theatre and everyday life. It is an important concept to 
which Derrida returns in an analysis of Rousseau, in Of 
Grammatolocy. Derrida here outlines a theatre that is at odds 
with the Western tradition, as is Artaud's [. . . ]. Derrida 
summarises that what Rousseau criticises in his 'Letter to M. 
d'Alembert', [sic] is not the content of spectacle, but re- 
presentation itself. What could take the place of this theatre, 
where the actor speaks in words other than their own? What will 
take its place is reminiscent of a theatre of everyday life, a 
'nature' theatre [. . . ]. Here oppositions and polarities of 
theatre, audience and performer, seer and seen, will dissolve, 
will deconstruct. 43 
On the one hand, the performer is 'speaking' in 'words' of her 
own when she lets the audience be 'privy' to her 'creative 
process'. That way, the very nature of the audience changes: the 
audience still exist but now in a different, deconstructed way. 
It is precisely because of such a 'new' relationship between the 
performer and the audience that the actual performance can 
become, in Read's words, a 'new event' (p. 215), an event in 
which 'no movement is repeatable the same way twice' (p. 215). 
On the other hand, the kind of theatre or performance described 
above is difficult to materialise unless the performance will 
look more like a ritual. Victor Turner describes ritual as: 
Ritual, unlike theatre, does not distinguish between audience and 
performers. Instead, there is a congregation whose leaders may 
be priests, party officials, or other religious or secular ritual 
specialists, but all share formally and substantially the same 
set of beliefs and accept the same system of practices, the same 
sets of rituals or liturgical actions. 44 
As an example, Turner mentions Grotowski, who apparently 
deconstructed the dividing line between the performer and the 
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audience at a certain stage of his career: 
In the past few years Grotowski seems. to have abandoned theatre 
altogether to set out on what he calls 'culture searches' or 
'paratheatrical experiments' like the 1977 (Summer) pilgrimage to 
Fire Mountain near Wroclaw in Poland, and the Global Village 
[. . . ]. The 
distinctive feature of those projects was the 
disappearance of the audience, and the development of ritualized 
experiences which, to my anthropologist's eye, bear a striking 
resemblance to the instructions and hazards typical of successive 
phases of boys' and girls' puberty rites in Central America. (p. 
117) 
The problem is, as long as there is a person who planned the 
'event' and there is another person who did not plan it but is 
presently participating in it, there inevitably will be a 
difference in attitude between the planner and the non-planner. 
From what Turner describes above, it seems that the gap between 
the two parties is thought to be eliminated, or at least made 
less prominent, when both the performer and the audience have the 
conviction that they together believe in the same thing, in the 
same 'practice'. This is quite different from saying that the 
gap between the 'priests' or their equivalents and the rest of 
the 'congregation' or their equivalents are eliminated from a 
third party's point of view. In the case of rituals, the third 
party's opinion presumably would not matter much. The important 
aspect of the congregation would reside in the fact that the 
participants actually can feel their belief in their faith. When 
Ann Halprin writes about the performance called Myth, the title 
Myth and the word 'ritual' used in her article seem suggestive: 
For 10 consecutive Thursdays, starting in October 1967, groups of 
about 50 people came to the Dancers' Workshop studios in San 
Francisco. Most of them expected a 'performance', and instead 
found themselves 'performers'. The Workshop had attempted to 
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prepare the public by mailing the E. . .] announcement [titled 
Myth], but people were too pre-conditioned to understand what the 
release meant, and could only be convinced by the actual 
experience. 
The 'audience' were, by and 
group. They were a mixture 
San Francisco Institute of 
students and professionals, 
psychotherapists, tourists, 
nude performers. In short: 
large, neither homogeneous nor an in- 
of hippies, student groups from the 
Art, all types of businessmen, dance 
architects, city planners, 
and those lured by our reputation for 
no pattern. 
Although each Myth was different, the central idea of every 
evening was to release people's buried creativity by answering 
one of their basic needs through ritual. 
[. . .] Certain general conditions were suggested to the group 
in the briefing room. Thereafter, anyone was free to participate 
or observe. A few people left. But the vast majority stayed, 
participated, even participated ecstatically. For some it was 
simply fun, for some a bore, for some extraordinarily sensual, 
for some a Happening, for some a kind of atavistic tribal 
reawakening. For me, it was all these things -- and a new 
explosion. 45 
The audience who feel confident in the 'ritual' stay, while those 
who do not find the 'ritual' to their liking can express their 
boredom or dissatisfaction or leave the place. Even though the 
performance is highly ritualistic, whether or not it is 
experienced as a 'ritual' depends entirely on the individual 
participants. Such a precarious nature of participation is what 
makes Halprin's project a 'performance' and not, strictly 
speaking, a 'ritual'. In the case of a performance which does 
not hint or does not intend to hint at any ritualistic means or 
ends, we are even less certain about the possibility of the 
participants ever having any common belief or any conviction of a 
common belief. 
A 'gap' between the performer and the audience gives a 
46 
performance the meaning which a ritual cannot fulfil. When we 
turn our eyes to improvisation in this repect, we find that a 
0 
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ritual or a quasi-ritual performance will have more to do with 
bringing about a constant equilibrium which will ingest the whole 
participants, as we saw in chapter 4. In such circumstances, the 
participants are more likely to regard improvisation as a 
righteous part of the canon, not as improvisation. The 
participants for a brief second may sense the 'moment' of an 
improvisatory action, but the next second they will be obliged to 
take in that 'moment' according to the law of the ritual. 
Everything initiated by the 'priests' is regarded as something of 
a perfection. In a non-ritualistic performance or in a 
performance which uses a 'ritual' only as a kind of experiment, 
the participants are free of any rules or any bindings which 
would automatically prompt them to interpret the 'moment' as 
being 'proper'. A gap, or any potential gap, between the 
performer and the audience is vital, because the participants 
are capable of sensing the 'moment' as part of a 'performance' 
only when there is a mental as well as physical buffer between 
one another. Grotowski's 'attempt at direct confrontation and 
47 
self-revelation' before he decides to abandon the concept of 
'audience' stresses such a 'gap'. Daphna Ben Chaim calls it 
'distance' (p. 45) and states: 'the spectator is aware, 
"consciously or unconsciously", that the actor's performance is 
separate from him or her, and that it is an "invitation". 
Implied in the voluntary nature of the event is that the 
spectator has the choice to accept the performance and respond to 
it, or to reject it and choose not to engage in self-penetration' 
(p. 45). 
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We can also take advantage of the 'gap' between the performer 
and the audience by creating an 'official' game out of the 
existence of such a 'gap'. This is the idea based on which 
Theatresports has been developed: 
Theatresports started as a game with two teams of improvisors 
competing against each other for points which were based on the 
execution of rudimentary improvisation and performance skills and 
awarded by a panel of judges. E. . .] One team would take the 
stage for an agreed period of time and, at the end of their 
allotted time, the opposing team could challenge for the stage. 
Each team would perform a scene based on the specific challenge, 
and the winner of the challenge would take the stage. [. . .] 
[The audience] voice their approval by simply calling out the 
names of the team they prefer; the judges also may call a 
'boring' to remove a team from the stage or to issue a warning 
that a scene end within a certain amount of time. Audience 
participation is encouraged by asking them to provide locations, 
occupations, relationships, experiences, or situations to be used 
within the improvised scene. Another technique is to involve. 
members of the audience in the scene on stage. The audience is 
always encouraged to 'boo' the judges if they disagree and to 
vocalize their reactions to whatever is happening on stage. 48 
The performer and the audience share the performance together by 
participating in the same 'game', but the rule of the 'game' 
makes it clear that the performer and the audience are separate, 
independent groups of people who keep to their respective roles 
of performing and approving/disapproving. This is a 'game' which 
reflects on the 'gap' through the participants' deliberate 
'playing' of the gap. The performer-audience hierarchy persists, 
though, even during such a game, and it seems that the 'gap' 
always goes beyond the participants' capacity for mocking it: 
During the 1984 Fringe Theatre Festival in Edmonton the 
performances of Theatresports were among the best attended; by 
week's end, lines were two hours long. [Marilyn] Herasymovych 
finds an anomaly in this popularity, however. The popularity is 
presumably based in part upon the verbal participation of the 
audience in the performance; but although Theatresports 
performers ask for audience contribution many times during a 
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performance, Herasymovych feels that these requests are very 
often only a pretext. The actors often seem to focus on 
attempting to make any audience suggestion fit a preconceived 
pattern upon which the actor has already decided. This is a 
frequent complaint. 49 
Schechner in Environmental Theater lists 'objections and 
obstacles to audience participation', in which we find: 'Neither 
the actor nor the spectator is trained to deal with 
50 
participation'. In the same vein, Joseph Chaikin 'thought for 
a time that actors might address and even touch members of 
the audience, but he eventually rejected this approach as not 
51 
only ineffective but assaultive'. We can infer from these 
comments that trying to eliminate a gap by physically touching 
someone, for example, may be taken by the audience as more than 
an 'invitation' because it might not let the audience have mental 
or physical room to interpret. 
The performer-audience relationship will have to give 'space' 
to both the performer and the audience so that they will be able 
to exercise their 'imagination'. Neither the performer nor the 
audience should be obliged to mould into the other party's 
intentions. As Spalding Gray writes in 'About Three Places in 
Rhode Island' from the performer's point of view: 
I was never one or the other and could be someone or something 
completely different for each audience member because they also 
live with their 'names' and associations. It is their story as 
well as mine. 
This theatre was concrete in its physical expression and 
abstract in its open narrative. It was an open mood for all to 
digest (reflection) and for all to play back (projection). This 
meeting of our imagination with the imagination of the audience 
seemed to open up external possibilities. This meeting of 
imaginations became a sort of transcendent third point somewhere 
in the space or in one mind, or many minds. It was always larger 
than myself and took me out of myself. 52 
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When the breakdown of the performer-audience hierarchy happens, 
it means that the performer is not afraid of letting the audience 
'scrutinise' her bodily expressions. The performer knows that 
the audience will not invade her area of 'imagination' 
to the extent that her bodily expressions will be impeded. The 
audience, on their part, can fully concentrate on interpreting 
the performer without the fear of their 'imagination' being 
invaded by the performer in an overly forceful manner. Only 
under such an agreement can the performer explore various 
possibilities, including improvisation, for the 'moment' of their 
performance and can the audience make their part of the decision. 
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6 Improvisation in a Wider Perspective 
6.1 Overview 
Our discussion of the performer-audience relationship in chapter 
5 has led us to conclude that what we call 'performance 
improvisation' is a practice which mainly concerns the performer 
rather than the audience. A performer's improvisatory actions 
mean nothing to the audience unless they are made to 'sense' the 
space and the time of the performance, which in itself does not 
suggest that the audience recognise 'improvisation'. In this 
chapter, we will look more closely at the practice of 
'performance improvisation', and we will leave the audience 
outside our discussion throughout the chapter. 
If we place a performer at the centre of the performance 
according to the so-called phenomenology which we will touch upon 
shortly, it is more precisely a performer's body that we put at 
the centre. A 'performance' in the realm of purely conceptual 
acts is outside our sphere of interest in the current 
discussion. Given that mind and body may not be separated 
clearly, as has been seen in chapter 2, we do not mean to say 
that a purely conceptual work completely defies any involvement 
of a performer's body. Nevertheless, 'body' in the present 
discussion refers to a body as an overt, physically tangible 
matter, a body which is potentially visible to the outside world. 
It also refers to overt, visible decision-making by a performer. 
'Alone among the elements that constitute the stage's semiotic 
field, ' Stanton B. Garner Jr states, 'the body is a sign that 
1 
looks back'. That a performer's body refuses to become a sign 
per se forms the principle of Garner's phenomenological approach 
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to performance: 
Reopening phenomenological lines of investigation allows us to 
redress the current of antitheatricality that runs through much 
poststructuralist criticism, an attitude symptomatic (like all 
antitheatricality) of a deeper uneasiness with the body -- in 
this case, with the body as a site of corporeal and subjective 
elements that always resist reduction to the merely textual. (p. 
26) 
Both phenomenological approaches and poststructuralist criticism 
have much to do with 'the blind spots [. . .] intrinsic to any 
field of vision' (p. 39), but the former tend to see in the blind 
spots the 'ambiguities and dis-possessions of subjectivity 
itself' (p. 38), when the latter would handle such blind spots in 
terms of 'signification and textuality' (p. 38). Here we will 
not explore the idea of phenomenology any deeper, but the 
shifting point seems to be clear: to people like Garner, a 
performer's body operates not only as another signifier but more 
importantly as a receptacle and amplifier of a performer's mind. 
The 'ambiguity' which Garner talks about refers not to the body's 
ambiguity as a 'sign' but rather to a performer's mental and 
physical ambiguities in decision-making and also to the way she 
concretises her decisions through her body. Such 'decision- 
making' is explained by David Cole in the light of improvisation: 
'[. . .] one does not 
know whether to call the activity in 
question "reading" or "writing". I am going to argue that it is 
uncertainty on this score -- and not, for example, any 
"freshness" or "spontaneity" that may or (as here) 
2 
may not be 
present -- which marks activity as improvisatory'. A 
performer's ambiguous existence is a reflex of how she is living 
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the moment of performance. To use Cole's terms, a performer does 
not live such a moment by reading into any 'script' (p. 104) nor 
does she clearly live in the world of 'writing'. This particular 
kind of ambiguity presupposes the notion that a performer's body 
has its value by simply being at the centre of the performance. 
As Deborah Jowitt states, '[. . .] the human body [. . .] can 
never be a neutral artistic medium. It is never inexpressive. 
it is not, in fact, an "it" but the physical manifestation of a 
3 
gendered and unique person'. A performer's decision-making 
determines how, when, and to what extent her intrinsic being 
reveals itself as an overt bodily action. 
Once we recognise a performer's body at the centre of the 
performance, it means that we perceive the performer in a 
'superior' status than where we are, simply because we will never 
become the performer and thus will never occupy that centre for 
ourselves. What a performer decides and what her body overtly 
shows us during performance now split from our criticism, which 
guarantees the performer a firm position at the centre of the 
performance. The very moment of her experiencing a performance 
may never be expressed in any other way on any other occasions 
even by the performer herself, but the performer's post- 
performance comments, descriptions, and records become 
'authentic' materials in their own right. For example, when 
Chaikin asks such questions as the ones below, all we can say 
from a strictly performer-oriented point of view is that we have 
to turn to the performers for an answer: 
When an actor responds to an imaginary stimulus, he himself 
chooses and shapes that stimulus. He has the potential for a 
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deep contact with that stimulus, since it is privately chosen. 
This contact brings up energy for the actor's use. On one level 
or another he is given energy by his inner promptings, 
associations, that part of his life which is already lived. 
From what part of himself is he drawing these associations as 
he performs? Does he draw from information and ideas of the 
character, the audience, and his self-image? Does he draw from a 
'body memory'? Does he draw his impulse from a liberated 
consciousness or from the same consciousness which he believes to 
be necessary for his daily personal safety? Does he draw from a 
common human source or from the contemporary bourgeois ego? 4 
The performers' answers to these questions will then be analysed 
and interpreted by critics. In this chapter, many of the 
examples of performances will be taken from the written materials 
which performers themselves have prepared for publication. We 
will make certain that there will be no confusion in our 
discussion over the performers' writings and the critics' 
writings. 
So long as the body is placed at the centre of the 
performance, it may permeate such traditionally stratified fields " 
as music, dance, and games, among other fields. Sally Banes, for 
example, reviews an incident of merging between dance and 
theatre: 'Ironically, while the avant-garde choreographers of the 
1960s were involved in stripping their dances of every vestige of 
theatricality, the nontheatrical arts borrowed from the theater, 
5 
and the theater, stressing physicality, became more dancelike'. 
In the end, 'the only difference between these performances and 
dance performances', Banes notes, 'was that these groups still 
marketed themselves as theater' (p. 253). If we start our 
discussion from the body, we have only 'performance' instead of 
oppositions among 'theatre', 'dance', and so on. 
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6.2 Setting Criteria 
The question of 'why' performers improvise at all will be outside 
the present discussion apart from the premise that the flexible 
human body cannot avoid improvising. The performers' decision- 
makings intertwine not only with the whole context of the 
performance but also with such innate improvising impulse. 
Our criteria for reviewing individual performances in this 
chapter start with one general condition: actions have to be 
overt and thus have to have consequences. Based on this, we can 
first posit the cases in which a performer's body is under strict 
instructions such as conforming to tight choreography. In the 
second cases, the body only has a guideline or principle to obey. 
The third cases put a performer's body in the contexts which 
question a convention or a tradition. We will look at 
performances which would in a traditional sense be called dance, 
games, music, and writing. 
6.3 Writing and Music 
Here, writing concerns our discussion only in the sense that some 
people regard some particular authors' works as being 
improvisatory. If an author may be given the status of a 
performer, her decision-making is made overt through her letting 
the words be recorded. She may scribble the words on paper, may 
type them, dictate them, or, supposing she is paralysed and 
cannot move any part of her body, she may blink her eyes 
according to the set rules so that the intended words will be 
expressed. Whichever means she employs, a performer cannot 
'write' by keeping what she wants to say in a purely conceptual 
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form, which tells us that writing places the body at the centre 
of a performance but in the most disguised way of all possible 
instances of performance. Gertrude Stein's The Making of 
Americans, for example, is viewed by Richard Bridgman as 'an 
improvised work of no identifiable genre in which the creator 
6 
learned by doing'. Bridgman here talks about 'genre' within the 
field of literature, but if we can also take Stein's writing as 
an improvisatory performance, it means that Stein's work 
challenges the convention and the tradition of grouping and 
labelling performances. Granted that novels characteristically 
posit no such formal rules as poetry does, Stein or any other 
novelist has no essential guidelines or principles to conform to, 
whether or not their writings happen to be improvisatory. This 
at first glance leaves those novelists with almost too wide a 
range of possibilities. On the other hand, since the 
consequences of the performance have to be quite medium-specific, 
namely, the written words or their equivalents, the novelists can 
only defy the tradition within the range of the written words. 
Bridgman explains Stein's 'improvisatory' writing process: 
The greater part of Gertrude Stein's writing was improvisational. 
She used her composition books as catch-alls in which she 
recorded the day's activities, confessed her uncertainties, 
celebrated her moments of contentment, tried out new techniques, 
and assessed the quality of her experimentation. For long 
periods, even though she made no progress, she labored on, 
awaiting inspiration. The monotony of these thousands of pages 
of disconnected trivia must be acknowledged if the inventory is 
to be complete. [. . .] Gertrude Stein is often accused of a 
self-indulgent abuse of language, and yet she regarded her 
primary stylistic goal as accuracy of verbal expression. [. . .] 
Clouds of association, fragmentary statements, covert references, 
and the arbitrary distortion of grammatical form: these 
constituted Gertrude Stein's representation of her consciousness 
in its actual state of existence. At its most complex, her prose 
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is an outpouring of verbal responses to her experience mixed with 
fantasies generated by the primary experiences and with words 
stimulated by the appearance or sound of other words already on 
the page or still in her head. (XV) 
Rather than focussing on the consequential words themselves, 
Bridgman brings our attention to the writer's action of mentally 
and physically producing the novels. The way Stein defies the 
convention, which we may include in our third category of the 
criteria, is overt enough to let other people like Bridgman call 
her work 'improvisatory', and yet her deliberate turning around 
7 
of convention ends up being a fixed work of 'literature'. 
Music differs from writing novels in one vital sense, which 
we can infer from Langer: '[Music] exhibits pure form not as an 
embellishment, but as its very essence; we can take it in its 
flower -- for instance, German music from Bach to Beethoven -- 
and have practically nothing but tonal structures before us: no 8 
scene, no object, no fact'. Unlike writing, music seems to 
have required 'form' simply because, being invisible and non- 
tangible, it otherwise would have made the composer's mental and 
physical decision-making end up in no overt consequences. Based 
on a solid tradition of musical forms, composers trying some 
improvisatory performances or improvisatory compositions have had 
convenient targets to improvise into or against, namely, norms 
and rules ranging from crystal-clear harmonic chords to roughly 
defined types of music. Improvisation in John Cage's music, for 
example, seems to operate ideally on the level of defying the 
entire system of music as it is understood in the West rather 
than on the level of merely playing against some specific musical 
rules and forms. 
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Cage's reluctance in relying on one's 'memory' is evident 
when he describes what he sees as the general tendency in 
'improvisation' as opposed to his definition of 'indeterminacy': 
E,. .] improvisation 
frequently depends not on the work you have 
to do [that is, the composition you're playing] but depends more 
on your taste and memory, and your likes and dislikes. It 
doesn't lead you into a new experience, but into something with 
which you're already familiar, whereas if you have work to do 
that is suggested but not determined by a notation, if it's 
indeterminate, this simply means that you are to supply the 
determination of certain things that the composer has not 
determined. 9 
The question is, is there a way of experiencing 'improvisation' 
which is also 'indeterminate'? Granted that strict indeterminacy 
in a human performance may be innately incompatible with the 
phenomenological existence of a human body and mind, we will need 
an extremely well-prepared context to make the performance as 
indeterminate as possible. A performer has to show overtly that 
what she is improvising is not exactly 'know[n]' to herself (p. 
222), and this turns out to be quite difficult to execute with 
clarity unless the context is right. Cage offers a few 
suggestions to 'create' indeterminacy: 
The first way is to play an instrument over which you have no 
control, or less control than usual. The next way is to divide 
empty time into rooms, you could say. In those rooms try to make 
clear the fact those rooms are different by putting different 
sounds in each room. If, for instance, I made this sound in a 
two-minute period -- say, we now begin a two-minute period [taps 
rock on table after a pause of several seconds], I don't need to 
make the sound again in that two-minute period. I could have 
made the sound then or at any other time. Instead of making it 
once I could make it several times, but if I made it several 
times, it is at that point that I could move toward my taste and 
memory. (p. 222) 
Without stipulating it in clear terms, Cage indicates the 
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phenomenon of an impending tendency within a performer to return 
to 'taste' and 'memory' even when it is the performer herself who 
has intentionally 'created' an indeterminate context. In order 
to achieve a taste-free and memory-free state, a performer has to 
adhere meticulously to narrow and highly specific conditions, 
which are intended not to allow the performer to rely on her past 
experience or knowledge. A model case is Cage's 'structural 
improvisation' (p. 224): 
Given a period of time, I will divide it. Say we have eight 
minutes. We'll divide it into sections of either one, two, 
three, or four minutes long, or three parts -- four minutes, 
three minutes, one minute, in any order -- or whatever. Then, if 
I have ten sounds, I can find out through the use of chance 
operations which of those ten sounds go in the first section, 
which go in the second section, and which go in the third. Then 
I improvise using the number of sounds that have been determined 
for the first section, the number of sounds for the second and 
the number of sounds for the third, and I will have an 
improvisation which is characterized by a change of sound at 
those different times, no matter what I play. (p. 224) 
We can see here that one of the most reliable ways of securing a 
relatively memory-free state is to use 'chance'. If a performer 
seeks after the purity of indeterminacy, she in effect is obliged 
to determine the potential indeterminacy very precisely. By 
citing his own work, Music of Changes, Cage explains this paradox 
of determinacy as a means of achieving indeterminacy: 
Though no two performances of the Music of Changes will be 
identical [. . . ], two performances will resemble one another 
closely. Though chance operations brought about the 
determinations of the composition, these operations are not 
available in its performance. The function of the performer in 
the case of the Music of Changes is that of a contractor who, 
following an architect's blueprint, constructs a building. That 
the Music of Changes was composed by means of chance operations 
identifies the composer with no matter what eventuality. But 
that its notation is in all respects determinate does not permit 
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the performer any such identification: his work is specifically 
laid out before him. He is therefore not able to perform from 
his own center but must identify himself insofar as possible with 
the center of the work as written. 10 
As shown here, the paradox is most plainly apparent when the 
'composer' and the 'performer' happen to be different 
individuals. Cage then gives an example of pieces which, in 
contrast to his Music of Changes, aims at indeterminacy 
without employing chance operations: 
In the case of the Intersection 3 by Morton Feldman, structure 
may be viewed as determinate or as indeterminate; method is 
definitely indeterminate. Frequency and duration characteristics 
of the material are determinate only within broad limits (they 
are with respect to narrow limits indeterminate); the timbre 
characteristic of the material, being given by the instrument 
designated, the piano, is determinate; the amplitude 
characteristic of the material is indeterminate. Form conceived 
in terms of a continuity of various weights -- that is, a 
continuity of numbers of sounds, the sounds themselves 
particularized only with respect to broad range limits (high, 
middle, and low) -- is determinate, particularly so due to the 
composer's having specified boxes as time units. Though one 
might equally describe it as indeterminate for other reasons. 
The term 'boxes' arises from the composer's use of graph paper 
for the notation of his composition. The function of the box is 
comparable to that of a green light in metropolitan thoroughfare 
control. The performer is free to play the given number of 
sounds in the range indicated at any time during the duration of 
the box, just as when driving an automobile one may cross an 
intersection at any time during the green light. With the 
exception of method, which is wholly indeterminte, the 
compositional means are characterized by being in certain 
respects determinate, in others indeterminate, and an 
interpretation of these opposites centers in a state of non- 
obstruction and interpenetration. (p. 36) 
We find a mesh of determinacy and indeterminacy in Intersection 
3. A performer is offered a reliable set of guidelines, which by 
no means follow any musical forms in traditional senses but 
instead are the bases for a set of certain contexts. These 
contexts require a performer's overt, physical and mental 
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decision-making and actions during the moment of performance. 
Inevitably a performer in this piece will not completely forgo 
her taste or memory; having an opportunity to make one's own 
decisions automatically means that all our past experiences will 
be consulted in one way or another. This particular piece does 
not intend to discover the most efficient way of subduing a 
performer's personal factors such as taste and memory. It is the 
balance between determinate and indeterminate factors that the 
piece tries to set here in order to let its performers make some 
actions without thinking too deeply or delving too profoundly 
into taste and memory. Having mentioned Intersection 3 as quoted 
above, Cage then reviews later works of his own, such as 
Imaginary Landscape No. IV for twelve radios and the Music of 
Charmes for piano (p. 57), which he asserts are 'structurally 
similar to [his] earlier work' (p. 57). His later works, 
however, differ fundamentally in physical realisations of their 
structures from his earlier works, which Cage himself explains: 
Formerly, [. . .] these lengths were time-lengths [based on a 
number of measures having a square root, so that the large 
lengths have the same relation within the whole that the small 
lengths have within a unit of it], whereas in the recent work the 
lengths exist only in space, the speed of travel through this 
space being unpredictable. (p. 57) 
Here, a linear approach of throwing a dice and pinning down the 
next step gives way to an approach in which how the performer 
throws a dice becomes an 'unpredictable' context itself. Cage's 
term 'space' above implies the kind of indeterminacy that allows 
a performer's physical body to move not merely as an executor of 
chance operations but also as part of a living, decision-maker. 
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The established 'forms' of music in the West can quite 
readily provide musical pieces such as a fugue by Bach or 
fragments of pieces such as a cadenza within a concerto. Those 
pieces give a performer, for example, an organist, a certain 
freedom during performance which belongs to the second category 
of our criteria. On the other hand, indeterminacy in Cage's 
sense especially in his later works has little to do with such 
progressive exploration of musical forms. Despite the fact that 
any 'improvisation' piece will be one of 'open' works to use 
11 
Umberto Eco's term, be it a Bach piece or a Cage piece, we note 
a difference among those pieces in their approaches towards the 
'forms'. Eco briefly cites Stockhausen and Berio (p. 1), whose 
works we may put between Bach and Cage: they both seem to defy 
the whole concept of form rather than exploring some specific 
forms as in Bach's music, but, compared to Cage's later works, 
they maintain their performers' position as executors of 
'chances'. If 'chances' can be regarded as a form unto itself, 
the importance lies more in how the chances will be realised than 
in how a performer exists in mind and body during the moment of 
performance. 
6.4 Games 
Kirby links various performances which we call happenings, games, 
tasks, or dance by stating that they have all been prompted by a 
shift in the status of 'exercises', that is, from the traditional 12 
'training values' of exercises to their merging with 
'performance'. From Kirby's brief sum-up, we can trace the 
beginning of a game as a performance piece in its own right: 
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Exercises [. . .] are frequently used in the new theatre for 
their performance qualities and expressiveness rather than for 
their training values. 
I believe that it was this same exercise that opened the 
first public performances of the Open Theatre. These 
presentations, which began in December, 1963, and continued into 
1965, combined various exercises and short plays on the same 
bill. It would be foolish to claim a kinship with Happenings for 
these 'variety' programs, but one wonders whether the similarity 
between the exercises and certain 'game' and task-oriented work 
by, among others, the Judson Dance Theatre did not suggest the 
possibility of presenting the exercises, which were designed to 
be done privately, to the public. (p. 13) 
Here we will mainly look at games which are not exactly 
'performances' in the strict sense of the term but are more than 
a series of simple warming-up exercises. Especially with regard 
to improvisation, games we are concerned with involve a 
performer's decision-making and its expression in bodily actions 
according to the rules of the games. 
Rules can be regarded as the most distinguishable feature of 
what we call a 'game'. Given that performers/players can make 
the rules of games by themselves if they want to, it is when the 
rules are already set for a universal application that we start 
our discussion. Games in general belong to our second category 
of the criteria. Their rules are 'written' quite specifically in 
order to give a performer an opportunity to interpret and 'use' 
them to her advantage, not in order to bind her to 'correct' 
actions. In games played on social occasions, the participants 
are put in a situational framework which allows them to behave 
differently from the way they behave in everyday life. In such 
circumstances, a game begins according to its rules but some of 
the participants already may be thinking that they are willing to 
fool around with the rules if possible and to try something which 
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people might not condone in everyday-life. Clive Barker notes 
that the rules of a game can actually be taken over by such 
13 
'hidden' motivations in the course of a game-playing. Here, 
the crucial point seems to be that the original rules of such a 
game are not only specific and relatively simple but are 
understood by the participants as a rather loosely-set guideline 
which could be flouted or manipulated without any serious 
'penalty' in sight. If game-playing may be regarded as an 
occasion for 'writing' as well as 'reading', games played on 
social occasions with a possible turning-over of the rules may be 
taken as some of the extreme examples of a strongly motivated 
'writing' and 'reading'. They are also improvisation in its 
wider sense of the term. According to David Cole, 'improvisation 
itself may best be understood as a limiting case of acting as 
reading, in which the actor simultaneously "writes" what he 
14 
"reads". With the existence of those socially-oriented games 
in mind, here in our discussion we will concentrate on games 
themselves rather than on their pragmatic potentialities. 
A game performer/player's overt action leads to consequences 
which, if successful, bring her to win the game. This is to say 
that 'writing' in games has a quite specific goal to achieve. 
There are, however, also cases in which winning ceases to be the 
objective or in which games are structured so as not to produce 15 
any winners. Eventually, what is common among what we call 
'games' in our present discussion seems to be that the 
participants of games have solid rules into which they may 
, write' but not to the extent of placing too serious a meaning or 
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value on the games' results. 
6.4.1 From Christine Poulter, Playing the Game 
Christine Poulter introduces some of the games which children 
would be familiar with but which Poulter intends to use for the 
training of a performer or a group of performers. If we 
particularly look for the games that encourage improvisatory 
decision-makings and actions on the part of the participants, we 
find a few different kinds of improvisatory skills required in 
the games. Especially pertinent to those skills is the question 
raised over an 'intelligent' decision-making and an 'instinctive' 
decision-making. Although all decision-makings in games have to 
be sufficiently quick, which seems to be a common understanding 
among the participants, there are games that primarily call for a 
performer's physical strength and dexterity while there are games 
that principally test a performer's mental flexibility and 
vigilance. 







1. Two players are chosen, one to be the cat the other to be 
the mouse. 
2. The other players stand in row s of equal numbers. 
3. There must be enough space to left and right, front and back 
of each player for the cat and mouse to run through the gaps. 
4. The players in the rows form a series of passages by lifting 
their arms and so closing the gaps to their left and right. 
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This forms passages that run from side to side. 
5. At a signal from the session leader the players turn to 
their right, arms still lifted, which will form passages 
that run from front to back. 
6. At the next signal they turn to face front and so on. 
7. The cat now chases the mouse up and down the passages. 
8. The session leader can change the direction of the passages 
at any time. 
9. If the cat catches the mouse they reverse roles. 
10. After a couple of minutes another pair are chosen to take 
over as cat and mouse. 16 
For the simple reason that neither the cat nor the mouse calls 
the shots to decide which passage they will go through, there 
cannot be any strategically improvisational actions involved. 
What is required of the cat and the mouse almost exclusively 
concerns their physical ability to react promptly to the shift of 
the passage and also to run fast enough either to catch or to 
escape. Even if the mouse or the cat thinks that she 
instinctively catches on the leader's signalling pattern and 
mentally as well as physically expects the next turn to take, it 
will be considered as the kind of action which any human being on 
any occasion would innately facilitate, and it could hardly be 
called what we here regard as improvisation in Cole's sense. It 
is a game which is most close to the first category of our 
criteria, since the cat and the mouse, virtually the sole 
'performers' in this game, have no choice but to follow the way 
paved for them by a leader. The rule leaves little room for the 
performers to 'write' upon it. 
'Blind Killer' compared to 'Alley Cats' seems to be a game 












1. The players put on blindfolds and move around the room. 
2. The session leader chooses one player to be the Hunter and 
whispers this fact to that player. 
3. The Hunter tries to catch all the other players. 
4. The Hunter catches someone by tapping on the 'victim's' 
shoulder three times. 
5. The 'victim' screams and 'dies'. 
6. When a player has been caught s/he may take off the blindfold 
and watch the rest of the chase, silently. (p. 84) 
The performers of this game rely on their auditory and/or tactile 
sensibilities, based on which they decide on their movements in 
order that they will be out of reach from the 'Hunter'. Instead 
of following the already-drawn passage, the performers in this 
case have at least several choices of movements. Measuring the 
distance between the Hunter and themselves, and also their 
position against other performers, with the help of the voices of 
the 'victims', the not-yet-caught performers may decide, for 
example, to deliberately slide backwards, sideways, or forward. 
Nevertheless, the performers' decision-making is severely 
hampered by their not being able to see, which results in their 
overt actions being more like a blind guess. As for the player 
of 'Hunter', her decision-making will be no less of a guesswork. 
Although 'Hunter' always has all the directions to choose from 
when she is about to make a move, she on the other hand will 
never 'win' unless she actually catches someone. Until 
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she does, the rest of the performers are 'winning'. In that 
sense, improvisatory aspects of this game can even be looked at 
as belonging to our third category of the criteria simply because 
'luck' plays a vital part of the materialisation of the game. 
In 'Granny's Footsteps', players can see one another and are 
able to judge the situation more accurately in terms of how they 








1. One player, A, stands at one end of the room, facing the 
wall. 
2. The other players stand in a line at the opposite end of the 
room. 
3. When the session leader calls 'Go' the players move towards 
A. 
4. The first player to touch A on the back is the winner. 
5. A can turn round at any point in the game and if s/he sees 
any player moving s/he can send them back to the beginning. 
6. When A turns round everyone freezes. 
7. The winner becomes the next A. (p. 37) 
Improvisatory possibilities centre around the way the players 
approach 'A'. While detecting the subtle motions of 'A', who is 
about to look back, and trying to react to 'Al's motions 
instantly by halting their physical movements, the players have 
to move forward. Their decision-makings are to be calculated 
without being pre-planned, which we can call improvisation. 
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Players may attempt to make slow movements or fast movements 
according to their observation of how often and how quickly 'A' 
turns. Compared to 'Blind Killer', players' mental aspects are 
more actively and sensitively stimulated in this game, which is 
helped by the game having a quite specific goal. At the same 
time, this is a highly physical game in that the players' 'lives' 
depend entirely upon their movements not being seen by 'A', which 
requires a swift command over the body. 'A' also has some 
freedom in calculating her pattern of looking back, which again 
can be called an improvisatory action. 
Some of the games introduced by Poulter characteristically do 
not have any objectives of 'winning'. They are 'games' not in 
the sense that participants test their physical and mental 
abilities for the sake of scoring high points. As we can see in 
'Cross the Circle' below, 'games' can also emphasise a more 
purely 'expressive' side of a player instead of her win/lose 
situations, and improvisation accordingly becomes less openly 











1. Everyone sits in a circle. 
2. The session leader gives each player a number: 1,2 or 3. 
3. All the number ones stand up. 
4. All the number ones must cross the circle and sit down on the 
other side. 
5. Whilst crossing the circle each player has to act as though 
moving through a particular environment, chosen by the 
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session leader, for example a high wire in the circus, the 
moon, etc. 
6. Number twos and then number threes are given different 
environments to try. (p. 34) 
Rather than competing with the other players, a player in this 
game simply responds to a certain 'environment' by visualising 
her 'feel' for that environment with her body. That she does not 
know the 'environment' till the leader tells it to her, that she 
has to complete her 'act' in a reasonable amount of time to keep 
up with the other players, and that she has space around her-to 
be used freely make this game a compact case for an improvisatory 
action in a traditional and performative sense. We have little 
difficulty in imagining such a group as the Open Theatre showing 
the actions which fundamentally have no difference from 'Cross 
the Circle' as a piece of performance and not as a game. On the 
other hand, there is a problem in 'Cross the Circle' being 
regarded as an effective 'game' of improvisation. A performer in 
'Cross the Circle' characteristically cannot make her overt 
mental-physical action until she first takes in the given 
'environment' by interpreting it in her own way. As discussed 
before, such interpretative opportunities often produce 'clich4'. 
In 'Cross the Circle', 'clichý' tends to come out easily, since 
the way the game is structured forces each player to think, 
however briefly, or to reflect upon what to do when her turn 
comes. A performer's interpreting process is more likely to 
become a process of exercising her intellectual imagination 
rather than a process of following her intuition. Meanwhile, 
'clichl' or not, this particular game demands a player's 
decision-making to be decisively visual. 
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Among the games that feature how to cooperate with the other 









1. Everyone stands in a circle. 
2. One player goes in to the centre of the circle and begins the 
game with a movement and sound which s/he keeps repeating 
until the whole machine is complete. 
3. A second player joins the machine with a movement and sound 
which complements that being made by the first player. 
4. One by one the rest of the group quickly join in until the 
machine is complete. (p. 42) 
This game, having no win/lose situation as a specific goal, may 
be taken as a group-oriented version of 'Cross the Circle'. 
Instead of playing a certain 'environment' individually, players 
improvise parts of a 'machine'. A player seems to be more 
tightly bound in this game than in 'Cross the Circle' in the 
sense that she has to blend in the machine-in-progress, which is 
not necessarily shaping itself in the manner she prefers. Those 
who join the machine at a later stage might find that their 
choices are getting narrower. Conversely, though, players can 
make their decisions quite freely on the basis of what the word 
'machine' implies. Simply because machines in the real world 
could be of any shape and of any size, players do not have to 
worry about the authenticity of their 'machine' as long as it 
keeps the general image held by themselves towards real machines. 
Such a lenient condition can help to bring out a player's quite 
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pure instincts in adding her own part to the others' parts; she 
does not have to 'think' and interpret as in the case of 'Cross 
the Circle'. Her mental and physical instincts made visible 
through an overt action and sound can only instinctively be 
valued by herself and by the other players as to their 
appropriateness. No one can categorically deny any of the 
players' decisions since there are no 'right' or 'wrong' machines 
in the first place. 
The players of 'Queenio' also cooperate with one another, but 
their improvisatory decision-makings are less 'performative' and 
more strategically intended to 'fool' one player who tries to 








1. One player, A, is given a tennis ball. 
2. The other players stand side by side, as close to each other 
as possible, in a line behind A, hands behind backs. 
3. Without looking, A throws the ball towards the line. 
4. One of the players in the line picks up the ball and it is 
concealed somewhere along the line. 
5. The line now calls in unison: 'Queenio Queenio who's got the 
bailio? ' 
6. A turns round to face the line and tries to guess who is 
concealing the ball. 
7. A can ask up to three players at a time to move about, with 
instructions such as 'Put out your hands; turn around; jump 
up and down' and so on. 
8. The players in the line can pass the ball along, making sure 
that A does not notice them do so. 
9. A may not touch any of the other players. (p. 45) 
The players do not pre-plan how they will conceal the tennis 
ball, which means that their overt actions entirely reflect the 
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'present' situation of exactly who has the tennis ball and who 
are called upon by the player W. Each player has to sense the 
other players' movements and intentions without transacting any 
verbal communications, and she herself in turn tries to convey 
her intentions by sending a non-verbal, physical signal to the 
other players. These actions have to be quick and decisive, 
while they cannot be obvious to W. At the same time, the 
players might try to 'fake' some actions which are deliberately 
intended to draw 'Alls attention to a false player. Since no one 
knows beforehand who will get the tennis ball, such 'fake' 
actions also have to be improvised on the spot among some of the 
players, which requires as much mental and physical sensitivities 
towards the other players. Furthermore, 'real' actions may look 
'fake' actions if the players cunningly mix various movements. 
The game offers situations for complex improvisatory actions. 
6.4.2 From Augusto Boal, Games for Actors and Non-Actors 
Boal defines the term 'exercise' and the term 'game' for the 
benefit of the reader of Games for Actors and Non-Actors. While 
both terms point to achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the 
movements of a performer's body, a performer in action has a 
frame of mind and also a frame of bodywork which alter as she 
switches from engaging in an exercise to engaging in a game, or 
vice versa. Exercises according to Boal are conducted so that a 
17 
performer will have a thorough understanding of her body. 
Through exercises, a performer will be brought to pay attention 
to her body's physiological aspects as much as her physical and 
mental sensitivities allows her. An exercise in Boal's words is 
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like a 'monologue', an 'introversion' (p. 60). Games shift the 
focus to 'expressivity of the body' (p. 60), which means that a 
performer now facilitates her mental and physical abilities in 
the presence of other people, for the sake of communication. A 
game is a 'dialogue', an 'extroversion' (p. 60). Having thus 
stated, Boal notes that exercises and games tend to overlap with 
each other and that the use of separate terms may basically be a 
matter of 'didactic intent' (p. 60). Here we find a merging 
point of Boal's definitions and Kirby's aforementioned 
definitions. 
The exercises and games introduced by Boal to some extent 
correspond to those taken up by Poulter. Here we will cite two 
games which grow out of children's games into more performance- 
conscious, 'theatrical' games. 
Among the 'image games' (p. 130) we find a game in which 
players are expected to 'complete the image' (p. 130): 
Everyone gets into pairs and starts with a frozen image of a 
handshake. One partner removes himself from the image, leaving 
the other with his hand extended. Now what is the story? 
Instead of saying what he thinks this new image means, the 
partner who has gone out returns to the image and completes the 
image, thus showing what he sees as a possible meaning for it; he 
puts himself in a different position, with a different 
relationship to the partner with the outstretched hand, changing 
the meaning of the image. 
Then the first partner comes out of this new frozen image, 
looks at it, and completes it, changing its meaning again. And 
so on# each partner alternating. The players should look quickly 
at the half-image they are completing, arranging themselves in a 
complementary position as fast as they can; like the modelling 
exercises, the actors should think with their bodies. It does 
not matter if there is no literal meaning to the way an actor 
chooses to complete the image -- the important thing is to keep 
the game moving and the ideas flowing. (pp. 130-31) 
The players keep up with a certain rhythm in completing the image 
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and in alternating the role of completing the image, which 
reduces time for mental reflection or planning and instead 
encourages a body-oriented thinking. At the same time, unlike 
'Machine' above, in which each player can make a 'mechanical' 
movement and can call it a part of a machine, the player who 
completes the image in this game will not simply add to the half- 
image of the other player but create a certain 'meaning', literal 
or not, every time her turn comes. This requires more thinking 
in the sense that a player has to generate a new, creative 'idea' 
while making an overt, physical movement. Such blending-of 
mental and physical functions within a performer culminates in a 
specific, bodily 'showing' of the performer's decision, which 
altogether makes a comprehensive case for our second caterogy of 
improvisation. 
Another game which requires a performer's mental as well as 
physical agility and sensitivity is developed from the concept of 
'mask': 
An actor starts talking and moving around normally, while the 
others try to capture and reproduce his mask. It is important 
not to caricature, but to reproduce the inner force which drives 
the actor to be as he is. The actors imitate the 'master', but 
imitation in the sense of the word as defined by Aristotle: 
trying not merely to copy appearances, but to reproduce the inner 
creative forces which produce these appearances. For instance, 
one actor's visible characteristics included extreme volubility; 
in reality he was a timid person, unsure of himself, a person 
whoe sought self-assurance by talking non-stop, as he was afraid 
others might attack him. The actor must create the fear 
impelling this excess verbosity. Moreover he must discover in 
the other person the social rituals which have prompted him to be 
victim to this fear. The foundation of the mask is always a 
social necessity determined by rituals. (p. 139) 
The game tests a performer's sensitivity in observing the 
behaviour of another person and also tests a performer's ability 
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to re-generate another person's 'being' from within the 
performer's self. The 'imitator' does not have much time to 
figure out the nature of the other person. She promptly has to 
detect the nature of the mask the other person is wearing and 
then look through the mask into the 'inner' part of the other 
person. What is required of a performer in such observations 
has much to do with experience as well as acute sensitivity 
towards other people's behaviour. A performer then tries to show 
what she has observed, which in effect reveals how she 
facilitates her mind and body in the manner she wants, and her 
improvisatory agility is now put to test. Like 'complete the 
image', this game demands a performer's complex mental and 
physical coordination. 
6.5 Dance 
The term 'dance' arguably spreads so thin that it will cover, if 
so required, any overt action shown by a human being. Such u se 
of the term 'dance' confirms that we have, in the course of 
performance history, shifted the focus of our attention from the 
observation of forms, of patterns, and of rhythms which are 
handed down, are learned, and are developed by a leading 
choreographer, to the recognition of the situation and the 
condition surrounding those overt actions. Pointing out that 
'the ethnocentrically European term "dance" is not applicable to 
systems of structured human body movement of non-European 
peoples, who have their own terms of reference for conceiving of 
18 
such activities', Georgiana Gore indicates the 'content- 
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dependent' (p. 59) nature of 'dance'. We thus are led to accept 
what a 'dancer' has to say about her definition of 'dance' and 
about her performance, which means that some of the 'dances' are 
called by that name only because the performers call them dances. 
'Dance' manifests a phenomenological point of view towards a 
performing 'body', particularly in the sense that a decision- 
making performer comes in the centre of discussion. Sally Banes 
also mentions 'context': 
In general, whether one is'speaking about art dance or social 
dance, the context of the event in which the movement is situated 
is more salient than the nature of the movement itself in 
determining whether the action is dance. 19 
The context may be agreed upon among the performers and the 
audience alike, with little explanation needed, based on a shared 
tradition. On the other hand, we can also create a new, desired 
context for ourselves, foregrounded by which our performance 
becomes a 'dance'. In Bane's words, 'dance can consist of 
movement organized poetically, familiar movements made strange by 
virtue of a new context' (p. 239). 
Here in this section of the chapter we will take up the field 
of 'dance' primarily from a viewpoint similar to those of Gore or 
Banes. We will not pre-define the ranges to be covered but will 
adhere to the principle notion of 'dance' as a performer's body 
making overt actions in circumstances which may differ widely 
from one performance piece to another. According to our 
categorisation of improvisation, 'dance' in such a sense 
particularly relates to the second and the third categories. 
Strictly 'choreographed' performances, in which a mistake is a 
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mistake whether deftly improvised or not, are regarded as a 
thesis to be reacted against by the performers engaging in such 
dance pieces as those described by Banes. To appreciate the 
relationship between improvisation and dance fully, we first 
briefly overview a change that has taken place in the concept and 
practice of 'dance' in the course of dance history in the West. 
6.5.1 Before Cunningham; Cunningham 
If we trace the development of 'modern dance' which Banes sums 
up, we can find in Lole Fuller, who worked in Paris in the 1890s, 
a budding concept of the kind of dance in which a dancer is given 
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a certain amount of decision-making role. Fuller apparently 
intended to show 'individual differences between the ways the 
dancers moved' (p. 2), which included letting the dancers have 
'choices within the present, imagistic fragments she [Fuller] 
created' (p. 2). This relieves the, performers of having to 
shuttle between a dichotomy of correct and incorrect movements, 
and their improvisatory options start gaining the status of being 
an authentic part of a dance-piece itself. Meanwhile, Fuller 
remained the decision-maker in terms of laying out the principle 
structure of the piece and its scope of choices. Banes also 
points out that Fuller 'often used untrained dancers in her 
works' (p. 2), which may suggest her interest in 'individuals' as 
alive, human 'bodies'. 
Of Isadora Duncan, Banes brings our attention especially to 
Duncan's 'attitudes' towards dance, which may or may not have 
been fully shown in her actual 'choreography': 
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Apparently Duncan's choreography was not improvised, but followed 
a fixed plan. But surely her charismatic stage presence imbued 
the spare dances with much of their legendary power. Her ideas 
about the possibilities of human freedom and personal expression 
in life, as in dance, her unabashed love for the human body, her 
rejection of the rigidity imposed by an academic approach to 
movement -- these attitudes (rather than the actual skeletal 
choreography that survives) are her most important legacy. (pp. 
2-3) 
Duncan's quest for 'freedom' and 'personal expression' in dance 
can partly be deduced from her rather defiant stand against the 
then mainstream ballet. As Deborah Jowitt explains, Duncan 
'railed at what she felt to be the innate inexpressiveness of the 
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ballet vocabulary'. Given that ballet and dance are not to be 
confused but not to be discussed totally separately either, here 
we simply note that Duncan saw in ballet not only 'discipline' 
(p. 170) and 'aristocratic decorum' (p. 170), to use Jowitt's 
words, but also 'arbitrary choices' (p. 170). Freedom for Duncan 
then may have a two-fold meaning. First, a performer's body and 
choreographic directions complement and highlight each other 
rather than the body being stuck in a choreographic straitjacket. 
Enveloping this kind of physical, expressive freedom, there is a 
freedom which defies the hierarchical superiority of the 
tradition and rules of the then ballet as a whole. Duncan's 
charisma was apparently needed if such freedom was to be 
attempted, and we also realise that Duncan was a powerful 
decision-maker while being a possible emancipator. In other 
words, Duncan's decision-makings were at the same time the 
revelation of her whole bodywork. Whether her movements were 
improvised or not almost ceases to be the issue, since her bodily 
presence presumably surpassed specific 'choreographies'. 
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Jowitt asserts that we can 'link' Martha Graham's works with 
Expressionism in art, the dancer being influenced by the wave of 
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'movement' in art. If 'freedom' in Duncan's sense is to be 
associated with Expressionism, dancers like Graham may indeed be 
Expressionists in that their works pursue certain 'subjectivity' 
(p. 171). Meanwhile, Jowitt carefully points out that those 
dancers' subjectivity seemed to take a course which was slightly 
different from the course taken by what Jowitt describes as the 
Expressionism movement as a whole (p. 171). This especially 
concerns the fact that Graham and others apparently had no 
'mystical' idea (p. 171) when they regarded their bodies as a 
'medium' (p. 172) and as the subject/object of their creation. 
Those dancers saw 'the actuality of the human body' (p. 172), 
which implies a quite practical view towards the body's 
physiology and its relationship with the mind. Nevertheless, 
such an attitude did not stop Graham and others from personally 
embodying choreography simply by their dominant presence (p. 
172). In Jowitt's words, the dancers' 'very skeletons seemed 
melted out of shape by the heat of their passions' (p. 172). 
Like Duncan, Graham's ultimate aim was to free 'individual' (p. 
172) performers from the kind of restrictions which, to Graham as 
well as to Duncan, hampered a smooth, straightforward 
relationship between performers' mind and body. If a dancer is 
passionate, then, she may as well end up 'melting' her 
choreography. One of Graham's works, Lamentation, aptly shows 
her 'freedom' in expression: 
[. . .] Graham's body, encased 
in a taut tube of stretch jersey, 
is all jutting angles straining against the cloth or protruding 
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from its open ends -- knees, elbows, hands with fingers pressed 
together, clubbed feet. The few moments of symmetry stand out 
against moments when the seated body is rocked off balance, 
distorted by the externalization of inner pressure. (p. 172) 
According to Jowitt, Graham's performance was not a 'mime' of her 
'emotion' (p. 172), which suggests that she was free from feeling 
obliged to convey any meanings through conventional signifying 
functions of a human body. We can say that Graham pursued 
individual freedom in expressing her 'feelings', always turning 
to the body as the ultimate and the only object to realise her 
will, which in turn made the body the subject of her feelings, 
too. So far, as in the case of Duncan, Graham may be regarded as 
a creator of an overt action called 'dance', which goes beyond 
specific boundaries of choreography and which also pushes the 
question of improvisatory aspects aside as being almost 
irrelevant. However, as Jowitt points out, once Graham's 
individual feelings and her bodily actions start to gain some 
value worthy of being handed down to other dancers (pp. 172-73), 
it is no longer her dancing 'being' that matters crucially but it 
is the 'codifi[cation]' (p. 172) of her 'being' that is 
important. Codification at the same time induces the building of 
'narrative' in performances (p. 172). At this stage of her 
career, then, we might say that Graham was working on the basis 
of core principles, which indeed were her passions and feelings 
but which often had to be judged against their enactment by other 
dancers. Codification also formed a piece of work, a detached 
and completed performance material, which brought about the 
question of correctness and mistakes. 
Merce Cunningham follows the line of Duncan and Graham, 
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especially in terms of putting his individual visions or beliefs 
into action and ending up with a piece which defies existent 
rules and conventions in ballet/dance. Cunningham differs most 
distinctly from Graham in that 'freedom' for Cunningham seems to 
mean a freedom of the performer's body from the performer's 
'feelings', or passions as in Graham's sense. We might be able 
to see a connection between the later stage of Graham's work with 
its codification of 'dance' and the fact that Cunningham used to 
dance with the Graham dancers before setting off a career of his 
own. Jowitt notes that Cunningham's movements are not, as 
popularly believed, pure movements: 'Remarkable duet passages, 
such as those that Cunningham in earlier days performed with 
Carolyn Brown, reveal through elegant, unusual movement ineffable 
truths about men and women together, truths more profound than 
emanate from many pas de deux intentionally cast as romances' (p. 
174). This, however, more concerns how the viewers of 
Cunningham's works will interpret what they see, which often 
needs its own framework for discussion. To focus on the 
performers' side of 'dance', we find a certain consistency within 
Cunningham's practice and his 'freedom' as Roger Copeland 
explains: 
It may seem ironic that Cunningham could be simultaneously 
attracted to compositional strategies based on chance and to a 
movement vocabulary markedly more balletic than Martha Graham's. 
But for Cunningham, chance and the ballet vocabulary are two 
means towards the same end: they liberate the choreographer from 
the limitations of his instincts. 23 
In order to pursue 'freedom' in such sense, Cunningham apparently 
puts more emphasis than others do on preparing the body to be 
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fully flexible and be ready for any command. In an attempt to 
achieve that, Cunningham takes up various ballet/dance methods 
and traditions without worrying excessively about existent 
divisions among them. Meanwhile, if we read what Banes writes 
about him, it is clear that Cunningham continues to find 
discipline important and crucial to his whole concept of dance, 
the kind of discipline which moulds 'technique'. This seems to 
suggest that a performer's body to Cunningham will be free not 
for the freedom's sake but rather for the practical purpose of 
making the body more overtly, subtly, and distinctively moveable. 
Banes points to the fact that: 
Unlike the post-modern choreographers, inspired by Cunningham's 
ideas or critical of his method, who would carry his theories 
further, however, Cunningham remains entrenched in a dance- 
technical idiom. It is an idiom that he invented, combining the 
elegant carriage and brilliant footwork of ballet with the 
flexibility of the spine and arms practiced by Graham and her 
contemporaries. 24 
We might thus say that while his performance presents itself 
against the grain of traditional ballet/dance performances, 
Cunningham firmly retains his presence as a choreographer who 
will be the ultimate rule-maker and disciplinarian as to how a 
performer should move her body. The overt actions of Cunningham 
and his dancers are likely to encompass the first and the third 
categories which we have set in this chapter. Cunningham as a 
decision-maker seems to be, as several people note, quite 
thorough in ensuring precise movements on the performers' part, 
which consequently leaves little room for improvisatory freedom. 
This has much to do with how exactly Cunningham makes decisions 
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and connects the decided-upon factors to the actual movements of 
a performer's body. As already mentioned before, Cunningham 
often turns to chance-operational means in order to make 
decisions. 
Cunningham explains the work called Torse, about which he 
first states, 'I figured out the phrasing and the continuity 
ahead of time, before the dancers came to rehearsal. Not, of 
course, the way they would dance the phrases, but the phrases 
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themselves'. Such pre-planning does imply a deeply mind- 
oriented approach towards making a performance, and yet in 
Cunningham's case the body is both the means as well as the 
target of exercising his intelligence. We might even say that 
every detail of Cunningham's mind-work will materialise 
physically. The fact that his planning of Torse heavily relies 
on chance seems to complicate our attempt to clarify Cunningham's 
approach since we primarily consider chance a preventive measure 
against exercising one's mind. Nevertheless, the very reason for 
his using chance will be clear once we realise that such a 
decisive framework is needed in order to actually enhance the 
precision of decision-making, which is not performers' but 
Cunningham's own. 'Decisions' and 'body movements' are both 
insulated, by means of chance, from what would make them too 
opaque and complicated to be 
handled objectively, such as a 
performer's intense 'passion'. The way Cunningham applies chance 
operative means to the body-work 
in Torse almost seems 
constructing a meticulous set of codes: 
There are sixty-four phrases, because that's the number of 
hexagrams in the I Ching. The phrases are formed like the 
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numbers themselves. For example, one has one part in it, two has 
two, three has three, up to sixty-four. But I didn't make it as 
though one were one rhythmic beat, and so forth, metrically. Let 
us take the second phrase, it will be clearer. The counts are 
related to weight changes. That is, if you stand on your foot, 
that's one; if you bend your knee, that's a weight change, so 
that's two. Now that could be done slowly or quickly. At sixty- 
four, you have sixty-four weight changes. [. . .] That was for 
the sixty-four movement phrases. But then you take the space and 
you have a similar process. I numbered the space with sixty-four 
squares, eight by eight. Then I used the I Ching as it comes out 
E. . . ]. Then I would toss to see 
how many people did each 
phrase among the men, the women or both. Gradually all the 
combinations would come out and I would see them more and more 
clearly and try them out. (pp. 20-21) 
At first glance, breaking up the body-movement into 'phrases' 
seems an intentional attempt to treat a performer's body as a 
complex set of components whose combinations would determine the 
whole nature of the dance-piece. It might lead us to think that 
all the movements of Torse result from an exclusive and pure 
cooperation between the body as a physical entity and the laws of 
nature. Only when questions such as the probability of finding 
improvisatory aspects in Torse are asked do we start seeing a 
human decision-maker, who in this case has to be extremely 
powerful so that she can actually follow through the whole idea 
of 'phrases' effectively. Here, 'decisions' refer to every bit 
of disciplinary instructions, corrections, and supervisions which 
have the sole purpose of ensuring the absolute 'freedom' of the 
body from all factors except the chosen means of chance. A 
decision-maker's job is to let no improvisatory actions disrupt 
the entire concept of the dance-piece, in other words, to inhibit 
improvisation in the course of the performance. For the 
performers, whether they happen to be decision-makers or not, 
chance operation produces a set of rules which would be either 
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followed or flouted, no room in between. Rules are not used as 
backbone principles but rather as the only principles available, 
which by themselves directly constitute the entire structure of 
the work. Asserting that such a use of chance will 'avoid what 
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might otherwise "flow" in an organic way', Copeland sums up 
Cunningham's choreography by saying, 'it does not come naturally 
to the human body' (p. 192). We, on the other hand, can say that 
Cunningham's idea of 'freedom' resides precisely in such 
unnatural physical actions, since a human performer's instinctive 
feeling as to what is natural and what is unnatural seems to be 
exactly what Cunningham intends to leave behind. If human 
improvisatory actions have much to do with a smooth relationship 
between body and mind, they are in effect revelations of what the 
mind finds 'natural' for the body to do or what the body does 
being regarded by the mind as 'natural' movements, which 
fundamentally contradicts the whole concept envisioned by 
Cunningham. 
Given all these, we cannot ignore some of the dances 
choreographed by Cunningham, in which certain decision-makings by 
the performers seem to hinge on improvisatory decisions, at least 
in a limited sense. Cunningham, who states that 'try[ing]' out 
the chance 'physically' among the dancers is 'the crucial 
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moment', regards the actual moment of body 
occasion which is more than the chances being 
flawlessly. For all the efforts being put to 
operation in dance, he nevertheless considers 
performing moments second to none in terms of 
On the basis of Cunningham's attitude towards 
in action as an 
carried out 
perfect the chance 
performers' 
making a 'dance'. 
the performing 
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moment, then, it does not surprise us to find pieces, for 
example, Second Hand, in which the performers are required to 
choose some particular movement among a limited number of choices 
at the moment of performing it. This is not exactly the kind of 
decision-making coming out of an instinctive mental/physical 
coordination, which results in what a performer herself could not 
have foreseen exactly. Second Hand is explained by Cunningham: 
Certain details can contribute to phrasing movement. You can 
amplify a phrase by very small movements that don't need to be 
evident for them to be effective. For example, in a dance called 
Second Hand made to Erik Satie's Socrate, I gave each dancer a 
certain number of different hand gestures which could be done in 
any order. Throughout the length of the third movement each 
dancer could make a choice about which one of those hand gestures 
he wanted to use. They were small things like finger signs, 
hands closed or opened; the dancer could hold them or change them 
as he wanted to in relation to some other movement he was doing. 
[. . .] All these gestures were almost unnoticeable 
in the dance 
because they are small and they may be held only briefly. Each 
dancer had twenty changes of hand shapes; they did not have to 
use them all. I did ask them to keep the same order each time, I 
think, although perhaps I didn't even do that. (p. 87) 
In this dance, Cunningham continues to be the ultimate decision- 
maker, only that he decides to provide his dancers with several 
choices, each of which has determined contents, namely, gestures. 
The dancers thus cannot improvise on gestures themselves, but 
they can decide on the whole sequence of gestures as they 
perform. Arranging the sequence can be done heuristically in the 
course of a rehearsal when performers try out various gestures in 
accordance with the movements in other parts of their bodies. 
Such a way of making decisions is one answer to placing a 
performer's body and her physical movements at the centre, that 
is, cherishing the 'moment' of moving her body over any other 
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factors in this particular dance-piece. The 'moment' of making 
physical movements can also be experienced by those same 
performers while they are performing the piece in a publicly- 
presentable form, that is, in a form which is complete apart from 
a few choices to be made. The performers' decision-making is 
influenced by the condition of their mind and body at the moment 
when they make choices. Nonetheless, the fact that Second Hand 
leaves choices for the performers only in the range of 'almost 
unnoticeable' hand gestures seems to imply that improvisation in 
this piece can hardly be regarded as a vital element which will 
form part of the backbone of the dance. Rather, the 
improvisatory aspects in Second Hand may have been intended as 
part of the technique to polish a performer's flexibility 
further, in this case, in the movement of her hands. 
6.5.2 Post-Cunningham: An Overview 
Banes attributes the significance of performances by people like 
Steve Paxton, Yvonne Rainer, and Robert Rauschenberg partly to 
the fact that '[f]rom the time of the first concert', they 
'included "choreographers" who were not trained dancers, but 
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artists, composers, and writers'. This, Hanes states, derived 
from the 'informality and flexibility of the workshop' (p. 13). 
Banes also points out that 'it was not only artists who provided 
fruitful areas of exchange for choreography. The new dance both 
simplified itself and complicated itself with technological 
experiments' (p. 14). We will not discuss 'technological 
experiments' in particular here but will regard them as some of 
the means through which the performers 'challenged the range of 
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purpose, materials, motivations, structures, and styles of dance' 
(p. 15). These performers are post-Cunningham in the sense that, 
first, they distinctly follow Cunningham's idea and practice in 
seeing 'dance' principally as the body in movement and, secondly, 
they nevertheless challenge Cunningham's and his predecessors' 
ideas on what defines dance/ballet. Banes describes these two 
points further. About the continuous flow which is advocated by 
Cunningham and by the post-Cunningham performers alike Banes 
writes: 
originally reacting against the expressionism of modern dance, 
which anchored movement to a literary idea or musical form, the 
post-modernists propose (as do Cunningham and Balanchine) that 
the formal qualities of dance might be reason enough for 
choreography, and that the purpose of making dances might be 
simply to make a framework within which we look at movement for 
its own sake. (p. 15) 
With such an understanding of the body and its movement rooted 
firmly in any of their works, the post-Cunningham performers 
eventually find themselves reaching for a meta-'dance' domain. 
The domain cannot be described in exact terms; some meta-'dance' 
qualities may not necessarily be pre-planned or consciously- 
enacted or intentional, while some of the meta-'dance' 
territories can be regarded as being extremely well-constructed, 
organised, and highly intentional. Each dancer/performer will be 
allowed to pursue her own idea and practice to the extent that 
the degree and the overtness of any meta aspects will entirely 
depend on the decisions made by the dancer/performer. Most 
likely, a performance will keep its specific and practical trend, 
and yet it also will become rather ambivalent with regard to each 
performer's attitude towards performance. Banes describes such 
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ambivalence as follows: 
The breakdown of the distinction between art and life [. . ], 
the clarification of individual, discrete movements, the 
isolation of the essential characteristics of dance, have all 
become valid purposes for making a dance. So has the option of 
making a dance for the pleasure of the dancer, whether or not 
the spectator finds it pleasing, or even accessible. The very 
question of what it means to create a dance can generate 
choreography E. . . ]. (p. 16) 
Ambivalence produces a performance, which does not necessarily 
solve the 'problem' but at least makes the very nature of 
ambivalence overt, and this means a great deal to a performer who 
seeks after some kind of physical as well as mental experience in 
ambivalence. If in Cunningham what we might call improvisatory 
aspects are likely to be used as part of the performers' 
technique, among post-Cunningham performers they do not always 
coincide with technique: technique is no longer to be defined 
clearly by those performers in the first place. For post- 
Cunningham performers, experiencing such an ambivalent 
circumstance in their own specific way proves to be a most 
intense 'moment' of performance. 
6.5.3 The Grand Union 
The Grand Union, founded by performers including Steve Paxton, 
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Trisha Brown, Douglas Dunn, David Gordon, and Yvonne Rainer, 
will be looked at here as one of the post-Cunningham practising 
'groups'. Susan Foster gives us a general perspective on how the 
Grand Union performers existed in the performing space, but at 
the same time she points out that the performers were independent 
from one another in their whole attitudes towards the shared 
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performance piece: 
For the most part, the Grand Union's performers were presented in 
gymnasiums, galleries, or churches which afforded a theatre-in- 
the-round viewing situation with a casual, makeshift atmosphere. 
Often, viewers entered to find the dancers already moving around: 
warming up, talking with one another, or arranging various props 
to be used that evening. The dancers' activity gradually evolved 
into the performance itself, although no specific beginning was 
announced. During the performance, dancers occasionally moved 
out into the seating area, and frequently addressed the audience 
directly. [. . .] Dancers carried out independent activities -- 
practicing a movement phrase, stretching, twirling a rope, 
carrying a ladder, or manipulating any of the mundane items 
scattered throughout the space. Sometimes they coalesced into 
duets or trios, uniting briefly, then returning to their 
individual pursuits. Occasionally a small group would persist in 
collaborating, proposing various structures for their heretofore 
unrelated activities. 30 
Unlike Cunningham, the performers of the Grand Union did not even 
seem to consider 'performance' an opportunity to show their 
movements, let alone their technique. This does not mean that 
the performers did not take movements seriously or that they did 
not have technique. The Grand Union performers apparently saw 
the purpose of their performance in 'an instant-to-instant, 
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personal, additive experience', which they allowed the audience 
to observe and sometimes to have direct contact with, but which 
fundamentally reflected quite self-consciously on the performers' 
own perception, or their own senses, rather than on a collective 
performer-audience experience. 
In the course of following her personal sense of experience, 
each performer may possibly have believed that she was moving 
according to her own personal 'directions'. Such directions 
nevertheless were too 'elastic' in the Grand Union to sustain 
or be consistent. This indicates that neither a performer's body 
nor her mind was to show any distinctive difference between 
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improvisation and non-improvisation within the piece. It seems 
that we have no choice but to take the whole developing process- 
cum-performance of the Grand Union and call it improvisation in 
one scoop. In that sense, the Grand Union's improvisation falls 
in our third category. 
Given all this, we also find that there existed improvisation 
in another sense in a Grand Union production. Once we start 
looking further into what performers and critics say about the 
Grand Union, we are made aware of the fact that there indeed was 
improvisation in its narrower sense of the term. When we read 
Foster describing improvisation in the Grand Union, we notice the 
word 'choreograph' being used to explain what the Grand Union 
performers did during the moment of performance. According to 
Foster, choreography itself in this case refers to the 
performers' improvisation, and yet Foster's description clearly 
implies that choreography consists of a certain principle and 
improvisation: 
Another feature of major importance was improvisation; that is, 
the dancers choreographed the dances as they performed them. 
Members of the company did share a knowledge of certain movements 
and phrases, material from previous performances, general 
aesthetic predispositions concerning matters of style, syntax, 
and the use of props and music, not to mention assumptions about 
what constituted an appropriate performance. They did not, 
however, know precisely what they would do at any given moment 
during the performance. Thus their work was imbued with a 
spontaneity and openness unknown in any prior tradition. 33 
Despite the fact that individuality among the performers was 
strongly propelled in the Grand Union, the performers nonetheless 
had a mutual stock of knowledge and technique which they could 
trace back without much difficulty at any moment during the 
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current performance session. Foster implies that the performers 
did not have to openly consult one another in search of this 
'shared' stock. They felt for one another's movement while 
making individual actions respectively, which altogether led the 
performance piece as a whole. Improvisation in this case emerged 
from the performers' common background and their understanding of 
the ability of one another as performers, in which sense we might 
include it in our second category of improvisation. If we call 
these shared elements a 'principle', we have to realise that the 
Grand Union's very purpose of putting on their pieces did not 
let such principle be firmly consolidated. That is exactly why 
there was a possibility of producing a performance which 'failed' 
from a traditional dance-movement point of view, as Foster notes: 
'Sometimes the dancers' conflicting intentions collided, 
producing a confused disorder. Inevitably, the process also gave 
rise to long periods of boring inactivity' (p. 54). To us, such 
possible inactivity conversely confirms that the Grand Union 
lacked a commanding choreographer who would pull everyone 
together and avoid this kind of 'failure'. Paxton states: 
The totally improvisational company that the Grand Union 
unintentionally became bypasses the grand game of choreographer 
and company. [. . .] following or allowing oneself to lead is 
each member's continual responsibility. The security of pre-set 
material is only occasionally indulged in, since it seems to get 
in the way of the amplified self-exploration that arises in 
improvisatory performance. 34 
We may be led to think that loading a choreographer's role on 
each performer prompted too drastic a vacillation in the 
performance space and time, but owning such a risk was actually 
247 
part of the purpose of performing for the Grand Union performers. 
Realising that they might 'fail', the performers would 
concentrate all the more on being individuals and on sharing 
'something' with one another at the same time, both of which the 
performers would willingly put on the line. Improvisation- 
within-improvisation then might be regarded as the kind of action 
made possible on the basis of all the performers involved knowing 
that they shared such risks as well as certain common 
backgrounds. 
The actual performance pieces by the Grand Union described by 
Paxton reveals that, despite the 'evolving' principle, many of 
their working-processes were quite systematic in the sense that 
they seemed to resemble game-playing. Those processes more 
likely required some kind of choreographers, though they did not 
dominate among the performers. In the following example by 
Paxton, Trisha Brown might be regarded as a prompter whose 
choreography inspired the rest of the performers in such a way 
that the whole piece looked like an improvisatory attempt on the 
part of the performers around the initial 'work' by Brown: 
Trisha Brown had choreographed a duet in which one person falls 
like a felled tree, while his partner breaks the fall. As the 
performers get more daring, they stop alernating the falls, do 
not stand at a safe close distance to each other, and topple in 
any direction. Consciously or not, Rainer had a similar falling 
section in CPAD [Continuous Project Altered Daily] [Yvonne 
Rainer's group], which David Gordon sees as a model for the 
subsequent Grand Union sequence. Six performers stand in a small 
circle and have the options of: continuing to stand, or falling 
in any direction. If they fall away from the circle, they extend 
an arm to catch themselves. If several people choose to fall at 
once, things get complicated, for each faller might not find a 
catcher; he might be left to fall on the floor. (p. 130) 
The Grand Union performances varied, which means that in no way 
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does the example above represent any standard working-process. 
Given this, we can still see in this particular piece of 
performance an improvisatory element characteristic of the Grand 
Union: the performers had some understanding of where their 
movements 'originated', in this case Brown's choreography, but at 
the same time they were actually living the 'moment' filled with 
dangers and possible disasters not only in terms of their 
physical safety but in terms of the performance moving forward in 
space and time. The presence of a choreographer did not change 
the very basis of what the Grand Union stood for. In the above 
example, performers were 'instinctively' aware of potential 
risks, which tells us that their handling of risks also depended 
on instinctive tactfulness rather than on the kind of tactfulness 
we would find in a well-planned performance: 
[. . .] the eyes 
learn to judge more acutely, the skin becomes 
hypersensitive to qualities of touch, particularly the arms; 
timing in the arc of the topple becomes a game in which you trust 
as long as your nerves allow, pushing your limits. Understanding 
where another's focus is becomes easy since it is instinctive. 
It is also crucial to safety and to communication. (p. 130) 
Choreography in the Grand Union was not intended to be learned 
and pursued by the performers. It only functioned to gather more 
than one performer in a certain framework and to let them work on 
their 'evolving' performance without spreading too many ideas too 
thin. Improvising on such a ground could not have easily stood 
out as clearly as in the case of many of the game-playing 
practices. Rather, improvisation seemed to reside in each 
performer's moment-to-moment sense of uncertainty, which a 
performer would 'instinctively' control. 
249 
It was only when the Grand Union performers started producing 
'repertories' that we begin to find improvisation in the distinct 
principle-variation sense, the kind of actions to be included 
unmistakably in our second category of improvisation. On 
'repertory' within the Grand Union, Paxton states: 
The Grand Union members, while gaining confidence in their powers 
of invention in performance, have kept some of the best 'bits'. 
What is termed 'improvisational repertory' has been created. 
This repertory, a first step on the scale toward set forms, 
recurs exactly or with variations. The unpredictable in group 
is: Who will pick up the signs and what version of the original 
will they play? The members slip in and out of the elastic 
structures, often playing as much on the levels of mutual 
understanding as on the original form. This understanding of 
others' mental and physical beings is the result of countless 
rehearsals, parties, and late-night recaps of performances over 
the years. (p. 131) 
We can see from the above that even in a 'repertory' piece the 
performers had a strong inclination to rely on their instincts, 
which suggests their preference for a once-only 'experience'. 
Improvisation for the Grand Union performers did not have 
evaluational consequences. There were no definite 'mistakes' or 
'corrections'. Improvisation instead had to do with the 
performers' personal as well as collective sensitivity towards 
their conscious or subconscious drives and how they were actually 
collaborating. 
6.5.4 Contact Improvisation 
We already discussed contact improvisation mainly from the 
viewpoint of mind-body relationship, which leaves us with the 
task of looking more generally at what the performing pair 
overtly 'do' to make a performance piece. 
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Since the vital element of contact improvisation lies in the 
fact that performers basically build up the whole sequence only 
by making 'contacts', our concern will be in what sense those 
'contacts' can be called improvisatory actions. Contact 
improvisation seems to be an extract of the more inclusive Grand 
Union works if we choose to focus particularly on the 
collaborative aspect of the Grand Union. Always performing in a 
pair, a contact improvisation performer is even more strongly 
pulled by her partner's instincts on how to make the next move. 
Despite the non-existence of a model or an ideal piece of contact 
improvisation, the performers apparently are driven by the 
unwritten rule that it is 'better' to avoid a poorly rhythmical 
performance or a very 'dull'-looking performance. In Paxton's 
words, the performers consciously or subconsciously understand 
that their 'framework' is set when their 'muscular tone is 
lightly stretched to extend the limbs, although not to a degree 
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that obscures the sensations of momentum and inertia'. Around 
this 'framework' the performers make 'contacts'. If we further 
infer from Paxton's comments, the performers having such a 
'framework' in view suggests that they actually harbour somewhere 
in their mind or their body an ideal way of making movements. 
Instead of referring to an ideal piece of contact improvisation, 
the 'ideal' in this case describes the performers' feelings, or 
more precisely, the kind of movements that makes the performers 
feel charged in mind and body. As Paxton states, the performers 
seem to 'hold to the ideal of active, reflexive, harmonic, 
spontaneous, mutual forms' (p. 40), which 'creates the attitude, 
which is manifest in the quality of energy-use' (p. 40). While 
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improvisatory aspects in contact improvisation have no 
choreographic lines to follow, 'framework' and 'ideal' as part of 
performers' feelings indeed constitute a principle, which makes 
it easier for the performers to improvise. 
Contact improvisation may be put closer to Cunningham since, 
compared to the more general Grand Union works, contact 
improvisation has a selected means of expression, namely, the 
physical 'contact', which, like Cunningham, concentrates on the 
body and its movement. Nevertheless, it seems that Cunningham 
and the performers of contact improvisation try to 'free' their 
bodies in completely opposite ways. In Cunningham, the body 
moves according to the directions which supposedly have not 
undergone any specifically manipulative interventions by a human 
decision-maker. In contact improvisation, the ideal bodily 
movements are those which precisely materialise a human decision- 
maker's instincts. 
As we have seen so far, trial-and-error approaches are vital 
elements of what we regard as an improvisatory performance. 
'Instincts' in effect call for such approaches. In contact 
improvisation, a trial-and-error approach in itself becomes a 
performance piece; trials and errors mainly concern 'touch[ing]' 
and 'balanc[ing]', to cite Paxton's words: 
The partners in the duet touch each other a lot, and it is 
through touching that the information about each other's movement 
is transmitted. They touch the floor, and there is emphasis on 
constant awareness of gravity. They touch themselves, 
internally, and a concentration is maintained upon the whole 
body. Balance is not defined by stretching along the center 
columns of the body, as in traditional dancing, but by the body's 
relationship to that part which is a useful fulcrum, since in 
this work a body may as often be on head as feet and relative to 
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the partner as often as to the floor. (p. 40) 
This is when the performers' instinctive search for an ideal 
improvisation overtly shows. Their touching and balancing retain 
a certain sobriety which keeps the whole performance on track. 
At the same time, the sobriety has much to do with making the 
performance 'pleasantly' harmonious, that is, mixing aggression 
with subsidence, or sprightness with calmness, which all beat to 
a certain rhythm taken up by the performers. Improvising some 
movements so that the performance will keep up such a rhythmic 
quality means that the performers are actually quite constrained 
in the choice of their next movement. They are not pressured to 
move according to tight directions, but they know, or feel, what 
kind of movement they should avoid and what they can try from 
moment to moment. Paxton asserts that we can even see a pattern 
of movements showing the performers' instinctive desire to blend 
various actions. 'Formulas', as Paxton calls the pattern, are: 
Ad & Pr 
Ad & Ar 
Pd & Ar 
Pd & Pr 
Ar & Ar 
Ad & Ad [A=active, P=passive, d=demand, r=response] 
Pd & Pr tends to become A& (A or P) because the contact is 
broken or degenerated by double passivity. Ad & Ar tends to 
become P& (Ar or Ad) as a habitual way out of a glandular stymie 
when the aim remains contact. Ad & Ad can be a fascinating form. 
Trying to step around someone to their left when they are trying 
to pass you to your right can result in a reflexive series Ad & 
Ad, Ad & Ad ..., and into Pr & Pr, Pr & Pr, Ad & Ad, ... 
E. . .] Beginners 
tend to lapse into one form and stay for 
seconds on end. Neither person is bound to be active or passive 
for very long, and it is desirable to have the intelligence and 
freedom to choose which mode is appropriate to the ongoing 
improvisation. (pp. 40-41) 
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The point is, the performers of contact improvisation seem to be 
able to grasp this kind of pattern while performing, without 
always realising that they are grasping it or that their 
movements can indeed be drawn up schematically, if rather 
roughly. We may be able to include contact improvisation in the 
second category of our criteria, which is to say that 
'improvisation' in contact improvisation does have principles, if 
not 'rules' as in games. At the same time we can put contact 
improvisation in the third category as well, mainly because 
principles in contact improvisation will have no 'goal' other 
than leading the performers to make the 'best' contacts that they 
can afford. Judging what the 'best' is in this case mostly 
depends on how the performers themselves feel about their 
actions, which can hardly be moulded into a traditional sense of 
'principles'. 
Hanes mentions that training is important in contact 
improvisation, though, unlike the training in Cunningham's 
productions, the contact improvisation performers have trainings 
in order to sharpen their instinctive feelings for a lively 
performance: 
E. . .]a minimal 
technical program trains one to develop the 
muscles to facilitate stretching, centering, taking weight, and 
increasing joint action. The training also aids consciousness 
of certain principles: sensing time, orienting oneself to space 
and to one's partner, discovering attitude, expanding peripheral 
vision. It takes about a week of working three hours a day to 
learn the basic methods. 36 
We can infer from the above that the training mostly concerns a 
performer's physical dexterity or flexibility, her sensitivity 
towards space and time, and her general perspective of creating a 
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performance piece. All these can be said of the Grand Union 
works, too, only here in contact improvisation the training seems 
to be much more deductive. Whereas in the Grand Union 
performances we cannot always define 'technique', in contact 
improvisation the trained performers actually apply what they 
have prepared physically and mentally through a highly specific 
channel of 'contact'-making. In other words, when we encounter 
the terms such as 'technique' and 'methods' in contact 
improvisation, we may regard their meanings not as the 
acquirement of certain sequential movements but as the very basic 
ability to move in whatever way the performers' instincts 
dictate. Given this, we once again hesitate to put contact 
improvisation exclusively in our second category per se. The 
gist of contact improvisation seems to lie in its principles 
which are not to be identified beyond the level of self- 
disciplined instincts. 
6.5.5 Yvonne Rainer 
Rainer's Trio A is a landmark piece, asserts Banes, which draws 
on the hitherto unexplored area of 'dance' as a possible 'object' 
being 'presented': 
The history of dance theory has been the repeated conflict 
between those who value technique and those who value expression. 
Those who followed Rameau and those who followed Lully at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, E. . .] the Cunninghamites and 
the Grahamites -- all these conflicts have pitted technique 
against expression in cycles for centuries. With Rainer's Trio A 
the cycle is at least broken. The debate is made irrelevant. 
The possibility is proposed that dance is neither perfection of 
technique nor of expression, but quite something else -- the 
presentation of objects in themselves. 37 
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This brings us back to the beginning of the chapter, where we 
have touched upon the phenomenology of a performer's existence, 
or her presence, at the moment of performance. To performers 
like Rainer, 'dance' can now refer to a performer's being itself. 
Such being has only to be 'presented' in an appropriate context, 
which allows the 'being' to become a dance piece. In most cases, 
a performer does not simply 'present' herself by quietly being 
present in space and time. Here in Trio A the appropriate 
context deliberately reacts against the traditional rules of 
ballet and dance, which conversely implies that the context of 
Trio A is in fact rather narrowly set. By defying or rejecting 
or deviating from the tradition, the performer herself at least 
knows what she is doing, which centres around the view that 
'neither technique nor expression' should necessarily be her 
carefully-intended purpose of performing. As we may infer from 
Banes, Trio A is an antithesis of the dance-works that came 
before it and therefore is more than a mere forefronting of a 
physical presence of the performer: 
Without entirely restricting post-modern dance to the rigid 
categories suggested by the chart, she notes the salient points 
of divergence with conventional dance aesthetics. [. . .] Yet at 
the same time Rainer operated dialectically in making Trio A, in 
regard to dance technique if not style or structure. Violating 
nearly every canon of classic dance conventions (both ballet and 
modern), she brought classical lines and gestures into conflict 
with their own subversions, to create an entirely new mode of 
dance. After Trio A, the choreographic terrain looked different. 
The boundaries of dance had burst open. Certain actions, certain 
postures, certain attitudes now became possible, and eventually 
familiar, parts of the vocabulary. (p. 44) 
The 'being' is presented under the rules set by Rainer. The 
rules 'burst open' the previously accepted concepts in the 
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'dance' field, which makes Rainer's work quite unique and 
idiosyncratic until her rules start to develop among the other 
performers and groups. Improvisation can hardly be an issue 
other than the fact that as a human performer Rainer certainly 
has to let her body respond to whatever circumstances each moment 
of a performance offers. Beyond such a minute, physiological 
level, we have no way of pinning down any single action as being 
improvisatory. No one except Rainer is thoroughly familiar with 
the rules she has made for Trio A, and without such knowledge it 
is difficult to discuss improvisation analytically. We may be 
able to take up the issue of improvisatory aspects within the 
work when the piece has been performed a number of times and been 
explained by the performer herself as to the concept and the 
purpose behind it. 
Turning to some of the other works by Rainer, we find a piece 
entitled Some Thoughts on Improvisation. Rainer describes this 
particular 'dance' as: '[a]n improvised solo with a spool of 
white thread, it had a taped reading of an essay I had written 
after dancing at the Green Gallery during an event by the artist 38 
James Lee Byars'. Questions on improvisation thus run in 
parallel to one another in this piece, one stream having to do 
with any physical improvisatory action involving 'a spool of 
white thread', the other with the verbal message on 
improvisation. Such a message quite openly brings an important 
part of the structural framework of Some Thoughts on 
Improvisation to the level of metaphysics, though Rainer seems to 
stress the piece's 'physical' side just as strongly. Her 
'essay' reads more like a personal note on what she as a 
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performer goes through mentally and physically when improvising 
than a general assessment of, or her own definition of, what she 
considers 'improvisation'. For example, Rainer spells out in the 
'essay' how she is able to 'connect': 
Improvisation, in my way of handling it, demands a constant 
connection with some thing -- object, action, and/or mood -- in a 
situation. The more connections are established the easier it is 
to proceed. The idea of 'more' or 'fewer' connections is related 
to one's degree of awareness of the total situation, including 
audience. One definition of a connection is a lifeline from 'it' 
to me that conducts a flow of stimuli and ideas. (p. 299) 
We might be able to regard this kind of 'connection' as what we 
have so far called in our discussion 'sensitivity'. Rainer here 
talks about the performer's mind and body functioning in various 
ways to various extents, which depends on the performer's 
'awareness' of an overall perspective of the performance. 
Similar arguments were discussed in chapter 2, only that what we 
find here is an argument being presented to the public in the 
performance, as one of the materials used in the performance, 
that is, as part of the performance. The tape being played 
during the performance involves no improvisatory aspects 
whatsoever, to which extent the 'essay' produces no more 
improvisation than writings on improvisation do in printed form. 
The performer instead 'lives' the moment of improvisation by 
moving with the 'thread', in a sense demonstrating the statement 
on the tape. We can surmise that the tape playing her 'thoughts 
on improvisation' contributes to the building-up of a narrowly- 
focussed 'topic' or 'theme' of the piece. In this untraditional 
'dance' with no established 'rules', the tape operates in lieu of 
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'rules', which let improvisation unfold more easily and more 
overtly. The framework of the piece thus set openly and 
specifically, the performer is allowed to move as if she is 
involved in a loosely guided exercise. She tries to explore her 
mental and physical dexterity based on her 'thoughts on 
improvisation', which, though being quite personal a 'rule', are 
made obvious to everyone, the performer and the audience alike, 
by means of a taped, verbal address. In this regard, Some 
Thpuqhts on Improvisation borders on the second and the third 
categories of our criteria. 
Another of Rainer's works entitled Terrain further projects 
an experimental side of her performance. Game-like elements in 
particular are pursued here by Rainer, which look more systematic 
and gymnastic than the exercise-like aspects found in Some 
Thoughts on Improvisation. Accordingly, improvisatory 
possibilities are likely to be materialised in a more overt way 
against the background of specific rules and directions which the 
performers follow. Terrain, Rainer writes, is a 'one-and-a-half- 
hour work in five sections for six people' (p. 13), and the 
sections are respectively called 'Diagonal', 'Duet', 'Solo 
Section', 'Play', and 'Bach' (p. 12). Looking at Rainer's 
description of the rules, we find that the section of 'Diagonal' 
can possibly provide some moments of improvisation, whereas in 
the other four sections we hardly detect an overt form of 
improvisation emerging. The performers move under the 
circumstances of 'mechanical' rules and conditions, which even 
remind us of Cunningham: 
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[Diagonal] consisted of 10 traveling movements to be done by one 
to six performers (each movement designated by its own number), 
and 4 traveling movements to be executed by only one or two 
performers -- each designated by a letter, A, B, C, or D. The 
directions of travel were limited to two upstage-to-downstage 
intersecting diagonals drawn corner to corner. (P. 14) 
The ten movements for 'one to six performers' vary in their 
specificity/generality, for example, no. 1 being simply described 
as 'Walk' or no. 2 as 'Run', whereas no. 6 as 'Triplet run -- left, 
right -- then backward twin on left en route -- resume triplet to 
finish' or no. 10 as '4 steps into jump -- left shoulder and hip 
meeting -- followed by r. leg thrusts forward; step on it, thrust 
1. leg back and across as r. elbow and shoulder blade jerk back' 
(p. 28). The four movements for 'one or two performers' are all 
highly instructional. Rainer, for example, describes the 
movement 'A' as 'Right arm circles twice as 1. leg chasse. 3rd 
time bring elbow in and thrust r. arm sharply toward corner as 
turn skip on r. leg. Dribble walk' (p. 28). Each performer in 
the 'group' is 'obliged to execute the given movement' when the 
'signal', either a number or a letter, is called out (p. 14). 
Thus far, the rules seem too specific and straightforward to 
allow enough room for the performers' decision-making moments. 
Terrain, however, is in fact performed in a more complex way with 
several additional rules overlapping the numbered and lettered 
movements, and it is when all these rules web together that the 
performers find themselves in a position to make decisions. Such 
a moment occurs when 'signals' are called out two at a time, to 
which each performer is expected to '[follow] whichever one [she] 
heard more clearly' (p. 14). If we can regard this moment as 
being improvisatory, it is in the sense that a performer 
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instinctively adopts one letter or number and drops the other. 
Forming a 'group' also involves some decision-making on the 
performers" part. The one who calls out a 'signal' may 
'simultaneously grasp the hand of a performer standing near-by, 
indicating that that person should accompany the "caller"' (p. 
14). This is again an instinctive action rather than an 
intelligent one, which makes maximum use of the performers' right 
to make decisions at the very moment of performing. On the other 
hand, if a performer wants to leave a 'group', she deliberately 
chooses not to call out any number or letter 'but simply 
execute[s] any one of the designated movements alone and so 
leave[s] the group' (pp. 14-15). These and other rules all 
intertwine, including the whole section of 'Diagonal' itself 
overlapping with another 'game' at the performers' own discretion 
(p. 15). Diagonal ends up becoming a game which highly depends 
on what the performers decide from moment to moment while 
strictly retaining a rigorous menu of rules. The fact that 
Rainer herself calls 'Diagonal' a 'game' (p. 15) seems to suggest 
the rule-bound nature of the piece. This is a game which 
foregrounds the performers' responsibility in their movement: 
there can be 'mistakes' of failing to follow the complex rules, 
and yet the performers are also allowed to take the rules in 
their own hands by making choices at certain moments. In those 
respects, 'Diagonal' is to be regarded as belonging to both the 
first and the second categories. 
6.5.6 Trisha Brown 
Trisha Brown constructively delves into improvisatory 
.4 
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potentialities in 'dance' performance by developing various 
physical movements which are intended to emancipate the 
performer's body from the established channels of stimulus and 
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reaction. In a conversation with Yvonne Rainer, Brown makes it 
clear that her search for more possibilities in improvisation 
mainly starts with an attempt to find a new, or a hitherto 
neglected, combination of bodily movements. As Rainer says, 
such attempts by Brown seem to stem from the source which is 
inherently physical rather than from the source of conscious 
ideas: 
Rainer: In your dancing, the energy for the beginning of an 
impulse occurs so suddenly that one thinks that maybe it 
is about the impulse at the beginning of a phrase, but 
that isn't right. Rather, the impulse constantly arises 
from different rhythms and therefore it's 
unpredictable. 40 
Still, Brown also stresses the fact that her search for 
improvisation is a continuous experiment on 'details': 
Brown: There is a kind of democratic distribution throughout the 
body. I'm always looking for what we've left out -- the 
backside of the knees, for example. There is an 
inevitability at work; I set up a tilt and all of the 
instinctive moves that follow in an improvisational 
choreographic process give you the base for a phrase 
which can then be amplified and altered. That's one of 
my basic tools. I'm constantly altering the meaning of 
move a by the introduction of move b... 
Rainer: ... while a is still going on ... 
Brown: ... which sets up something 
that will occur in move f. 
(p. 45) 
Much as she leans on body-oriented approaches, Brown nevertheless 
seems to recognise a factor which actually drives her into such 
approaches, namely, her desire to '[make] a new dance grammar' 
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(p. 45), as Rainer puts it. Brown believes, and tries to prove, 
that a 'new' grammar can only start with new 'details'. Her 
physical experiment on details thus turns out to be quite 
intellectual in the sense that part of her purpose is to discover 
a chink in the 'traditional' armour in the field of 'dance'. 
Brown's attempt to nourish various 'rhythms' leads her quite 
smoothly from experimenting on the physical aspects of an 
individual performer to creating a performance piece. As we will 
see, this does not necessarily mean that a performer's physical 
movement on the one hand and 'dance' as a piece on the other 
logically precede or follow one another. Granted that a 
performance has to start somewhere, which in a real situation 
tends to be either the body or the rules and rarely both, it 
still seems to be that the body and an overall performance 
ultimately mean the same in Brown's works. Improvisatory 
possibilities seem to reveal in different shapes and in different 
circumstances as Brown goes through changes in her choreographic 
technique, that is, how tightly she controls the 'rules' she sets 
up. 
Marianne Goldberg traces Brown's performance pieces, in the 
course of which Goldberg focuses on the question of 'rules' in 
relation to the kind of 'scores' that Brown uses. 'Brown says', 
Goldberg notes, 'her creative process occurs at the interface 
between the movement score and the immediate physical response of 
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the dancers to it'. According to Goldberg, changes in Brown's 
scores are evident: whereas from the earlier years the scores 
were 'decipher[able]' (p. 155), in later years they have become 
'so complex they are almost impossible to discern' (p. 155). In 
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primary Accumulation, performed in 1972, the score still retains 
a 'mathematical' structure with specific and sequential 
instructions for the performers (p. 155). Locus, performed in 
1975 has a score which gives its 'dancer' a strong existential 
awareness as to her performing space and her moving self (p. 
155). The performer's 'kinesphere' is set 'as a cube defined by 
27 points distributed along its sides' (p. 155), and the 
performer makes 'modular gestures' which are determined by the 
rule matching gestures with 'points' (p. 155). Consequently, the 
performer may participate in 'clusters of separate gestures' all 
performed at the same time (p. 155). From what the score so far 
suggests, we can say that Locus offers the performer a chance to 
make improvisatory decisions only on the basis of a meticulous 
web of spatial and modular rules. This changes radically, as 
Goldberg states, in Watermotor, performed in 1978, for here Brown 
leaves the 'mathematical' formula and instead begins to create a 
piece with her physical improvisatory movements (p. 155). The 
score in this case comes afterwards (p. 155). 
As Goldberg explains, Watermotor turns out to be a watershed 
for Brown in the sense that she discards what Goldberg calls 
'stability' (p. 155), referring to the use of a score as a basis 
for improvisation, and starts relying more and more on the 
'unpredictab[ility]' (p. 155) of the body of the performer. 
Having always been keen on developing bodily movements in a non- 
traditional way, Brown's turning-point is never a complete shift 
of an attitude towards how to create 'dance' but rather the 
loosening of a control she has had over the structure of her 
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'dance' pieces as a whole. Improvisation accordingly sees a 
change, that is, from being an action based on a well-conceived 
principle to an action which materialises the performer's 
instinctive drive to make certain movements. With such a change 
may come a performance that plainly reveals a performer's 
ambivalence if any, which seems to imply another dimension of 
Brown's performance. This is described by Goldberg as: '[Brown] 
also began to cancel out a movement in one direction with a 
gesture in another, deflecting the viewer's focus with sequences 
of movements that ricocheted before ever having been firmly 
established' (p. 155). Improvisation itself becomes a 
performance piece. 
As Brown becomes increasingly instinctive in making her 
performance, her choreography in effect gets 'more difficult' (p. 
157), according to Goldberg. If we can say that an emphasis on 
individual performers' physical movements themselves implies an 
overt, phenomenological presence of those performers in space and 
time, we might then interpret the word 'difficult' not simply in 
the sense that performers' physical fitness and technique 
become more demanding but also in'the sense that the 'scores' 
assume once-only, idiosyncratic pictures. In fact, Goldberg 
leads our attention to the contrary. Although '[p]art of Brown's 
early interests were in the everyday dynamics of untrained 
dancers' (p. 157), which we presume smoothly agree with 
'mathematical' scores, this does not mean that Brown's later, 
improvisation-first approaches inevitably abandon 'everyday 
dynamic' aspects. Goldberg states that 'vestiges of task-like 
performing remain in the way Brown's dancers today toss off 
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complex movement without showing off or displaying emotional 
expressions' (p. 157). Whether actually repeatable or not, 
Brown's later works at least seem to retain the element which 
deliberately placates, if not hinder, rampantly improvisatory 
actions. In this respect, Brown seems to hold on to a principle 
throughout her search for improvisatory possibilities. 
6.5.7 Ann Halprin 
In an interview with Yvonne Rainer, Ann Halprin talks about how 
she and her fellow performers try out improvisation. Halprin has 
one quite clear reason for pursuing improvisatory approaches when 
she is in the process of making a performance, and her reason is 
reminiscent with why Rainer chooses to pursue improvisation. 
Like Rainer, Halprin seems to be conscious of her strong 
desire to break some existent 'dance'-rules and traditions, which 
she attempts in practice by thoroughly exploring improvisatory 
actions: 
I wanted to explore in a 
preconceived notions I hý 
was, or what composition 
where we could rely only 
Everything was done, for 
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particular way breaking down any 
3d about what dance was, or what movement 
was. I began setting up situations 
on our improvisational skills. 
quite a few years, with improvisation. 
With the fundamental questions of 'what dance is', 'what movement 
is', and 'what composition is' firmly in her mind, Halprin 
improvises not for 'self-expression' (p. 143) but rather for 
a breakthrough in going beyond tradition (p. 143). This is why 
Halprin's performance pieces used to be 'fixed' (p. 144) after 
they were produced through improvisatory approaches (p. 144). 
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Granted that she has always regarded improvisation as a tool and 
also as the material, we find Halprin looking back on the point 
of her career when she seemed to be determined to complete her 
creative process, that is, to finish her work and keep it 
'fixed'. Her creative process through improvisation during those 
years may have been highly physical, but that did not seem to 
change the principle which she then held, namely, a process was a 
way-through to a certain result. This means that improvisation 
was not a result in itself: 
We would isolate in an anatomical and objective way the body as 
an instrument. We would improvise with rotation or flexion or 
other anatomical structures. We would say, we're going to begin 
to work with how you can articulate this part of the body, 
isolate it from another part of the body -- what is the efficient 
way to do that movement, do we really need to do this or is it 
just habit? [. . .] And we used improvisation to explore space 
and certain kinds of dynamics. We would set up a situation where 
two people had a focus that concerned the amount of space between 
them. They would improvise to get a feeling of what could 
happen, and what one person did would elicit a reaction in cause 
and effect. (p. 143) 
Here Halprin describes a process of creating her and her group's 
performance pieces. The performers delve into their own bodies 
by making quite experimental physical movements. They also make 
certain that spatial surroundings will be well-grasped, and they 
adapt to given situations by being readily flexible as well as by 
working reciprocally with other performers. Such a process, 
Haiprin explains, led to the construction of pieces which 'were 
completely improvised with particular focuses' (p. 144). Among 
such focuses were 'voice', that is, Halprin and her colleagues 
'began to allow the voice to become an integral part of movement' 
(p. 144). 'Free-association' (p. 144) of various forms of voice 
P-6? 
such as shouting was webbed into a 'dance' piece, which in effect 
broke a 'dance' tradition (p. 144). Simply put, improvisation at 
this stage of Halprin's career existed in order to produce 
tradition-defying results. 
Halprin also uses charts, and this is again part of her 
attempt to find ways to break tradition. By '[taking] every 
possible anatomical combination of movement and put them all on 
sheets of paper and [give] them numbers' (p. 145), Haiprin has a 
chance to hit on the combinations which she has missed or has 
never considered possible (p. 145). Those combinations are then 
tried by the performer in person and will be developed to form 
part of a performance piece (p. 145). According to Halprin, the 
performers still adopt an improvisatory process even when they 
follow such charts (p. 145), which suggests that the use of 
charts by the performers is complementary to their physically- 
oriented improvisatory try-outs. Unlike some choreographers who 
rely on charts to create unpredictability at the moment of a 
performance, Halprin says that the movements which have been 
produced with the help of charts end up in a 'fixed' state of a 
performance piece (p. 146). 
Rainer in the interview reminds Halprin of the time when 
Halprin adopted 'tasks'. The purpose, Rainer observes, was 
primarily to 'become aware of your body', that is, 'to do the 
movement or the kinesthetic thing that the task brought about', 
which is not always the same as doing the 'assigned' task itself 
(p. 147). Halprin responds to Rainer's comment by pointing out 
that she and her colleagues later started to focus more on the 
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'task itself': 'Then we set up tasks that would be so challenging 
that the choice of a task would be the idea of the movement' (p. 
147). We can surmise that tasks under this circumstance begin to 
acquire the weight of becoming a performance piece almost by 
themselves. For example, Halprin talks about 'the wine bottle 
task' given by Jo Landor, which was 'so challenging and so 
difficult that I [Halprin] was quite content to do it' (pp. 147- 
48). This particular task forms part of the piece called Five- 
Lem Stool, which also features some other performers engaged 
in tasks such as 'slid[ing] down' a board placed diagonally to 
the 'ceiling beam' (p. 148). Neither her wine bottle task nor 
the slide-down-a-board task has a meaning beyond the point that 
it has to be performed. Apart from the fact that they are in 
themselves quite demanding on the performers' body, these tasks 
do not lead to any further developments within the piece. In 
Halprin's words, the performers who have managed to do the 
'impossible' tasks assigned to them can be regarded as having 
'arrived at an incredible bit of fantasy' (p. 148), which is to 
say that they 'simply did something' (p. 148). Here we find that 
Halprin and her colleagues are pursuing a process of making a 
performance which induces improvisation froma formula, that is, 
from a task, rather than pursuing a process which gradually trims 
improvisation into a formula, that is, into 'fixed' movements. 
In Five-Legged Stool, improvisation refers to each performer's 
mental as well as physical agility and flexibility in following 
through her assigned task right at the very moment of each 
performance. She makes decisions as she proceeds to fulfil her 
tasks, for example, 'pouring water' (p. 148). The performers are 
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not allowed to pour water in a different manner from performance 
to performance, but they have a choice of combinations or a 
choice in the order for the tasks to be performed (p. 148). As 
far as what we read in this interview is concerned, Halprin seems 
to handle improvisation in such a way that it will never occupy 
the position from which it can grow by itself as in contact 
improvisation. Improvisation for Halprin up to the stage of her 
career covered in the interview seems to be either a tool or a 
by-product of her main concern, that is, breaking a tradition. 
6.5.8 Simone Forti 
Banes compares Halprin's approach towards improvisation with 
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Simone Forti's. Forti at one time 'studied with' Halprin. 
While Halprin conspicuously regarded improvisation as a way- 
through and therefore was more inclined to treat improvisation 
'analytically' (p. 22), Forti was more impressionistic in her 
approach towards improvisation, which, as Banes points out, seems 
to be what she learned from working with Halprin (p. 22). As 
analytically as Halprin's classes could get, part of the sessions 
focused on 'imagery' rather than on 'kinesiological analysis', 
letting the performers move their bodies without a pressure to 
'compose' or 'to judge the movements', or 'to create any 
overview' (p. 22). The performers were allowed, if only during 
that particular session, to jump into the materialisation of what 
they saw or felt in their mind, and this experience seems to have 
paved a way for Forti's approach towards improvisation (p. 22). 
In Banes' words, Forti learned from Halprin 'the use of natural 
movements' (p. 24), which was a far cry from the use of movements 
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in ballet or in 'modern dance' involving much 'tension' (p. 24). 
'Natural' movements, based on 'a relaxed state', did not need 
'preparation' and were produced 'instinctively' and 'organically' 
(p. 24). Forti, according to Banes, worked on improvisation 
along the line of 'imagery' for four years, but then she 
concluded that rampant imagery would not induce much in her work 
after all (p. 24). We might be able to detect in Forti's dilemma 
the problem we discussed mainly in chapter 2, namely, the 
relationship between a performer's mind and her body. In Forti's 
case, we may suspect, the question concerns how a performer can 
actually materialise her 'imagery' by means of her physical self, 
or how a performer handles the inevitable gap between imagery and 
'real' movements. 
Banes' description about Huddle, one of Forti's dance pieces, 
helps us make a supposition that Forti seeks a breakaway from her 
dilemma by creating performances which involve exercise-like 
actions or even game elements. By setting rules for the 
exercises and structuring the entire piece out of those rules, 
Forti seems to avoid circumstances in which 'floods of imagery' 
(p. 24) may dominate her attention. In a sense, both Halprin and 
Forti at one time come to the point where they start to 
concentrate more on the very moment of a performance. Though 
this does not mean that they have come to consider less, important 
the improvising 'process' to 'free' performers' bodies, it does 
imply a shift of their view towards improvisation. Like Halprin, 
Forti in Huddle chooses to build up a game-like structure rather 
than to explore 'freedom' further as in contact improvisation: 
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Six or seven people form a strong web by facing each other and 
bending forward, planting their feet firmly, keeping the knees 
slightly bent, and putting their arms around each other's waists 
and shoulders. One person separates from the structure [. . ], 
climbs over the huddle slowly and calmly, finding available foot- 
and handholds supplied by the other bodies, and rejoins the 
huddle on the other side. There is no particular order for 
climbing, but by the shifting of balance and readjustment of 
center that takes place when one person withdraws to start the 
climb, the group can immediately feel one person's intention to 
ascend. (p. 27) 
Improvisatory aspects in this particular piece lie in each 
performer's sensitivity towards other performers' subtle 
movements as well as in her making decisions whether to 
'ascend' or not. Sheer 'freedom' of a body gives way to an 
exercise of 'freedom' which holds up given principles. Despite 
their differences in initial attitudes towards improvisation 
in terms of theory and practice, Halprin and Forti both seem to 
find a kind of solution, if a temporary one, to the problem of 
'natural' movements, which is made possible by setting up a 
demanding but not too rigid set of rules for performers. 
6.5.9 Lucinda Childs 
Even more so than tasks or game-like movements in Halprin's and 
Forti's works, some of Lucinda Childs' performance pieces are 
quite formally patterned in terms of choreography. If tasks or 
games performed in a piece can function as a means of bringing 
out the performers' physical and mental readiness or flexibility, 
they can also reveal the fact that performers are still human 
beings and thus susceptible to a moment-to-moment change of air. 
That a performance piece is built up of patterns in itself 
suggests the choreographer's, in this case Childs', intention to 
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cast some light on a hitherto under-recognised side of the human 
behaviour. As we discussed before, 'mechanical' patterns will 
never be totally compatible with movements made by human 
performers in actual practice simply because human performers are 
bound to make some changes, however small, even if they try not 
to. A deliberate matching of patterns and humans is likely to 
show how human the performers actually are. This presumably will 
be most obvious in overt physical actions by the performers, 
which we may regard at least partly as improvisatory actions. 
Nevertheless, whether or not Childs includes such improvisatory 
possibilities among her intention is another question. Childs 
sets up patterns for her performers, whose mode of operation 
becomes a performance piece. Banes explains in general terms how 
those patterns function: 
By presenting a single, simple set of movements that repeat with 
only slightly contrasting variation, Childs demands close 
attention. Some variations are based on the subtle structural 
reordering of the movements. Others flow from the natural 
distortions and limited stylistic differences she permits among 
the dancers as they excute the prescribed steps. Although the 
jumps, pivots, walks, and hops must be done precisely, the arms, 
head, and torso of each dancer are free to function in a 
comfortable, economical way that facilitates performance of the 
footwork. 44 
As in the works of other choreographers/dancers, here again we 
find the use of rather mathematical formulae, which by themselves 
are demanding enough for the performers to fulfil. At the same 
time, Banes makes it clear that Childs regards her 'set of 
movements' not as a complete, self-contained sequence of actions 
but rather as movements that beget movements. This means that 
the performers have to let their own bodies decide on their next 
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action whenever and wherever the patterns do not stipulate. 
For example, we can look at a piece called Calico Mingling. 
As Childs herself explains, this is a 'dance for four women' and 
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it has 'four arrangements'. Childs notes that '[e]ach time it 
is seen, it is more radically removed from the initial 
presentation' (p. 36), suggesting that the patterns set for the 
piece have the potential for a performance-to-performance growth 
not in their forms but in their materialisation by the 
performers. Each performer in Calico Mingling performs a 
'phrase', which 'consists of forward and backward walking on 
straight, circular, and semi-circular paths [. . . ]' (p. 36). 
The 'phrases' are 'completed in six paces' (p. 36). There are 
further rules which, for instance, enable the performers who are 
'on parallel lines four feet apart' to allow 'their circular or 
semi-circular loops extend eight feet to their respective left or 
right so that a kind of interlacing effect is achieved' (p. 36). 
Only if the performers 'are in unison', they have to 'remain at a 
fixed distance' (p. 36). The 'unisons' can be made between two 
dancers or among three or four dancers, and they can break from a 
certain fixed distance to form some different distances (p. 36). 
The 'four arrangements' refer to the patterns stipulating where 
the performers position themselves against one another. The 
first arrangement requires that all the performers 'face the same 
direction', the second arrangement requires that they face the 
opposite direction, the third that 'two face opposite the other 
two', and the fourth arrangement requires that the third one be 
'reversed with an additional inversion of placement between two 
of the dancers' (p. 36). Childs sets up such exact patterns and 
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makes them overlap one another so that each pattern will be 
'viewed' (p. 36) from-a different 'angle' (p. 36), that is, each 
pattern will be performed in different formations, in different 
sequences. In Calico Mingling the survival of a performance 
depends on the mechanism of the patterns themselves, which 
prevents the actions from spreading too thinly or interfering 
with one another too closely (p. 36). The performers of this 
particular piece then can safely concentrate on following the 
given rules without worrying too much about the movements going 
out of control. Within each phrase, improvisatory possibilities 
exist only in terms of the physiological complexity of the 
human performer, since a phrase is expected to be 'repeated' 
precisely. Improvisation in this piece has more to do with the 
four people making sequential decisions on phrases and 
arrangements as they perform. According to the way they use the 
rules, a performance can be 'radical' or, we may presume, very 
'boring'. In this respect, Calico Mingling can even be 
associated with contact improvisation for its overall rhythmical 
dynamics. Despite the fact that the two are complete opposites 
in terms of their principles, the one having minimum rules and 
the other having precise geometrical rules, both contact 
improvisation and Calico Mingling rely on the performers' mostly 
instinctive decision-makings to determine how they will proceed, 
develop, and indeed get more 'interesting' during the moment of 
performance. Improvisation in Calico Mingling does not simply 
mean the performers abiding by the given rules while improvising. 
More significantly, improvisation in this particular piece means 
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the performers challenging the given rules not by flouting them 
but by producing a most organic formation and sequence out of 
them. Such an improvisatory circumstance, namely, a head-on 
collision between rules and expansive possibilities, can be 
regarded as an extreme case within the second category of our 
criteria. 
6.5.10 Deborah Hay 
As Susan Leigh Foster points out, 'image' and 'dance' are part 
and parcel of one another in Deborah Hay's performance pieces. 
Hay sometimes makes her 'image' explicit by verbally defining 
what her physical movements imply: 
program notes often function as yet another voice participating 
in the dance, with titles and notes for dances consisting of 
poetic images that sometimes label the movement being performed. 
[. . .] These descriptions include images from nature -- 
'reflecting brook', 'still summer hill', 'bird dance' or 'gnarled 
trees' -- interspersed with specific movement directives -- 
'slow, well-paced run', or 'large sweeping movements on the 
floor' -- and more abstract instructions such as 'the embodiment 
of all images', 'arrival', or 'preponderance of the great'. The 
movement occasionally looks like its namesake [. . . ]. More 
often, however, the movement approximates some quality or feature 
of the image such as stillness, gnarledness, or randomness. 46 
Especially from the last sentence in this quote we can infer that 
'image' for Hay is not some perfect model or ideal picture with 
which the performer tries to identify her moving body. Movements 
in Hay's performance may or may not 'look like' what their verbal 
descriptions indicate, but since any kind of visual implication, 
concretisation, or even resemblance inevitably involves a drastic 
metaphysical interpretation on the part of the performer, 
likeness will always be a relative and often subjective term. It 
seems that what Hay seeks after in 'image' is less of a visual 
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analogy than of a principle. Whether taken from 'nature' or 
being highly abstract, 'image' can be regarded as a guidance or a 
framework which Hay sets up. This in effect means that what Hay 
has with 'image' is a first-hand hint for inspiration as well as 
a self-made restriction of possible movements for each 
performance piece. If Hay decides to focus on 'stillness', as 
Foster describes above, we might then say that Hay has elicited a 
principle, namely, exploring 'stillness', from a certain 'image'. 
The term 'image' then starts to assume a more pragmatic use 
than it might first suggest. It is the performer's body that Hay 
brings to the centre, phenomenologically speaking, and working 
with 'image' helps the performer see her body from a new 
perspective or leads her to a new kind of movement which she 
might not discover if she were not performing to a certain 
'image'. 'Image' for Hay concerns the performer's body rather 
than what Foster calls the performer's 'self' (p. 52), which, we 
may infer from Foster, refers to the performer being committed, 
both mentally and physically, to a kind of incarnation: 
The dancer is denied any transition between images that would 
help explain how the self evolved from one thing to another. If 
such transitions were included in the choreography, the dancer 
could maintain a certain 'self'-consistency. Hay's dances would 
then become the stories of a versatile dancer whose self was 
fluid enough to become different things. Instead, the complete 
discontinuity between images in Hay's dances presents the dancer 
as the sum total of all the contrasting images performed. (p. 52) 
From what we have seen so far, it seems that improvisatory 
possibilities for these performances by Hay would resemble some 
of Chaikin's improvisatory works. In other words, we can detect 
some exercise-like or game-like qualities in Hay and accordingly 
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expect from her performance the kind of improvisation seen in the 
Open Theatre productions. Nevertheless, Foster also suggests 
that Hay's attitudes towards the mental side of a performer 
remain strong alongside her attitudes towards a performer's body. 
Hay's mind-body relationship seems to be more consciously grasped 
by the performer herself compared to what Chaikin's performers 
feel. About the importance of the performer's mind, Foster 
writes: 
Hay [. . .] asks that when performing her choreography the 
subject of the dancer become as mutable as the cellularly 
composed body. Both body and subject assume an existence like 
that of 'gnarled trees' or a 'slow, well-paced run'. The subject 
does not become these images prior to the body as it would in a 
Graham dance, because the subject does not provide causal 
motivation for the body's actions. Body and subject simply 
participate in a given image together as different facets of that 
image. (p. 51) 
It may well be that such a dichotomy between mind and body exists 
only within the performer's, and the choreographer's, own 
'feelings' towards performance. Still, we can at least say this: 
a sharp distinction between 'subject' and 'body', even only in 
theory, is not likely to lead to the kind of improvisation that 
develops around a game-like principle. 
Foster also brings our attention to a kind of environmental 
approach that Hay adopts. Here we are able to find one of the 
reasons why her attitudes towards performance cannot be 
considered without extending the area of discussion beyond the 
problem of body and 'image': 
Deborah Hay dances with and within the world around her. She 
communes with the natural and social landscape, sensing and 
manifesting its constant change. Her facial expression, her 
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costume, the quality, shape, and timing of her movement -- all 
reflect a calm, ethereal rapport with her surroundings. She 
proclaims a loving openness toward the dance, the audience, and 
the environment by moving with grace and dignity, completely 
absorbed in the dance. [. . .] The dance, which may last an hour 
or more, consists largely of discrete phrases performed several 
times and then left behind. (p. 5) 
Just as we find it difficult to pin down improvisatory elements 
in environmental theatre, the sheer fact of Hay willingly 
mingling with her surroundings implies the near impossibility of 
extracting some elements and calling them improvisation. As long 
as her phenomenological presence in the performance space is 
concerned, we may either regard her entire movement as being to 
some extent improvisatory or conclude that improvisatory aspects 
are beside the issue in the first place. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter I will give an answer to the research 
question, 'What can I induce from materials focussed around the 
individual "creativities" that might serve to construct a 
prototypical explanation to define "performance improvisation"? '. 
In order to answer the research question, what I first have 
to do is to clarify what 'performance' is on the one hand and 
what 'improvisation' is on the other. The next section will 
point to the significant findings in the Chapters 2 to 6 that 
reveal the elements of the domain of 'performance' and the 
elements of the domain of 'improvisation'. 
7.1 Significant Findings in the Chapters 2 to 6 
7.1.1 On Elements that Characterise So-Called 
'Improvisation' 
First, we note that the question of mind and body recurred again 
and again in the preceding chapters. On a highly practical 
level, it was suggested that the performer should let her 'body' 
move before starting to think about the'meaning of the movement. 
As a case in point, we are reminded of Michael Chekhov's 
exercises for 'improvisation'. 
The apparent priority of the body over the mind relates to 
the apparent 'freedom' which improvisation seems to enjoy. When 
the performer improvises, she is in a situation which allows her 
to exercise her freedom within the constraints of formal or not 
so formal rules. The situation demands that the performer takes 
in the rules and shows that she is able to use the rules to her 
optimum advantage. The way to show such an ability is to make a 
concrete physical movement. For example, in contact 
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improvisation, the seemingly free movement of the pair of 
performers actually relies on the unsung 'rules', which are 
deeply embedded in the performers' own sense of 'ideal'. 
Paradoxically, the performer can only try to achieve her 
'ideal' improvisation by accumulating very down-to-earth 
experience which includes various kinds of training and the 
acquisition of technique. Such experience is 'remembered' and 
lived by the performer at the moment of improvisation. 
Improvisation draws our attention to the spatiotemporal 
'moment', or the actual 'process' of what the performer does 
physically and mentally. The performance of the Grand Union 
provides us with a straightforward example. If 'process' is to 
be focussed on, then this means that improvisation will 
necessarily be performer-oriented. The performer improvises for 
the sake of satisfying herself and her co-performers rather than 
for the purpose of presenting a 'good' piece of work to the 
audience. Irrespective of the presence or the reaction of the 
audience, the performer's own 'feel good' factor exists. 
It is likely that improvisation materialises when the 
performer makes physical or mental decisions subconsciously, 
which strongly relates to the notion that the performer's body is 
expected to respond quickly to any situation in the 'process'. 
This also suggests that improvisation values 'intuition' rather 
than 'intelligence' in the sense that, whatever the result may 
be, the performer's body has to make a concrete move 'this 
instant'. 
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7.1.2 On Elements that Characterise So-Called 
'Performance' 
Paradoxically, the more we focus on the performer's body, the 
more profound the question of mind becomes. Cunningham, for 
example, searches for the way the human body disengages itself 
from the so-called human feelings; improvisation is intentionally 
avoided. The situation or the 'rules' can be set in such a way 
that the performer finds it difficult to draw on her 
improvisatory technique. 
Performance may endorse or discourage improvisation, but any 
performance has to have its own 'intention', according to Kirby, 
which indicates the importance of a conscious initiative on the 
performer's part. By 'consciousness' I refer to the concerns 
that emphasise the performer standing somewhat apart from what 
she does: the performer standing apart is able to grasp what she 
does, be it an improvisation or not, in a larger perspective of 
'intention'. 
Performance does not necessarily commit itself to the 
spatiotemporal aspect of the human body. 'Intelligent' decisions 
often challenge the pressure of time and physical limitations. 
'Intelligence' may prevent the human body from moving 'freely', 
but performance is not about 'freedom'. Performance needs a 
certain framework, tight or casual, to distinguish itself from 
human life itself. Where performance is, there are 'constraints' 
that one way or another bind the performer. The constraints 
offer the performer some criteria to appraise what she does. 
Since performance is born with 'intention',. the performer 
always searches for some kind of 'result' or some 'ideal'. The 
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result, nevertheless, is not necessarily definite like a 
particular 'answer' or a particular 'ending'. 'Idealism' as a 
kind of direction that the performer lays out and follows in 
practice is inherent in any performance. 
There should exist a gap between the performer and the 
audience. Without this gap, the audience may end up being too 
involved in the performer's work to be able to interpret it or 
exercise their imagination over it. Whether or not the audience 
interpret the performer's action as an improvisation, the 
performance exists as long as the performer and the audience 
retain some kind of 'agreement' between them. This indicates 
that performance reaches beyond the 'feel-good' factor of the 
performer. 'Goodness' in performance implies the sense of 
creating a world that envelops the audience as well as the 
performer. Performance is motivated by such 'goodness' even 
though the actual reaction of the audience can never be predicted 
precisely. 
7.1.3 Introducing the Concept of Binary Opposition 
As we point out the significant elements that characterise the 
so-called 'improvisation' and the so-called 'performance', we are 
led to realise that those elements can be classified in terms of 
a simple binary opposition. In the next section, I will 
introduce a set of oppositional pairs that differentiate 
'performance' and 'improvisation' from each other. By discussing 
the features of each pair, I will realign both 'performance' and 
'improvisation' in a clearer and more tangible perspective than 
before. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, I will come 
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back to the question of 'performance improvisation', which will 
be elucidated on the basis of the detailed explanation of the 
performance/improvisation opposition in the next section. 
7.2 Performance/Improvisation Opposition 
A set of eight pairs that I have drawn from the discussion in the 
Chapters 2 to 6 according to the principle of the binary 
opposition introduced in the sub-section above are: 
Performance Improvisation 
1 Mind Body 
2 Consciousness Subconsciousness 
3 Intelligence Intuition 
4 Constraints Freedom 
5 Result-Oriented Process-Centred 
6 Idealism Remembered Experience 
7 Performer versus Audience Performer-Oriented 
8 Goodness-Motivated Feeling-Good 
In the following eight sub-sections, I will attempt to elucidate 
the domain of 'performance' as opposed to the domain of 
'improvisation' by focussing on the materials from the Chapters 2 
to 6 that particularly concern the above-mentioned headings. 
7.2.1 Mind/Body 
'Performance' happens more in the human mind than in the human 
body. This is most evidently indicated when the performer 
deliberately disrupts the otherwise 'natural' mind-body flow 
inherent in any human being. As Schechner and Mintz explained, 
the performer is capable of creating a situation in-which the 
mind does not smoothly reflect the body, or vice versa. 
'Performance' reveals a new dimension through such attempts of 
parting body from mind, which requires the performer's or the 
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choreographer's or the director's highly mental initiative. For 
example, we have seen that Cunningham makes 'rules' in such a way 
that the so-called 'natural' movement of the body is defied. The 
rules have to be carefully planned in order to let the mental 
initiative have its way. 
'Improvisation' emphasises the human body rather than the 
human mind. What Melrose called 'body-thinking' applies to all, 
1 
from the later Stanislavskian improvisation to Michael Chekhov's 
claim that 'gestures' actually equal human psychology to 
Schechner's assertion that what seems to be the 'surface' 
feeling, such as muscles activating, can also become the feeling 
coming from the 'depth' of the performer. The importance of the 
human body which so many people point out seems to have derived 
from their conviction that it is easier and more effective to 
approach improvisation that way. For example, Chaikin's 'sound 
and movement' exercise was aptly devised to let one person's 
'kinetic impulses' be transformed into another person's 'inner 
feeling', never the other way around. As I quoted in Chapter 2, 
'sound and movement' was 'an attempt to work from the outside 
2 
in' by '[u]sing kinetic impulses to locate inner states. ' 
7.2.2 Consciousness/Subconsciousness 
At least some degree of conscious effort is required of the 
person who creates 'performance'. The 'intent' to 'affect an 
audience' distinguishes itself as 'performance', according to 
Kirby. 'Performance' thus cannot let the performer lose sight 
of what she is doing, irrespective of the extent of her physical 
and mental commitment to it. The performer's conscious effort 
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is the point upon which people focus whenever the borderline 
between 'performance' and something other seems uncertain. 
Langer, Thom, and Blau have reiterated the difference between 
improvisation which remains as it is and improvisation which 
3 
becomes more than a mere improvisation. If any improvisatory 
action is to be regarded as 'performance', that action must be 
put in a certain perspective by the performer herself. Such a 
perspective may take shape in the definition of the 'work of art' 
as in Langer or the reference to the 'recoverable' improvisation 
as in Thom or the dismissal of 'shallow' improvisation as in 
Blau. Whatever the term used in lieu of 'perspective' may be, 
an improvisatory action can be called 'performance' only when 
the improvisation does not happen for its own sake. 
If we turn to 'improvisation' itself, the emphasis on the 
human body directly relates to the notion that the performer 
improvises at the subconscious level of her being. The 
performer's body should be able to move without her consciousness 
offering in-detail instructions. The improvising body must 
acquire the kind of versatility based on the 'imaginative use of 
[, .] various mental, physical, sensory and emotional 4 
resources', as I quoted in Chapter 2. Such versatility will be 
applicable to all performing circumstances, according to 
Strasberg, even unexpected ones. The well-trained body can react 
even when consciousness may lag behind. 
7.2.3 Intelligence/Intuition 
'Performance' is not all about the spatiotemporal action and 
reaction of the human body. Included in 'performance' is the 
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kind of human intelligence which directly confronts the fact of 
the human body existing in a particular space and time. When a 
person plans a performance piece, she exercises her intelligence 
so that she can set a framework for the performer's body to move 
in the space and time of that performance piece. This is like a 
test for the spatiotemporal aspect of the human body to go 
through. For example, the 'task' performances about which 
Halprin writes are planned to give the performers the opportunity 
to experience the kind of mental and physical agility and 
flexibility which otherwise would not be experienced easily. In 
5 
Happenings, performers go through a highly 'unique' experience 
which would not be possible without the very concept of 
'Happenings' in the first place. As a concept, 'Happenings' may 
be one of the most overtly 'intelligent' of all ideas for 
performance discussed in the preceding chapters. 
'Improvisation' derives from people's intelligent initiative 
to set an appropriate framework, but in the actual practice of 
improvisation the performer's 'intuition' prevails upon 
intelligence. For example, a sophisticated intelligence detected 
in the establishment of the principles of contact improvisation 
proves its worth only when the performers intuitively let their 
bodies move. In improvisation, the performer does not have the 
luxury of time before making decisions on her physical movement. 
'Intuition' is a dare against the spatiotemporal limitations 
facing the performer. Nevertheless, intuition appears 
differently from improvisation to improvisation: the performer 
exercises her intuition overtly in contact improvisation, whereas 
in one of Childs' performance pieces the performer only lets her 
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intuition emerge through a network of precise and geometrical 
rules. 
7.2.4 Constraints/Freedom 
'Performance' happens as we set constraints to everyday life of a 
human being. The preceding chapters have shown that constraints 
may take any form, apply to any situation, and be subject to any 
change, which all depend on the decisions made by those involved 
in the performance. At one end of the spectrum, we have fairly 
general or abstract constraints; at the other end, constraints 
tend to be highly technical and specified in detail. 
Performances such as Happenings and environmental theatre 
entirely rely on the kind of constraints which, paradoxically 
enough, will readily accept what we would otherwise call 
'accidents' or 'mistakes' or 'the deprivation of human 
intentionality'. On the other hand, in some of Brown's dance 
pieces, constraints are devised almost mathematically as in 
complicated game rules. 
The nature of constraints is extremely important in defining 
'improvisation'. Depending on the constraint, we may find it 
more appropriate to regard some performers' work as being 
irrelevant to 'improvisation' or as being beyond 'improvisation' 
or as the denial of 'improvisation'. For example, both Duncan 
and Graham exerted such strong personalities when they performed 
that they seemed to absorb and transform constraints at will. It 
is rather difficult, and possibly meaningless, to try and pin 
down such dancers' improvisatory actions. Meanwhile, 
'indeterminacy' as attempted in Cage's pieces sometimes overtly 
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6 
defies 'improvisation'. Many people agree that 'improvisation' 
happens most clearly and easily when the constraints strike the 
'right' balance. Constraints should be neither too tight nor too 
rigid if the performer is to be allowed to exercise her 
improvisatory 'freedom'. For example, a performer wearing a mask 
enjoys a certain 'freedom' which is secured by the very 
constraints of the mask itself. In contact improvisation, the 
pair of performers make 'contacts' with each other: each 
performer's 'muscular tone is lightly stretched to extend the 
limbs, although not to a degree that obscures the sensations of 
7 
momentum and inertia', as I quoted in Chapter 6. The simplicity 
of the rules and their practical potentiality maintain an 
exquisite balance, which enables the performers of contact 
improvisation to move 'freely'. 
7.2.5 Result-Oriented/Process-Centred . 
In the sense that 'performance' has to have an 'intended' 
initiative, the person who intends to make 'performance' always 
aims at some 'result'. At its most basic level, such a 'result' 
identifies with the person's sense of achievement, that is, her 
'intention' having been met to her own satisfaction. All results 
are thus prefigured at least in terms of the general framework of 
individual intentions. The actual 'results' may be fully 
expected ones or may possibly be unexpected ones, depending upon 
the nature of intentions. In Cunningham's work, the result is 
achieved when Cunningham and other people who are involved know 
that the detailed plans devised for their piece have been 
accurately performed. On the other side of the coin, however, 
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Cunningham also plans an 'unexpected' result. For example, in 
many of his pieces, Cunningham's intention includes that the 
dancers and the music do not perform on the basis of a solid pre- 
8 
agreement between them. The Grand Union's performances, 
contact improvisation; and Schechner's environmental theatre also 
aim at the kind of results which are intended to be at least 
partly unexpected. 
The preceding chapters have shown that 'improvisation' is the 
way in which we pay particular attention to the spatiotemporal 
performing 'moment'. By referring to 'improvisation', we are 
thus focussing on the actual 'process' of what the performer goes 
through in her space and time. 'Process' most clearly reveals 
itself when the performer has no choice but to tackle the unknown 
quality of the 'moment' as it comes her way. We are reminded of 
the fact that, "as in the Grand Union and contact improvisation, 
many exercise-like and game-like performances are devised to make 
performers move around in pairs or in groups. Working with other 
people provides an excellent opportunity for any performer to 
experience the kind of 'process' which cannot be predicted with 
absolute precision beforehand. 
7.2.6 Idealism/Remembered Experience 
'Performance' is a product of 'idealism'. Ideals differ from 
'results' even though they affect each other. The 'ideal' 
performance which the performer cherishes within herself remains 
intact whether or not the actual, 'outside' result of a 
performance piece satisfies her own sense of achievement. The 
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performer retains what she regards as the 'ideal' irrespective of 
the kind of result she aims at in practice. Like a blueprint and 
a scale model, a person's 'ideal' performance is not necessarily 
feasible in a practical sense or straightforwardly applicable in 
the actual space and time. This, however, does not change the 
fact that the performer's intention to produce 'performance' is 
both prompted by and directed to her 'ideal'. The preceding 
chapters have highlighted some of the 'ideals' as envisioned and 
nourished by individuals and groups. Cage, for example, wrote 
about 'indeterminacy' and about the way he created some highly 
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deliberate and intricately planned circumstances and contexts. 
Cage's 'indeterminacy' may be regarded as one of his 'ideals', to 
which end he thought up elaborate procedures in the form of 
compositions. 
On the standpoint of 'improvisation', we find that 'idealism' 
collides head on with both the possibility and limitations of the 
performer's physical aspect. Whatever its 'ideal' may be, a 
piece of 'improvisation' always depends on the performer's 
ability to make decisions which direct her physical movements. 
This explains why many of the articles on improvisation discussed 
in the preceding chapters'stressed the importance of training 
performers or of the performer's acquiring technique. It is only 
when she becomes completely confident in her physical movement, 
which includes knowing what her body cannot do, that the 
performer is given the opportunity to seek after her 'ideal' in 
and through improvisation. Training and acquiring technique 
means that the performer systematically learns to accumulate 
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physical memories. This, according to Spolin, is 'the enriching, 
restructuring, and integration of all of [the] daily life 
10 
responses for use in the art form', and the performer will re- 
experience what she has learned when she makes an attempt at 
'improvisation'. Remembered experience thus refers to the 
performer's ability to re-experience what is imprinted on her 
body. The Grand Union performances testify to the vital 
importance of remembered experience to be shared by the members 
of the group: if one's physical memories are trained to detect 
the others' physical memories as well, the performers manage to 
improvise as a group without rigid prior plannings. 
7.2.7 Performer versus Audience/Performer-Oriented 
More than any other feature of the oppositional pairs taken up so 
far, the feature of 'performer versus audience' raises a 
question that penetrates the very core of what we would define as 
'performance'. I suggested in the preceding chapters that 
'performance' needs some kind of a 'gap' that separates the 
audience from the performer either physically or mentally, or 
both. In fact, 'gaps' take different forms in different 
circumstances. As pointed out in the preceding chapters, the 
concept and reality of the 'audience' may not always be clear. 
Depending on the circumstance, as in some 'happenings', the 
audience can easily mix with the performers possibly to the 
extent that they become performers themselves, filling in the 
gap. In some cases, the audience in the sense of 'invited 
guests' do not exist in the first place; some of the performances 
by Boal and his group create an 'audience' out of a crowd in the 
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street with or without its consent or its knowledge of having 
been made into an audience. 'Gaps' thus may be filled and 
unfilled at the performer's or the audience's discretion; 'gaps' 
may also be 'forced' onto the alleged audience. Whatever happens 
in the actual space and time, the performer's initial intention 
of sensing some kind of a gap between herself and others, or 
between her group and others, remains utterly crucial. Without 
such an intention, we have no performance. 
The definitive concept and reality of the audience apply to 
'improvisation' only when the performer and the audience share a 
common understanding regarding such matters as the background of 
the improvisation, the technical knowledge and ability of the 
performer, and the way the environment affects the entire process 
of the improvisation. As Blau writes, improvisation is 'not 
11 
merely random or associative'. The commedia dell'arte thrived 
on performer-audience rapport, relying on the presupposition that 
the participants were expected to tune in on the 'common' 
wavelength. In other words, the 'gap' between the Commedia 
performers and their audience was verified and then appropriated 
to mutual satisfaction. The very feasibility of the performer 
and the audience interacting at such a wavelength has been 
questioned or denied by many people in this century, as the 
preceding chapters have shown. Consequently, at least in the 
fields that we have discussed in this thesis, 'improvisation' now 
refers almost exclusively to the performer and her 'conduct', 
that is, what she physically, subconsciously, and intuitively 
goes through within some particular framework, which is always 
based on her experience. 'Improvisation' in this new meaning is 
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performer-oriented, less because the performer considers the 
audience unimportant than because she knows about the audience 
well enough to discard the idea of striving for a 'common' 
wavelength. The performer knows that she cannot rely on the 
audience reacting in the way she wants and that it is not easy to 
predict the reaction of the audience in a precise manner. 
Meanwhile, the performer enjoys the advantage of being on the 
producing side of physical, subconscious, and intuitive actions, 
which gives her the authority to call some of her actions 
'improvisation' as far as she is concerned. 
7.2.8 Goodness-Motivated/Feeling-Good 
I use the word 'good' here, but it is not for evaluating or 
measuring any form of 'performance' according to any specific 
standard. What I call 'goodness' means that the performer's 
'intent' to 'affect an audience' is shown in overt and clear 
enough a manner so that other people will be able to see, sense, 
and interpret what she produces. 'Performance' is goodness- 
motivated. Whether or not the performer's 'intention' has been 
with her for a long time, there comes a point in time when she 
makes a decision to show her 'intention' to the outside world. 
Only then shall the performer's intention ever have a chance of 
becoming part of 'reality', that is, the world of the performer 
and the audience where any intended 'framework' will be 
negotiated against the laws of human nature. A rather extreme 
example is one of Chaikin's performances, in which he performed 
'himself', a person recovering from aphasia. A strong sense of 
12 
'corporeality' was clearly shown as well as intended. 
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'Goodness', nevertheless, is motivated by the performer, and the 
audience in actual performances do not necessarily grasp the 
exact nature or the source of the 'goodness'. For example, in 
Chaikin's performance mentioned above, some members of the 
audience could have been ignorant of the performer's 'intention'. 
In some of Boal's performances, as mentioned in the previous sub- 
section, the audience may not even know that they have become an 
audience. The fact remains that such 'ignorant' audiences are 
still affected in one way or another by the performer's shown 
intention. 
We have already seen that 'improvisation' is conspicuously 
performer-oriented. The performer improvises for the sake of 
satisfying her own sense of 'intuition' or 'freedom', and not 
exactly for the sake of presenting a piece of 'improvisation' in 
the eyes of other people. When I use the word 'good' in the 
context of 'improvisation', the word thus refers to the 
performer's physical as well as emotional state at its 'best'. 
Only the performer herself can appreciate this 'feel-good' 
factor; it prompts the performer to improvise, sustains her 
during the moment of improvisation, and is independent of 
an 'intention' to 'affect an audience'. Depending on the 
circumstance, the 'feel-good' factor functions in various ways. 
For example, in contact improvisation, the performer is at her 
'best' when she feels charged in mind and body, that is, when she 
13 
is capable of using her 'energy' freely and intuitively while 
easily keeping to the rules of making 'contacts'. The 
performer's 'feel-good' factor in contact improvisation coincides 
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with the moment of utmost concentration and freedom as far as she 
is concerned. Some of Halprin's performances prompt the 
performer's 'feel-good' factor to be activated as the performer 
proceeds with an assigned task. I quoted Halprin's own words in 
Chapter 6: '[The wine bottle task was] so challenging and so 
14 
difficult that I was quite content to do it'. If the task 
demands of the performer some improvisatory efficiency, she 
proves her 'best' by assuming the very efficiency wanted for the 
occasion. Unlike in contact improvisation, the performer's 
'feel-good' factor in such task performances coincides with her 
conviction that her improvisatory action exactly fits the 
requirement of the task. Other aspects of Halprin's work include 
her using 'improvisation' for the purpose of breaking a dance 
tradition. To that end, Halprin found herself trying 
'everything' through improvisation. In such a case, the 
performer's 'feel-good' factor coincides with her 'intuition' and 
'freedom' being exercised for what she considers a worthy cause. 
7.3 Towards a Definition of Performance Improvisation 
We are reminded of the fact, as was briefly mentioned in Chapter 
1, that the two words 'performance' and 'improvisation' have had 
a long history of being interdependent in their semantics and 
pragmatic use. In this thesis, I first of all gave the name 
'performance improvisation' to that commonly-accepted and yet so 
far not precisely defined area of interdependence. The purpose 
of the thesis has been to expose, by way of interpreting and 
analysing individual 'creativities', the nature of 'performance 
improvisation' in detail and, as a result, to offer a benchmark 
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for any further attempt at a more exact definition. In Chapter 
1, I showed the logical relationship between 'performance' and 
'improvisation' and 'performance improvisation' in the form of a 
simple scheme. Our accustomed assumption that both 'performance' 
and 'improvisation' reveal their comprehensive characteristics 
through interaction was indicated by the domains of 'performance' 
and 'improvisation' partially invading each other in the scheme. 
Nevertheless, the scheme in Chapter 1 only made it clear that 
'performance improvisation' is a concept as well as a phenomenon 
intrinsically embedded in any discussion that deals with the 
characteristics of 'performance' and of 'improvisation'. In the 
course of this concluding chapter, the scheme has undergone 
refinement with the introduction of the set of oppositional pairs 
that verbally specify what characterise 'performance' and 
























The individual 'creativities' discussed in the preceding 
chapters testify to the fact that there is a constant negotiation 
between features belonging to 'performance' and those belonging 
to 'improvisation'. There also is a negotiation between one 
oppositional pair of features and another. Every 'creativity' 
manifests its own degree of negotiation. The measurement of the 
degree entirely depends on the way in which we confront each 
'creativity', and here I will point to four major possible ways. 
First, we can look either at the entire piece of any 'work', 
for example, the whole duration of a Grand Union performance 
piece, or at each single 'moment' of a piece of 'work', for 
example, a brief and fragmentary moment within a Grand Union 
performance piece. Second, we can focus either on the 
'experience' per se or on the supra-'experience'. The 
'experience' per se refers to what people go through during some 
moment of a piece of work or during a piece of work as a whole. 
Since the genuine 'experience' per se would not easily yield to a 
systematic interpretation and analysis without the help of some 
scientific research tools, for example, those that enable us to 
see which part of the brain is active, our focussing on the 
'experience' per se mainly concerns people's anecdotes of the 
'experience'. Our focussing on the supra-'experience', on the 
other hand, concerns those comments and writings which do not 
particularly centre around people' s experience itself. For 
example, some of Kirby's writings on Happenings and some of 
Cage's writings on his performance pieces describe the 
'experience' per se in detail, while their other writings on the 
same subjects describe the supra-'experience' rather than the 
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'experience' itself. Third, we can either consult what the 
performer writes and says about her own work or stay away from 
the performer's comments. The performer-oriented nature of 
'improvisation', for example, can be explored in depth if we 
select the material carefully according to the position of the 
writer, that is, if she is herself the performer of the work or 
not. Lastly, we can either focus on the production of a 'moment' 
and a piece of work or on the appreciation of those. At first 
glance, we might be inclined to regard the production of a work 
as solely concerning the performer and the appreciation of the 
work as mainly concerning the audience. The situation, in fact, 
is more complicated. As we have seen in the main chapters and 
also in the previous section of this chapter, the performer also 
appreciates her own work, for example, by evaluating the physical 
movement she has made. Some pieces of work, on the other hand, 
expect the audience to participate in the 'work' in such a way 
that they end up becoming 'performers'. 
Whichever way we adopt, we look at each 'creativity' in order 
to measure the degree of negotiation between the features and 
between the oppositional pairs. What I would call a 'vertical 
negotiation' emphasises or represses some particular oppositional 
pairs. For example, we might regard some particular moment of a 
piece of work as being almost irrelevant to both the 'goodness- 
motivated' feature and the 'feel-good' feature. On the other 
hand, what I would call a 'horizontal negotiation' emphasises or 
represses one of the features of an oppositional pair. For 
example, some particular piece of work might as a whole be 
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regarded as putting more emphasis on the 'process' than on the 
'result'. It is important to point out that all the features of 
the eight oppositional pairs are considered present at any rate 
in any single 'creativity'. 
Each individual 'creativity' considered for discussion in the 
thesis has proven in the main chapters to be a nebulous 
intertwinement of 'performance' and 'improvisation'. I have 
attempted to elucidate the nature of intertwinement in this 
concluding chapter, which has culminated in eliciting the eight 
pairs of oppositional features. Future attempts at a definition 
of performance improvisation will concentrate their efforts on 
the actual dynamics of the intertwinement in each individual 
'creativity'. Of special interest will be the degrees of 
negotiation between 'performance' and 'improvisation' as 
mentioned in the paragraphs above. 
Finally, it is when we have made a considerable progress in 
our attempts at exploring and unmasking the dynamics of the 
intertwinement that we will have firmly in our grasp a convincing 
definition of 'performance improvisation' which is no longer a 
mere interaction of 'performance' and 'improvisation' but has 
become an honest reflection of that quintessential quality 
treasured by all the writers of the materials we have read in 
this thesis and by others as well. The enormous range and the 
surprisingly subtle variety of 'creativities' that we have seen 
will continue to remind us that people indeed try out every 
possible means to seek the quintessence, which they consider more 
than merely worthwhile. 
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